#!/usr/bin/env bash # multiuser.sh — the restricted-tier rehearsal (#74): does 'box grant' give a # plain incus-group user their own boxes, on the hardened boxnet, with no view # of anyone else's — measured live, from both sides of the socket? # # sudo BOX_MULTIUSER_REHEARSAL=1 bash drill/multiuser.sh --yes # # It creates two throwaway system users, grants them the tier through the real # 'box grant', mints real boxes as them, probes the isolation contract from # INSIDE those boxes, revokes one user, and deletes everything it made. Root # only, and opt-in twice (the env gate and the prompt): it edits the group # database and the daemon's project list, which is nothing to do casually. # # Criteria (a)-(f) are issue #74's acceptance gate, kept under their letters; # (g)-(l) are what the Task-0 findings added: the network CONTRACT is the # tier's whole point, so it is measured, never assumed. # # a. an incus-group user is auto-confined to their own project # b. they can box new / list / exec / snapshot / restore / clone their own box # c. they cannot see another user's boxes # d. the same box name in two projects does not collide # e. box expose refuses for them (daemon-global state) # f. box setup-host / box doctor answer with the honest restricted note # g. their boxes ride boxnet and carry the full isolation contract # h. the private incusbr- escape hatch is closed (boxnet is the ONLY network) # i. (folded into b: snapshot / restore / clone) # k. the grant survives an incus-user restart # l. box revoke --purge removes the user's world and touches nobody else's # m. a RAW attach to boxnet (no box-net profile) keeps every network- and # host-owned control — the scoped guarantee, measured (#75 review) # n. a grant that fails is fail-closed: fresh user backed out (verified), # pre-existing member warned loudly, re-run converges (#75 review) # # ok/no/note return 0 by design — the 'A && ok || no' idiom below is the # same one drill.sh is built on (and the reason for the SC2015 disable). # shellcheck disable=SC2015 set -u YES=0; KEEP=0; MODE=() for a in "$@"; do case "$a" in --yes) YES=1 ;; --keep) KEEP=1 ;; --container) MODE=(--container) ;; # CI / kvm-less hosts: don't wait on a VM *) echo "usage: sudo BOX_MULTIUSER_REHEARSAL=1 bash drill/multiuser.sh [--yes] [--container] [--keep]" >&2; exit 2 ;; esac done [ "${BOX_MULTIUSER_REHEARSAL:-}" = 1 ] || { echo "multiuser.sh: this rehearsal creates system users and edits the group database." >&2 echo "opt in explicitly: sudo BOX_MULTIUSER_REHEARSAL=1 bash drill/multiuser.sh --yes" >&2 exit 2 } [ "$(id -u)" -eq 0 ] || { echo "multiuser.sh: root only (it creates users and grants tiers)." >&2; exit 1; } command -v box >/dev/null || { echo "multiuser.sh: no 'box' on PATH — the tier needs the global install (#71): sudo bash install.sh" >&2; exit 1; } command -v incus >/dev/null || { echo "multiuser.sh: incus is not installed — box setup-host first." >&2; exit 1; } incus network show boxnet >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo "multiuser.sh: no boxnet — box setup-host first." >&2; exit 1; } if [ "$YES" -ne 1 ]; then [ -t 0 ] || { echo "multiuser.sh: no terminal to confirm on — pass --yes." >&2; exit 2; } printf 'multiuser.sh: create users %s/%s, grant them the tier, mint boxes as them, then delete it all? [y/N] ' boxdrill1 boxdrill2 read -r reply case "$reply" in y|Y|yes|YES|Yes) : ;; *) echo "aborted."; exit 1 ;; esac fi pass=0; fail=0; findings=(); audit=() ok() { printf ' \033[32mPASS\033[0m %s\n' "$*"; pass=$((pass+1)); } no() { printf ' \033[31mFAIL\033[0m %s\n' "$*"; fail=$((fail+1)); findings+=("FAIL: $*"); } note() { printf ' \033[33mNOTE\033[0m %s\n' "$*"; findings+=("NOTE: $*"); } inf() { printf ' %s\n' "$*"; } phase(){ printf '\n\033[1m══ %s\033[0m\n' "$*"; } aud() { audit+=("$*"); } U1=boxdrill1; U2=boxdrill2 # Run as a rehearsal user. runuser resets HOME/USER to the target (we are # root), and stdin is pinned: an incus with a terminal can go interactive and # wedge the run forever — the drill's oldest trap, honored here. as_u() { local u="$1"; shift; runuser -u "$u" -- "$@" local u="$1" b="$2" url="$3" out rc out="$(as_u "$u" timeout -k 5 30 incus exec "$b" -- curl -sS -m 15 -o /dev/null "$url" 2>&1)"; rc=$? # Silence + success is the only 'reachable': when the OUTER timeout kills a # wedged exec (the #26 shape), curl never spoke — empty output with rc 124 # must not read as an open door. case "$rc:$out" in 0:) echo reachable ;; *Connection\ refused*) echo refused ;; *) echo dropped ;; esac } # For probes whose PASS is "reachable": one retry. A nested-virt host can # blow a first TLS handshake on timing alone, and a rehearsal that cries # broken-egress over that teaches people to ignore it. Isolation probes never # retry — for them silence is the pass, and silence is not flaky. probe_up() { # probe_up local r; r="$(probe_from "$@")" [ "$r" = reachable ] || r="$(probe_from "$@")" echo "$r" } cleanup() { [ "$KEEP" = 1 ] && { echo "(--keep: users and boxes left for inspection)"; return; } echo echo "── cleanup" for u in "$U1" "$U2" boxdrill3 boxdrill4; do id "$u" >/dev/null 2>&1 || continue # A half-failed purge followed by userdel leaves a project owned by # nobody — and doctor's leftover check keys on the USER existing. Keep # the user when the purge fails, and name what survived. if BOX_YES=1 box revoke "$u" --purge >/dev/null 2>&1; then userdel -r "$u" >/dev/null 2>&1 id "$u" >/dev/null 2>&1 && echo " WARNING: user $u still exists" || echo " removed $u (tier, boxes, account)" else echo " WARNING: purge FAILED for $u — kept the account so 'box doctor' can name it; project user-$(id -u "$u") may survive" fi done } trap cleanup EXIT phase "G. the grant — box grant is the convergence, and it converges" for u in "$U1" "$U2"; do id "$u" >/dev/null 2>&1 || useradd -m -s /bin/bash "$u" done # Before any grant: a bare user has NO tier — the socket refuses them. This is # the baseline that makes everything after it meaningful. as_u "$U1" incus list >/dev/null 2>&1 \ && no "(a) $U1 reached the daemon BEFORE any grant — the socket is not confining" \ || ok "(a) before the grant, $U1 cannot reach the daemon at all" box grant "$U1" >/dev/null 2>&1 && ok "box grant $U1 exits 0" || no "box grant $U1 failed" box grant "$U2" >/dev/null 2>&1 && ok "box grant $U2 exits 0" || no "box grant $U2 failed" box grant "$U1" >/dev/null 2>&1 && ok "box grant is idempotent (re-run exits 0)" || no "box grant re-run failed" uid1="$(id -u "$U1")"; uid2="$(id -u "$U2")" p1="user-$uid1"; p2="user-$uid2" acc="$(incus project get "$p1" restricted.networks.access 2>/dev/null)" [ "$acc" = boxnet ] \ && ok "(h) $p1 is restricted to boxnet and ONLY boxnet" \ || no "(h) $p1 restricted.networks.access = '$acc' — the unhardened private bridge is still reachable" aud "h. restricted.networks.access after grant: '$acc' (the private incusbr-$uid1 is unreferenced)" snaps="$(incus project get "$p1" restricted.snapshots 2>/dev/null)" [ "$snaps" = allow ] && ok "snapshots allowed in $p1 (the clone workflow exists)" \ || no "restricted.snapshots = '$snaps' — box snapshot will refuse" incus --project "$p1" profile device get default eth0 type >/dev/null 2>&1 \ && no "(h) $p1's default profile still carries the private-bridge eth0" \ || ok "(h) $p1's default profile places no network — box-net is the only door" iso="$(incus --project "$p1" profile device