forked from heavy-duty/box
Review found two real problems, both confirmed by reproducing them. setup-host hardcoded 'sudo' for every privileged call, so install.sh's deliberate root branch — the one that proceeds when id -u is 0 even with no sudo installed — handed off to a script that died on 'sudo: command not found' before doing anything (exit 127, reproduced with env -i and a minimal PATH). The root path was nominal, not real. Privilege is now resolved once: nothing at UID 0, sudo otherwise, a clear error if neither is possible. Two things fell out of that. Root does not need incus-admin at all (UID 0 opens the socket regardless), so adding root to the group was a no-op that also missed the human — under 'sudo install.sh' that is SUDO_USER, who is now the one granted the group. And apt must not hang: install.sh runs setup-host with nobody watching, while a fresh cloud image holds the dpkg lock in apt-daily for its first minutes, so the calls are now bounded and non-interactive. The drill did not exercise any of this. It ran setup-host immediately after install.sh, so the stack existed by the drill's own hand and a run passed identically whether or not install.sh had done a thing — a fresh run converged three times while its messages still described the pre-#63 "first pass may only add you to the group" behaviour. It now asserts the post-install stack in-group, before the clean or anything else mutates the host, which is the assertion that actually proves #64. setup-host then runs exactly once more, after the clean — that one is load-bearing, since the clean deliberately unsets dns.mode and something has to converge it back. DRILL_OWNS_SETUP=1 hands sequencing back to the drill. Pre-setup tripwires now read before install.sh, because install.sh is what triggers setup now; read afterwards they said nothing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
217 lines
11 KiB
Bash
Executable file
217 lines
11 KiB
Bash
Executable file
#!/usr/bin/env bash
|
|
# One-time host setup: install Incus, create the isolated network + ACL and
|
|
# the box-net profile. Idempotent. Ubuntu 24.04 / Debian 13.
|
|
set -euo pipefail
|
|
|
|
self="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)/$(basename "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")"
|
|
here="$(dirname "$(dirname "$self")")"
|
|
|
|
# How we reach root, decided once. 'sudo' cannot be hardcoded: at UID 0 it is
|
|
# unnecessary, and on a minimal root image it is not installed at all — this
|
|
# script died on 'sudo: command not found' before doing anything, which made
|
|
# install.sh's deliberate root path unusable on exactly the hosts it was for.
|
|
if [ "$(id -u)" -eq 0 ]; then
|
|
SUDO=""
|
|
elif command -v sudo >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
|
SUDO="sudo"
|
|
else
|
|
echo "ERROR: host setup needs root and 'sudo' was not found." >&2
|
|
echo " re-run this as root: $self" >&2
|
|
exit 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# apt, unattended-safe. install.sh now runs us without a human watching, and
|
|
# a fresh cloud image has apt-daily/unattended-upgrades holding the dpkg lock
|
|
# for the first minutes of its life — plain 'apt-get install' then waits on it
|
|
# in complete silence, indefinitely. Bound the wait and never prompt.
|
|
# 'env', not a bare VAR=val prefix: bash recognises assignments at PARSE time,
|
|
# so with $SUDO empty (we are root) 'DEBIAN_FRONTEND=x apt-get' would have
|
|
# already been parsed as a plain word and bash would try to EXECUTE it —
|
|
# 'DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive: command not found'. env is immune.
|
|
apt_get() {
|
|
$SUDO env DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get -o DPkg::Lock::Timeout=300 "$@"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ! command -v incus >/dev/null; then
|
|
apt_get update
|
|
apt_get install -y incus
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [ "$(id -u)" -eq 0 ]; then
|
|
# Root needs no group: UID 0 opens /var/lib/incus/unix.socket regardless of
|
|
# who owns it, and there is nothing to re-exec into. The HUMAN needs it — and
|
|
# under 'sudo install.sh' that is SUDO_USER, not the root we are running as.
|
|
# Adding root to incus-admin would be a no-op that also left the actual user
|
|
# locked out of their own boxes.
|
|
# NOTE: 'id -nG "$name"' here is deliberate and NOT the bug fixed below. That
|
|
# bug was asking the DATABASE about our own process; this asks the database
|
|
# about someone else's account, which is the only thing it can be asked.
|
|
login_user="${SUDO_USER:-}"
|
|
if [ -n "$login_user" ] && [ "$login_user" != root ]; then
|
|
if ! id -nG "$login_user" | grep -qw incus-admin; then
|
|
usermod -aG incus-admin "$login_user"
|
|
echo "added $login_user to incus-admin — log out and back in for your shell to pick it up"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
