forked from heavy-duty/box
docs(box-design): update isolation-stack names to the 0.4.0 rename
The Snapshots, ownership-rule, and Isolation sections still named the pre-0.4.0 stack (claudenet/claude-dev/claude-isolate) while the rest of the repo — README, host/setup-host.sh, host/box-firewall.sh — uses boxnet/box-net/ box-isolate. Rename the doc references to match ground truth: claudenet→boxnet, claude-dev→box-net (profile), claude-isolate→box-isolate (ACL). Stale wording only; the mechanism described is unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ snapshots, not a secrets store:
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- `box snapshot <n> [label]` — checkpoint after login + clone.
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- `box new --name <n2> --from <src>[/<snapshot>]` — clone an existing box
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or snapshot (authed state and all). Isolation is preserved: the clone keeps
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the `claude-dev` profile + `claudenet` + ACL.
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the `box-net` profile + `boxnet` + ACL.
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- `box restore <n> <snapshot>` — roll a box back to a checkpoint.
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Log in once → snapshot → spin up authed boxes from it.
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@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ forever — and wrapping them one at a time grows a worse `incus`. The rule:
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> **box owns a command when it must enforce an invariant Incus cannot see:**
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> the `user.box=1` boundary (never touch an instance we didn't mint), the
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> isolation stack (`claude-dev` profile + `claudenet` + ACL), or the creds-free
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> isolation stack (`box-net` profile + `boxnet` + ACL), or the creds-free
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> snapshot→clone workflow. Everything else is Incus's job.
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The rule cuts both ways, and that's the point:
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@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ warns and proceeds — from there the trust boundary is yours to keep.
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## Isolation
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Dedicated NAT bridge `claudenet` + Incus `claude-isolate` ACL dropping all
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Dedicated NAT bridge `boxnet` + Incus `box-isolate` ACL dropping all
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RFC1918/CGNAT/link-local egress, plus host-firewall rules blocking instance →
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host. Entry is `incus exec` over the local socket — no inbound path. The VM is
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the trust boundary.
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@ -104,12 +104,12 @@ the trust boundary.
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That last clause is the one that was assumed and turned out to be false, so it
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is spelled out here with the mechanism, and `drill/` tests it on every run.
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- **Box → host, LAN, RFC1918, CGNAT, link-local:** the `claude-isolate` ACL.
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- **Box → host, LAN, RFC1918, CGNAT, link-local:** the `box-isolate` ACL.
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- **Box → box: an nftables *bridge-family* rule** (`host/box-firewall.sh`).
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It cannot be an ACL rule. Two boxes on one bridge share an L2 segment, so
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their frames are *switched* between bridge ports and never traverse the
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netfilter path an L3 ACL lives on — the ACL looked airtight (it drops
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`10.0.0.0/8`, which contains `claudenet`) while box→box was in fact wide open.
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`10.0.0.0/8`, which contains `boxnet`) while box→box was in fact wide open.
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A live probe found box A's SYN arriving at box B. The bridge family's forward
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hook fires exactly on port-to-port frames, which on this bridge means box→box
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and nothing else: gateway traffic and routed egress are delivered locally, not
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