get box-net eth0 security.port_isolation 2>/dev/null)" [ "$iso" = true ] && ok "box-net profile is in $p1, port_isolation true" \ || no "box-net profile in $p1 is wrong (port_isolation='$iso')" phase "a. confinement — each user lands in their own project, and only theirs" projects="$(as_u "$U1" incus project list --format csv 2>/dev/null | cut -d, -f1)" if [ "$(printf '%s\n' "$projects" | grep -c .)" = 1 ] && printf '%s' "$projects" | grep -q "$p1"; then ok "(a) $U1 sees exactly one project: their own ($p1)" else no "(a) $U1 sees: $(printf '%s' "$projects" | tr '\n' ' ') — confinement LEAKED, which vetoes the tier" fi as_u "$U1" incus list --project default >/dev/null 2>&1 \ && no "(a) $U1 can list the DEFAULT project — admin boxes are visible" \ || ok "(a) the default project refuses $U1" aud "a. incus-user confines: project list as $U1 = '$(printf '%s' "$projects" | tr '\n' ' ')'" phase "b. the lifecycle, as a restricted user — new/list/exec/snapshot/restore/clone/rm" # The mint's narration is kept and shown on failure — a FAIL that names # nothing is the drill's oldest sin. mintlog="$(mktemp)" # 1GiB / 2 cpus: a blank Debian needs no more, and the rehearsal runs TWO # boxes at once — on a small (or nested) rehearsal host, 2GiB apiece is the # difference between measuring isolation and measuring swap. if as_u "$U1" box new --name mine --template blank --cpu 2 --memory 1GiB "${MODE[@]}" >"$mintlog" 2>&1; then ok "(b) box new mine — minted" else no "(b) box new failed for $U1 (rc≠0) — its last words:" grep -v '^\.*$' "$mintlog" | tail -6 | sed 's/^/ /' fi rm -f "$mintlog" as_u "$U1" box list 2>/dev/null | grep -q '^mine ' && ok "(b) box list shows mine" || no "(b) box list does not show mine" as_u "$U1" box exec mine -- true >/dev/null 2>&1 && ok "(b) box exec mine -- true" || no "(b) box exec failed" as_u "$U1" box info mine 2>/dev/null | grep -q '10\.88\.' \ && ok "(g) box info shows a boxnet (10.88.x) address — placed on the hardened network" \ || no "(g) mine has no boxnet address in box info" as_u "$U1" box snapshot mine s1 >/dev/null 2>&1 && ok "(b) box snapshot mine s1" || no "(b) snapshot refused" as_u "$U1" box restore mine s1 >/dev/null 2>&1 && ok "(b) box restore mine s1 (the incus 6 'snapshot restore' spelling)" || no "(b) restore failed" as_u "$U1" box new --name c1 --from mine/s1 >/dev/null 2>&1 && ok "(b) box new --from mine/s1 — the clone workflow" || no "(b) clone failed" # c1 stays alive through phase g: it is the distinctly-NAMED sibling the # enumeration probe needs (both users' primaries are 'mine' by design of d). aud "b. full lifecycle exercised as $U1 through the real CLI" phase "d. same name, two users — projects mean no collision" as_u "$U2" box new --name mine --template blank --cpu 2 --memory 1GiB "${MODE[@]}" >/dev/null 2>&1 \ && ok "(d) $U2 minted their own 'mine' beside $U1's" \ || no "(d) $U2 could not mint 'mine' — names collide across users" phase "c. cross-visibility — each sees exactly their own" n1="$(as_u "$U1" box list 2>/dev/null | grep -c '^mine ')" n2="$(as_u "$U2" box list 2>/dev/null | grep -c '^mine ')" [ "$n1" = 1 ] && [ "$n2" = 1 ] \ && ok "(c) both users see exactly one 'mine' — their own" \ || no "(c) visibility leaked: $U1 sees $n1, $U2 sees $n2 — vetoes the tier" as_u "$U1" incus list --project "$p2" >/dev/null 2>&1 \ && no "(c) $U1 can list $U2's project" \ || ok "(c) $U2's project refuses $U1" aud "c. cross-user visibility: $U1=$n1 'mine', $U2=$n2 'mine', foreign project listing refused" phase "g. the isolation contract, measured from INSIDE the boxes" ip1="$(incus --project "$p1" list mine --format csv --columns 4 2>/dev/null | tr -d '"' | sed 's/ (.