docs(box-design): update isolation-stack names to the 0.4.0 rename

The Snapshots, ownership-rule, and Isolation sections still named the
pre-0.4.0 stack (claudenet/claude-dev/claude-isolate) while the rest of the
repo — README, host/setup-host.sh, host/box-firewall.sh — uses boxnet/box-net/
box-isolate. Rename the doc references to match ground truth: claudenet→boxnet,
claude-dev→box-net (profile), claude-isolate→box-isolate (ACL). Stale wording
only; the mechanism described is unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
claude-hdb 2026-07-15 00:23:58 +00:00
parent 9fb2b8147c
commit aff68f5492

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@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ snapshots, not a secrets store:
- `box snapshot <n> [label]` — checkpoint after login + clone.
- `box new --name <n2> --from <src>[/<snapshot>]` — clone an existing box
or snapshot (authed state and all). Isolation is preserved: the clone keeps
the `claude-dev` profile + `claudenet` + ACL.
the `box-net` profile + `boxnet` + ACL.
- `box restore <n> <snapshot>` — roll a box back to a checkpoint.
Log in once → snapshot → spin up authed boxes from it.
@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ forever — and wrapping them one at a time grows a worse `incus`. The rule:
> **box owns a command when it must enforce an invariant Incus cannot see:**
> the `user.box=1` boundary (never touch an instance we didn't mint), the
> isolation stack (`claude-dev` profile + `claudenet` + ACL), or the creds-free
> isolation stack (`box-net` profile + `boxnet` + ACL), or the creds-free
> snapshot→clone workflow. Everything else is Incus's job.
The rule cuts both ways, and that's the point:
@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ warns and proceeds — from there the trust boundary is yours to keep.
## Isolation
Dedicated NAT bridge `claudenet` + Incus `claude-isolate` ACL dropping all
Dedicated NAT bridge `boxnet` + Incus `box-isolate` ACL dropping all
RFC1918/CGNAT/link-local egress, plus host-firewall rules blocking instance →
host. Entry is `incus exec` over the local socket — no inbound path. The VM is
the trust boundary.
@ -104,12 +104,12 @@ the trust boundary.
That last clause is the one that was assumed and turned out to be false, so it
is spelled out here with the mechanism, and `drill/` tests it on every run.
- **Box → host, LAN, RFC1918, CGNAT, link-local:** the `claude-isolate` ACL.
- **Box → host, LAN, RFC1918, CGNAT, link-local:** the `box-isolate` ACL.
- **Box → box: an nftables *bridge-family* rule** (`host/box-firewall.sh`).
It cannot be an ACL rule. Two boxes on one bridge share an L2 segment, so
their frames are *switched* between bridge ports and never traverse the
netfilter path an L3 ACL lives on — the ACL looked airtight (it drops
`10.0.0.0/8`, which contains `claudenet`) while box→box was in fact wide open.
`10.0.0.0/8`, which contains `boxnet`) while box→box was in fact wide open.
A live probe found box A's SYN arriving at box B. The bridge family's forward
hook fires exactly on port-to-port frames, which on this bridge means box→box
and nothing else: gateway traffic and routed egress are delivered locally, not