# Group membership is a property of THIS PROCESS's credentials, not of the group
|
|
# database — and the two disagree for exactly as long as it matters here.
|
|
# 'id -nG "$USER"' names a user, so it reads /etc/group and reports incus-admin
|
|
# the instant usermod returns; the running shell's own credentials still lack
|
|
# it, because supplementary groups are fixed at login. So the old check passed
|
|
# on a same-session re-run, sailed into the incus calls below, and died on a
|
|
# permission error that named neither the group nor the re-login. Argless
|
|
# 'id -nG' asks the process what it actually holds, which is what incus checks
|
|
# when it opens /var/lib/incus/unix.socket.
|
|
elif ! id -nG | grep -qw incus-admin; then
|
|
$SUDO usermod -aG incus-admin "$USER"
|
|
# Then finish the job rather than adjourning it. Exiting 0 here was a
|
|
# success-shaped no-op: no boxnet, no ACL, no box-net profile, no firewall —
|
|
# and the burden of knowing that on the reader of a NOTE (#63). 'sg' runs us
|
|
# again with the new group in our credentials, no re-login, one invocation.
|
|
# The guard makes that at most one hop: if sg somehow lands without the
|
|
# group, we fail loudly instead of forking forever.
|
|
if [ -z "${BOX_SETUP_HOST_REEXEC:-}" ]; then
|
|
echo "added $USER to incus-admin — re-running under the new group (no re-login needed)"
|
|
export BOX_SETUP_HOST_REEXEC=1
|
|
exec sg incus-admin -c "$(printf '%q ' bash "$self" "$@")"
|
|
fi
|
|
echo "ERROR: still not in incus-admin after usermod + sg." >&2
|
|
echo " log out and back in, then re-run: box setup-host" >&2
|
|
exit 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Storage pool + base config (safe to re-run: skipped once the pool exists).
|
|
# NOT 'incus admin init --minimal': minimal picks the 'dir' backend, which has
|
|
# no copy-on-write — every snapshot and clone is a FULL copy of the box's root,
|
|
# several GB and minutes apiece once a box is provisioned, against a workflow
|
|
# whose whole point is "log in once, snapshot, clone forever" (#29). btrfs on
|
|
# a loop device gives CoW (near-instant, near-free clones) with no
|
|
# partitioning. The preseed mirrors exactly what --minimal creates (pool,
|
|
# incusbr0, default profile) with only the driver deliberate; dir remains the
|
|
# fallback so a host that cannot do btrfs still works — just slowly, and it
|
|
# says so.
|
|
if ! incus storage show default >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
|
driver=btrfs
|
|
command -v mkfs.btrfs >/dev/null 2>&1 || apt_get install -y btrfs-progs || driver=dir
|
|
if ! incus admin init --preseed <<PRESEED
|
|
storage_pools:
|
|
- name: default
|
|
driver: $driver
|
|
networks:
|
|
- name: incusbr0
|
|
type: bridge
|
|
profiles:
|
|
- name: default
|
|
devices:
|
|
root:
|
|
path: /
|
|
pool: default
|
|
type: disk
|
|
eth0:
|
|
name: eth0
|
|
network: incusbr0
|
|
type: nic
|
|
PRESEED
|
|
then
|
|
echo "storage: $driver preseed failed — falling back to --minimal (dir: every clone is a full disk copy)" >&2
|
|
incus admin init --minimal
|
|
fi
|
|
echo "storage: pool 'default' driver = $(incus storage show default | awk '/^driver:/ {print $2}')"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Isolated NAT network. IPv6 off: one less egress path to reason about.
|
|
# 10.88, not 10.87: a pre-rename host may still carry claudenet on 10.87 with
|
|
# legacy boxes attached — two bridges must not claim one subnet.
|
|
incus network show boxnet >/dev/null 2>&1 || incus network create boxnet \
|
|
ipv4.address=10.88.0.1/24 ipv4.nat=true ipv6.address=none
|
|
|
|
# ACL: default egress allow (internet), explicit drops for private space.
|
|
# Gateway carve-out first so instance DNS (dnsmasq on 10.88.0.1) survives.
|
|
if ! incus network acl show box-isolate >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
|
incus network acl create box-isolate
|
|
incus network acl rule add box-isolate egress action=allow destination=10.88.0.1/32
|
|
incus network acl rule add box-isolate egress action=drop destination=10.0.0.0/8
|
|
incus network acl rule add box-isolate egress action=drop destination=172.16.0.0/12
|
|
incus network acl rule add box-isolate egress action=drop destination=192.168.0.0/16
|
|
incus network acl rule add box-isolate egress action=drop destination=169.254.0.0/16
|
|
incus network acl rule add box-isolate egress action=drop destination=100.64.0.0/10