*//' | head -n1)" ip2="$(incus --project "$p2" list mine --format csv --columns 4 2>/dev/null | tr -d '"' | sed 's/ (.*//' | head -n1)" inf "$U1's mine: ${ip1:-} $U2's mine: ${ip2:-}" case "$ip1" in 10.88.*) ok "(g) $U1's box holds a boxnet lease" ;; *) no "(g) $U1's box is NOT on boxnet: '$ip1'" ;; esac r="$(probe_up "$U1" mine https://1.1.1.1)" [ "$r" = reachable ] && ok "(g) egress to the public internet works (curl 1.1.1.1: $r)" || no "(g) public egress broken: $r" as_u "$U1" timeout -k 5 20 incus exec mine -- getent hosts deb.debian.org >/dev/null 2>&1 \ && ok "(g) public DNS resolves (via the pinned resolver)" || no "(g) DNS broken inside the box" r="$(probe_from "$U1" mine "http://10.88.0.1:22")" [ "$r" = dropped ] && ok "(g) box → host is dropped (gateway :22: $r)" || no "(g) box can reach the HOST: $r" r="$(probe_from "$U1" mine "http://192.168.0.1")" [ "$r" = dropped ] && ok "(g) box → RFC1918 is dropped ($r)" || no "(g) box reaches private space: $r" if [ -n "$ip2" ]; then r="$(probe_from "$U1" mine "http://$ip2:9")" [ "$r" = dropped ] && ok "(g) $U1's box → $U2's box is DROPPED (cross-user sibling isolation)" \ || no "(g) cross-user box→box answered ($r) — a packet crossed the user boundary" aud "g. cross-user sibling probe $ip1 → $ip2: $r (silence is the pass; 'refused' would mean arrival)" else note "(g) no ip for $U2's box — sibling probe skipped" fi # Enumeration is probed with a SIBLING's name, never the box's own — a box # always resolves itself from /etc/hosts (cloud-init writes it), and reading # that as a gateway leak was this rehearsal's first false FAIL. c1 (U1's # clone, still alive) is the distinctly-named instance; U2's box asks. as_u "$U2" timeout -k 5 20 incus exec mine -- getent hosts c1 >/dev/null 2>&1 \ && no "(g) a box can resolve a sibling's name through the gateway (dns.mode leak)" \ || ok "(g) a sibling's name does not resolve (dns.mode=none holds for the tier)" as_u "$U1" box rm c1 --force >/dev/null 2>&1 && ok "(b) box rm c1" || no "(b) rm failed" v6="$(as_u "$U1" timeout -k 5 20 incus exec mine -- sh -c 'ip -6 addr show dev eth0 scope global 2>/dev/null' 2>/dev/null)" [ -z "$v6" ] && ok "(g) no global IPv6 inside the box (the IPv4-only contract)" \ || no "(g) the box holds a global IPv6 address — an uncovered egress path" phase "h. the escape hatches, tried and refused" # Each probe asserts more than a nonzero exit — an image hiccup or a name # collision also exits nonzero, and reading that as "the escape is closed" # is a false verdict wearing a green light (the drill has relearned this # enough times to earn a rule). For the attach, the incus ERROR WORDING # drifts between 6.0.x releases (6.0.4 refuses before "Launching", 6.0.0 # after — MU-4), so the assertion is the OUTCOME: nothing may end up running # on the private bridge, and the refusal line is printed as evidence. out="$(as_u "$U1" incus launch images:debian/13 esc --network "incusbr-$uid1" 2>&1)"; rc=$? st="$(incus --project "$p1" list esc --format csv --columns s 2>/dev/null | head -n1)" if [ "$rc" -eq 0 ] || [ "$st" = RUNNING ]; then no "(h) the private-bridge attach was NOT refused (rc=$rc, esc state: ${st:-none}):" printf '%s\n' "$out" | tail -3 | sed 's/^/ /' else ok "(h) attaching the private incusbr-$uid1 is refused (rc=$rc, nothing running on it)" inf "refusal: $(printf '%s\n' "$out" | grep -m1 -i 'error' || printf '%s\n' "$out" | tail -1)" fi as_u "$U1" incus delete -f esc >/dev/null 2>&1 out="$(as_u "$U1" incus project set "$p1" restricted.networks.access "boxnet,incusbr-$uid1" 2>&1)"; rc=$? if [ "$rc" -ne 0 ] && printf '%s' "$out" | grep -qi 'restricted'; then ok "(h) a restricted certificate cannot widen its own project" else no "(h) project-widen attempt: rc=$rc, said: $(printf '%s' "$out" | head -1)" fi out="$(as_u "$U1" incus network set boxnet dns.mode=managed 2>&1)"; rc=$? if [ "$rc" -ne 0 ] && printf '%s' "$out" | grep -qiE 'permission|restricted'; then ok "(h) boxnet's config refuses a restricted certificate" else no "(h) boxnet edit attempt: rc=$rc, said: $(printf '%s' "$out" | head -1)" fi phase "m. a raw attach to boxnet — the scoped guarantee, measured" # A restricted user CAN 'incus launch --network boxnet' without the box-net # profile: boxnet must be in restricted.networks.access for the profile to # work at all, and Incus has no allow-via-profile-only lever. What the raw # NIC loses is per-NIC security.port_isolation — the deliberately redundant # L2 twin of the host-owned nft bridge drop. Everything else binds to the # NETWORK (ACL, dns.mode=none, resolver pin) or the HOST (nft drop), so the # contract's claim for raw attachments is "every control except the # redundant per-NIC layer" — and a claim is a measurement here, not prose. # Same image the blank template mints (the /cloud variant): the plain image # has no DHCP client, so its raw instance holds NO lease — and against a # dead NIC every negative probe below "passes" vacuously while the contract # goes unmeasured. Caught on this criterion's first run (MU-5). rawout="$(as_u "$U1" incus launch images:debian/13/cloud esc2 --network boxnet 2>&1)"; rawrc=$? if [ "$rawrc" -ne 0 ]; then # Version fork, measured: 6.0.4 permits a restricted cert a raw --network # reference to an allowed network; 6.0.0 refuses it at the permission # layer. A refusal is not a broken probe — it is the STRONGEST of the # three resolutions (prevention): on such a daemon the bypass this # criterion measures cannot be expressed at all. Anything else (an image # error, a name collision) is a broken probe and says so with its log. if printf '%s' "$rawout" | grep -qiE 'permission|not allowed|restricted'; then ok "(m) raw attach to boxnet is REFUSED outright by this incus — prevention, the strongest resolution" inf "refusal: $(printf '%s\n' "$rawout" | grep -m1 -i 'error' || printf '%s\n' "$rawout" | tail -1)" aud "m. this incus version refuses raw --network for restricted certs; where permitted (6.0.4, MU-5) the raw NIC keeps every network- and host-owned control — both worlds measured" else no "(m) raw attach failed for a reason that is neither refusal nor success — unmeasured:" printf '%s\n' "$rawout" | tail -3 | sed 's/^/ /' fi else ok "(m) raw attach to boxnet launches (expected: the network must be usable for the profile to work)" ip_raw="" for _ in $(seq 1 45); do ip_raw="$(incus --project "$p1" list esc2 --format csv --columns 4 2>/dev/null | tr -d '"' | sed 's/ (.*//' | grep . | head -n1)" [ -n "$ip_raw" ] && as_u "$U1" timeout -k 5 15 incus exec esc2 -- true >/dev/null 2>&1 && break sleep 2 done inf "raw instance esc2: ${ip_raw:-}" if [ -z "$ip_raw" ]; then # Without an address the negative probes below would all pass vacuously # — a dead NIC drops everything, including the truth. no "(m) the raw instance never got a boxnet lease — the scoped guarantee went UNMEASURED" else r="$(probe_up "$U1" esc2 https://1.1.1.1)" [ "$r" = reachable ] && ok "(m) raw NIC: public egress works ($r)" || no "(m) raw NIC: egress broken: $r" r="$(probe_from "$U1" esc2 "http://192.168.0.1")" [ "$r" = dropped ] && ok "(m) raw NIC: RFC1918 still dropped (the ACL binds to the network, not the profile)" \ || no "(m) raw NIC: reaches private space ($r) — the ACL did not cover a raw attach" if [ -n "$ip2" ]; then r="$(probe_from "$U1" esc2 "http://$ip2:9")" [ "$r" = dropped ] && ok "(m) raw → another user's box is DROPPED (the nft drop is host-owned)" \ || no "(m) raw