The tool underneath was already generic: a thin, honest wrapper over Incus. What was Claude-specific was welded on — one image, one profile, one cloud-init file, one hardcoded 'sudo -u claude'. The weld is now a template. The mechanic: 'box new' stamps the template's identity onto the instance (user.box=1, user.box.template, user.box.user); shell/exec/ tmux read the user back off the instance, and 'incus copy' carries user.* keys (audit B2), so a clone knows what it is without consulting the template. Templates are box.env (parsed against a strict allowlist, never sourced — no key for a network exists, on purpose) plus a verbatim cloud-init. Every template launches with the shared box-net profile: the isolated NIC and root disk, nothing template-controlled — resources land per-instance from box.env, overridable via BOX_CPU/ BOX_MEMORY/BOX_DISK (which is also how the drill shrinks boxes on a small host now that profile edits can't). The three open calls, taken as recommended: clean cut at 0.4.0 (no claudebox shim; the installer retires the old symlink); default template = claude (muscle memory survives); repo stays heavy-duty/ claudebox, binary is box. Compat is the tag, not the name: resolve_box and list honor the legacy user.claudebox=1 forever, and the legacy tag maps to the claude user — a pre-rename box lists, shells, clones, unchanged. Deliberate divergence from #17's table: the host-stack resource names (claudenet, claude-isolate, nft tables, claudebox-firewall.*) are NOT renamed — they are host-internal, invisible to users, and renaming them breaks every provisioned host for zero user-visible gain. claude-dev is no longer created; setup-host creates box-net, teardown removes both. Closes #17 |
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| bin | ||
| docs | ||
| drill | ||
| host | ||
| profiles | ||
| templates | ||
| .gitignore | ||
| install.sh | ||
| LICENSE | ||
| README.md | ||
| VERSION | ||
claudebox — ships the box CLI
Headless, trust-less, throwaway dev VMs. One command mints a fresh,
network-isolated Incus box from a template; the flagship template is
claude — Debian 13 with Claude Code installed, the box this repo is named
for. The box is the product — you log in and work; destroying it loses
nothing you didn't push.
Strictly creds-free. A box ships with everything installed and no credentials — no Claude token, no git PAT, nothing. You authenticate interactively inside the box. The tool never stores or injects a secret. That means there's nothing shared or committed, so it's safe for multiple operators out of the box.
Templates set what's in the box, never what it can reach. A template is
image + user + resources + cloud-init; the network and every security flag
live in a shared profile no template can touch, so blank is a box with
nobody home — not a box with the safety off.
The tool knows nothing about your projects. You just git clone inside a
box. A repo can ship an optional .claudebox/
runbook that Claude Code reads and acts on — there is no install step and no
host-run setup. See docs/claudebox-design.md for the
design rationale.
0.4.0 renamed the CLI from
claudeboxtobox— a clean cut, no shim. Existing boxes minted by any earlier version keep working under every verb (their legacy tag is honored forever); only the old command name retired.
Install
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/heavy-duty/claudebox/main/install.sh | bash
Installs the tree to ~/.local/share/claudebox and links box onto your
PATH. Re-run any time to upgrade — upgrading from a pre-0.4.0 install also
retires the old claudebox symlink. (No git clone needed.)
One-time host setup (Ubuntu 24.04 / Debian 13)
~/.local/share/claudebox/host/setup-host.sh # run twice if it adds you to incus-admin (re-login between)
Idempotent. Installs Incus and creates the isolation stack: the claudenet NAT
bridge (sibling-name resolution off, resolver pinned to public upstreams —
BOX_DNS overrides), the claude-isolate ACL (drops all RFC1918/CGNAT/
link-local egress), the box-net profile (port-isolated NICs — boxes can't
reach each other), and firewall rules blocking instance → host. All rules
re-apply at boot via claudebox-firewall.service — no post-reboot ritual. If
the host lacks dnsmasq-base (Debian cloud images skip Recommends):
sudo apt-get install -y dnsmasq-base.
Quick start
box new --name work # mint a fresh, creds-free claude box (~10 min cold)
box shell work # enter as the template's user
Inside the box, authenticate as needed:
claude # then run /login — copy the URL (press c), open it
# in YOUR browser, paste the code back. No host CLI needed.
gh auth login # or drop a PAT in — your git credentials, your call
git clone https://github.com/you/project && cd project
claude # if the repo has .claudebox/, Claude reads it and sets up
Templates
The claude box is one template among several. A template is a directory under
templates/: a box.env (image, user, resources — parsed against a strict
allowlist, never sourced) and a user-data.yaml (cloud-init, passed to Incus
verbatim).
box templates # list what this install can mint
box new --name scratch --template blank # bare Debian: same isolation, no tooling
A template cannot name a network, a profile, or a security.* flag —
there is no key for them. Every box launches with the shared box-net
profile (the isolated NIC + root disk), so every template gets the identical
trust boundary. Resources come from the template's box.env;
BOX_CPU / BOX_MEMORY / BOX_DISK environment variables override them at
mint time. The template's identity (name, user) is stamped onto the instance,
so shell, exec and tmux land in the right user — and a clone still
knows, because incus copy carries the metadata.
Log in once, reuse via snapshots
Because every fresh box is creds-free, re-authenticating each time would be toil. Snapshot an authenticated box and clone from it instead:
box snapshot work authed # checkpoint after you've logged in
box new --name feature --from work/authed # clone the authed state into a new box
--from copies the whole box (Claude login, git creds, clones and all) while
preserving isolation. You can also box new --name x --from work to clone
a box's live state, or roll a box back with box restore work authed.