|
|
fi
|
|
incus network set boxnet security.acls=box-isolate \
|
|
security.acls.default.egress.action=allow \
|
|
security.acls.default.ingress.action=drop
|
|
|
|
# A box must not be able to ENUMERATE its siblings, either. dnsmasq on the
|
|
# gateway serves DNS (that carve-out is what makes egress resolution work) and
|
|
# it holds a record for every instance on the network — so 'getent hosts <box>'
|
|
# from inside one box resolved another's name and address. Connection blocked,
|
|
# reconnaissance wide open. dns.mode=none stops it registering instance records;
|
|
# forwarding for public names is unaffected (verified live).
|
|
incus network set boxnet dns.mode=none
|
|
|
|
# A box's resolver must not be a function of the host's VPN posture (#33).
|
|
# The bridge's dnsmasq forwards to whatever sits in the HOST's /etc/resolv.conf
|
|
# at that moment. On a Tailscale/VPN host that is MagicDNS: box DNS flaps with
|
|
# the tailnet (this is what killed cold mints), and tailnet peer names and
|
|
# split-DNS zones RESOLVE from inside a box — name-level reconnaissance of a
|
|
# private network, the same shape as the sibling enumeration closed above.
|
|
# no-resolv detaches dnsmasq from the host's resolver entirely; server= pins a
|
|
# stable public upstream (override: BOX_DNS="ip ip…"). raw.dnsmasq is the
|
|
# lever — the bridge has no first-class upstream key. Verified live on the
|
|
# drill host: pin applied, box resolves, cold mint survives.
|
|
BOX_DNS="${BOX_DNS:-1.1.1.1 8.8.8.8}"
|
|
incus network set boxnet raw.dnsmasq \
|
|
"$(printf 'no-resolv\n'; for s in $BOX_DNS; do printf 'server=%s\n' "$s"; done)"
|
|
|
|
# Sibling isolation itself is NOT an ACL rule — an L3 ACL never sees frames
|
|
# switched between two ports of one bridge. It lives in box-firewall.sh
|
|
# as an nftables bridge-family rule. See the comment there; it is the reason
|
|
# boxes cannot reach each other.
|
|
|
|
# IPv6 stays off (ipv6.address=none, above). Every rule in the ACL and every
|
|
# rule in the firewall is IPv4-only, so IPv6 would be an uncovered path, not a
|
|
# feature. That is a contract, not a default.
|
|
|
|
# --- Firewall coexistence ---------------------------------------------------
|
|
# Hosts running UFW (INPUT drop) and/or Docker (FORWARD drop) silently eat
|
|
# boxnet traffic. Punch minimal, ordered holes; the Incus ACL still layers
|
|
# on top. The trailing deny also blocks instance -> host's own (public) IPs,
|
|
# which the RFC1918-only ACL cannot express. Rules live in
|
|
# box-firewall.sh; a boot-time systemd unit re-applies the runtime-only
|
|
# parts (nft table, DOCKER-USER) after every reboot.
|
|
# The no-UFW path drives nft directly, and a stock Debian 13 cloud image ships
|
|
# neither nftables nor UFW — install the dependency we are about to use.
|
|
if ! command -v ufw >/dev/null 2>&1 && ! command -v nft >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
|
apt_get install -y nftables
|
|
fi
|
|
$SUDO install -m 755 "$here/host/box-firewall.sh" /usr/local/sbin/box-firewall
|
|
$SUDO install -m 644 "$here/host/box-firewall.service" /etc/systemd/system/
|
|
$SUDO systemctl daemon-reload
|
|
$SUDO systemctl enable box-firewall.service
|
|
# RESTART, not 'enable --now'. The unit is RemainAfterExit, so once it has run
|
|
# it stays "active" forever — and 'enable --now' does nothing to an active unit.
|
|
# Re-running setup-host after upgrading the tool therefore installed the new
|
|
# rules to /usr/local/sbin and never applied them: the host kept the old
|
|
# firewall, silently, and the box→box hole stayed open through a release that
|
|
# claimed to close it. Restart re-runs the script, which is idempotent by design.
|
|
$SUDO systemctl restart box-firewall.service
|
|
|
|
# Profile — box-net, the placement contract: the isolated NIC and the root
|
|
# disk, nothing a template controls (resources are stamped per-instance from
|
|
# the template at mint time). A legacy claude-dev profile is left alone:
|
|
# Incus refuses to delete an in-use profile, and pre-rename boxes reference
|
|
# it until their last one is gone — teardown-host removes it then.
|
|
if ! incus profile show box-net >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
|
incus profile create box-net
|
|
fi
|
|
incus profile edit box-net < "$here/profiles/box-net.yaml"
|
|
|
|
# The sibling drop is the one rule whose absence is invisible: everything keeps
|
|
# working, and boxes can simply reach each other. Assert it landed.
|
|
if $SUDO nft list table bridge box >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
|
echo "Isolation: box-to-box drop is live (nft bridge table 'box')."
|
|
else
|
|
echo "WARNING: the box-to-box drop is NOT active — boxes can reach each other." >&2
|
|
echo " check: sudo /usr/local/sbin/box-firewall ; sudo nft list table bridge box" >&2
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
echo "Host ready. Launch with: box new --name <box>"
|