instance reached a sibling ($r) — the host drop did not cover it" fi r="$(probe_from "$U2" mine "http://$ip_raw:9")" [ "$r" = dropped ] && ok "(m) another user's box → raw is DROPPED (both directions hold)" \ || no "(m) a sibling reached the raw instance ($r)" as_u "$U1" timeout -k 5 20 incus exec esc2 -- getent hosts mine >/dev/null 2>&1 \ && no "(m) raw NIC can enumerate instance names (dns.mode leak)" \ || ok "(m) raw NIC: name enumeration still blocked (dns.mode=none is the network's)" fi as_u "$U1" incus delete -f esc2 >/dev/null 2>&1 aud "m. raw boxnet attach keeps ACL + nft drop + dns.mode (measured); loses only per-NIC port_isolation — the scoped guarantee in box-design.md" fi phase "e/f. the honest refusals — expose, setup-host, doctor" out="$(as_u "$U1" box expose mine 3000 2>&1)"; rc=$? [ "$rc" -ne 0 ] && printf '%s' "$out" | grep -qi restricted \ && ok "(e) box expose refuses with the restricted message (rc=$rc)" \ || no "(e) box expose: rc=$rc, said: $(printf '%s' "$out" | head -1)" out="$(as_u "$U1" box setup-host 2>&1)"; rc=$? [ "$rc" -eq 0 ] && printf '%s' "$out" | grep -q "restricted tier" \ && ok "(f) box setup-host: the honest note, exit 0" \ || no "(f) box setup-host as $U1: rc=$rc" out="$(as_u "$U1" box doctor 2>&1)"; rc=$? printf '%s' "$out" | grep -q "Access tier — restricted" \ && ok "(f) box doctor answers at the restricted tier (rc=$rc)" \ || no "(f) box doctor did not honor the tier (rc=$rc)" aud "e/f. expose refused; setup-host and doctor answer honestly at the tier" phase "k. the grant survives an incus-user restart (the re-sync question, #74)" systemctl restart incus-user.socket 2>/dev/null sleep 1 as_u "$U1" box list 2>/dev/null | grep -q '^mine ' \ && ok "(k) after restarting incus-user, $U1 still reaches their boxes" \ || no "(k) the restart broke $U1's access" acc="$(incus project get "$p1" restricted.networks.access 2>/dev/null)" [ "$acc" = boxnet ] && ok "(k) restricted.networks.access is still boxnet — nothing re-widened" \ || no "(k) the restart rewrote network access to '$acc'" aud "k. incus-user re-sync: convergence intact (matches its source: setup runs only at project creation)" phase "l. revoke — one user out, the other untouched" # Revocation's hard case is a user who is LOGGED IN: groups are read at # login, so a held session keeps the socket — and after a purge it could # touch incus-user and recreate the project with stock, unhardened defaults. # Hold a session open across the purge and demand it dies with the tier. runuser -u "$U2" -- sleep 300 /dev/null 2>&1 & sleep 1 BOX_YES=1 box revoke "$U2" --purge >/dev/null 2>&1 && ok "(l) box revoke $U2 --purge exits 0" || no "(l) revoke failed" pgrep -u "$U2" >/dev/null 2>&1 \ && no "(l) $U2 still has live processes after the purge — a stale session could recreate their project, unhardened" \ || ok "(l) the purge terminated $U2's held session (no stale-group path back in)" as_u "$U2" incus list >/dev/null 2>&1 \ && no "(l) $U2 still reaches the daemon after revoke" \ || ok "(l) $U2 is locked out" incus project show "$p2" >/dev/null 2>&1 \ && no "(l) $U2's project survived the purge" \ || ok "(l) $U2's project, boxes and bridge are gone" st="$(incus --project "$p1" list mine --format csv --columns s 2>/dev/null | head -n1)" [ "$st" = RUNNING ] && ok "(l) $U1's box is untouched and RUNNING through it all" \ || no "(l) $U1's box state after $U2's purge: '$st'" aud "l. revoke --purge is scoped: $U2 erased, $U1 unmoved" phase "n. a grant that fails is fail-closed — injected, both flavors" U3=boxdrill3; U4=boxdrill4 BOXROOT="$(dirname "$(dirname "$(readlink -f "$(command -v box)")")")" # Flavor 1: a FRESH user, fault injected at the LAST mutation (the