Forgotten what you called a checkpoint? box info work prints the box's
snapshot labels and the --from line to clone one.
Commands
box new --name <box> [--template <t>] [--from <src>[/<snap>]] [--vm|--container] [--remote r]
box templates # list the templates this install can mint
box list # list your boxes
box info <box> # one box: state, IP, snapshot labels
box shell <box> # enter as the template's user
box exec <box> -- <cmd...> # run a command in the box
box tmux <box> [session] # attach/create a tmux session — survives disconnects
box snapshot <box> [label] # checkpoint (label defaults to manual-<epoch>)
box restore <box> <snap> # roll back to a snapshot
box rename <box> <new> # rename a box (stop it first)
box down <box> # stop (state kept; `start` resumes)
box start <box> # start a stopped box
box rm <box> [--force] # delete the box + its snapshots (asks first)
box incus <box> -- <args...> # escape hatch: any incus command, box resolved
box doctor [--fix|--pin-dns] # is this host fit to mint boxes? diagnose from ground truth
box status # deprecated alias for `list`
box help [<command>] # full help, or one command's page
Every command takes --help, and options come after the command
(box list --json). Exit status: 0 ok, 1 it went wrong, 2 you asked
wrong.
new fresh-launches from a template (default: claude), or with --from
clones an existing box or snapshot. VM mode (--vm, the default where
/dev/kvm exists) is the trust-less target; container mode (auto-fallback,
security.nesting=true) is for hosts without nested virt — weaker isolation,
dev/test only.
Boxes are just Incus instances
A box is an ordinary Incus instance tagged user.box=1 (pre-0.4.0 boxes
carry user.claudebox=1, honored forever). box wraps the box lifecycle and the isolation model — not all of Incus. It owns a command
when it must enforce something Incus can't see: that tag (it will not stop,
rename or delete an instance it didn't mint), the isolation stack, or the
creds-free snapshot workflow. For everything else, there's the door:
box incus work -- config show # instance name appended
box incus work -- file push x.tar {}/tmp/ # or placed with {}
The box is resolved and tag-checked; the rest is passed to incus verbatim, and
the command is echoed before it runs. If it can move the box off the isolation
stack (profile, network, device, security.*), box warns and proceeds —
the trust boundary is then yours to keep. See
docs/claudebox-design.md for the rule and why the
command surface is a table.
Isolation
The contract: a box reaches the public internet and nothing else. Not the host, not your LAN, not another box, not even another box's name. What enforces it, layer by layer:
- Dedicated NAT bridge
claudenet, IPv6 off. Every rule below is IPv4-only, so IPv6 would be an uncovered path — off is part of the contract, not a default. claude-isolateACL — drops all egress to private space (RFC1918, CGNAT, link-local), with a single carve-out to the gateway so DNS works.- Sibling isolation, at L2 — two boxes on one bridge are switched,
never routed, so no L3 rule can separate them (learned the hard way; see
below).
security.port_isolationon every box NIC plus an nft bridge-family drop mean box A cannot exchange frames with box B at all. - No name-level reconnaissance —
dns.mode=nonestops the gateway resolving sibling names, and the bridge's resolver is pinned to public upstreams (no-resolv), so tailnet names and split-DNS zones from a host-level VPN don't resolve inside a box either. - Host firewall — instance → host is dropped except DNS/DHCP, including
the host's public IPs. Entry is
incus execover the local socket only — no inbound path exists.
The VM is the trust boundary: whatever runs inside — Claude, or anything a template ships — can run arbitrary code and touch nothing you care about.
Measured, not claimed
Every clause above is probed live by an end-to-end drill, because the one time this contract was reasoned about instead of measured, the reasoning was wrong: box→box traffic was "covered" by an L3 drop that L2-switched frames never meet — a hole found by probing, not by reading the rules. On a bare host the drill installs the whole stack, mints a box cold, snapshots and clones it, probes every boundary from inside the boxes, and removes what it minted — currently 47 checks, 47 passing. drill/RUNS.md is the full history, including every trap that fooled a run into a wrong verdict.
bash drill/doctor.sh # read-only: is this host healthy and the stack live?
bash drill/drill.sh # FULL end-to-end — mutates the host; use a machine you own
The doctor reads ground truth, not config claims — the kernel's isolated on
flag per bridge port, the process table, the resolver actually in use — and
diagnoses the host faults that have actually happened: a wedged Incus daemon,
a dnsmasq that silently isn't serving, a VPN resolver that boxes would
inherit.
Recipes: the .claudebox/ convention
A repo that wants to be easy to stand up in a box ships an optional .claudebox/
folder — a runbook Claude reads and follows (install deps, start services,
template env, seed data, smoke-test). It is agent-facing documentation, not a
host-executed script. See docs/claudebox-recipe.md.
Uninstall
~/.local/share/claudebox/host/teardown-host.sh # boxes, network, ACL, profile, firewall
~/.local/share/claudebox/host/teardown-host.sh --purge-incus # ...and Incus itself
rm -rf ~/.local/share/claudebox ~/.local/bin/box # the CLI
Non-goals
- No unattended/CI bring-up. The flow is interactive (log in, clone, ask Claude). Reproducible-by-construction provisioning is out of scope.
- No credential storage or injection by the tool. Boxes are creds-free; snapshots are the reuse mechanism, not a secrets store.