profile # edit) — so the backout runs after every earlier mutation has landed. The # contract: nonzero exit, the group's absence VERIFIED, and a clean re-run # converges the partial state (which is what makes re-run-to-repair real). useradd -m -s /bin/bash "$U3" 2>/dev/null badroot="$(mktemp -d)" cp -r "$BOXROOT/." "$badroot/" echo 'devices: {' > "$badroot/profiles/box-net.yaml" # yaml that cannot load out="$(bash "$badroot/host/grant-user.sh" "$U3" 2>&1)"; rc=$? rm -rf "$badroot" if [ "$rc" -ne 0 ] && ! id -nG "$U3" | tr ' ' '\n' | grep -qx incus; then ok "(n) fresh-user grant failed at the last mutation → backed out, group absence verified (rc=$rc)" else no "(n) injected failure: rc=$rc, in-group=$(id -nG "$U3" | tr ' ' '\n' | grep -cx incus) — not fail-closed:" printf '%s\n' "$out" | tail -3 | sed 's/^/ /' fi printf '%s' "$out" | grep -q "verified against the group database" \ && ok "(n) the backout message claims only what it verified" \ || no "(n) the backout message is not the verified one" box grant "$U3" >/dev/null 2>&1 \ && ok "(n) a clean re-run converges the partial state left by the failure" \ || no "(n) re-run after injected failure did NOT converge" # Flavor 2: a PRE-EXISTING member (hand-added before box, the review's named # scenario) with an instance parked on the private bridge by an # instance-local NIC — narrowing must fail, the grant must fail LOUDLY # saying they retain socket access, and must NOT strip the membership this # run did not add. Unblock, re-run, converge. useradd -m -s /bin/bash "$U4" 2>/dev/null usermod -aG incus "$U4" as_u "$U4" incus project list >/dev/null 2>&1 # materialize their project # Stage the blocker with an INSTANCE-LOCAL NIC, the shape that actually # blocks narrowing (a profile-inherited NIC is detached by grant's own # eth0 removal — no conflict). A raw --network flag would do it on 6.0.4 # but 6.0.0 refuses that spelling for restricted certs (see criterion m); # 'device override' lifts their own stock profile NIC into the instance — # their instance, their config, permitted on both — same resulting state. stage="$(as_u "$U4" incus launch images:debian/13 blocker 2>&1)"; stagerc=$? [ "$stagerc" -eq 0 ] && { stage="$(as_u "$U4" incus config device override blocker eth0 2>&1)"; stagerc=$?; } if [ "$stagerc" -eq 0 ]; then out="$(box grant "$U4" 2>&1)"; rc=$? if [ "$rc" -ne 0 ] && printf '%s' "$out" | grep -q "still holding socket access"; then ok "(n) blocked narrowing fails LOUDLY, naming the retained access (rc=$rc)" else no "(n) blocked narrowing: rc=$rc — the loud contract is missing:" printf '%s\n' "$out" | tail -3 | sed 's/^/ /' fi id -nG "$U4" | tr ' ' '\n' | grep -qx incus \ && ok "(n) the pre-existing membership was NOT stripped by the failed re-grant" \ || no "(n) the failed grant stripped a membership it did not add" as_u "$U4" incus delete -f blocker >/dev/null 2>&1 box grant "$U4" >/dev/null 2>&1 \ && ok "(n) unblocked re-run converges" \ || no "(n) re-run after unblocking failed" else no "(n) could not stage the private-bridge blocker — the blocked-narrowing contract went unmeasured:" printf '%s\n' "$stage" | tail -3 | sed 's/^/ /' fi aud "n. fail-closed injections: fresh-user backout verified; pre-existing member warned, not stripped; re-runs converge" echo echo "════════════════════════════════════════════" echo " $pass passed, $fail failed" if [ "${#findings[@]}" -gt 0 ]; then echo; printf ' %s\n' "${findings[@]}" fi echo echo " #74 audit answers:" printf ' · %s\n' "${audit[@]}" echo [ "$fail" -eq 0 ] && echo " VERDICT: the restricted tier HOLDS — grant/confine/isolate/revoke, measured." \ || echo " VERDICT: the tier does NOT hold — see the findings." [ "$fail" -eq 0 ]