forked from heavy-duty/box
Review 4727756972 (A2): the backout no longer trusts gpasswd — it re-reads the live group database after removal; verified-absent gets the safe message, anything else screams ROLLBACK INCOMPLETE, exits nonzero, and names the exact remediation. The concurrent-login window (a session begun between usermod and backout keeps the group) is CLOSED to the extent the database can't reach: the backout detects live processes and names loginctl terminate-user, and the success wording claims only what was verified. Review 4727641752 (A1): a failed grant for a user whose membership predates the run (the hand-added-user scenario) now fails LOUDLY — they retain socket access on part-converged policy, and the message says so with both remediations (box revoke now, or fix and re-run). Their membership is not stripped: breaking a working user over a failed re-grant is its own hazard. The default-profile eth0 removal is deliberately not restored on failure — that mutation only reduces capability, and restoring it would move the failure state AWAY from fail-closed. Injected-failure coverage is criterion (n), both flavors: fresh-user backout (fault at the LAST mutation, so the rollback runs after every earlier one) with the group's absence verified and a converging re-run; blocked narrowing staged for real with an instance-local NIC parked on the private bridge. Review A3, resolution 3 with the measurement demanded: criterion (m) launches exactly 'incus launch --network boxnet' as the restricted user and probes the raw NIC from inside — egress works, RFC1918 dropped (the ACL is the network's), sibling probes dropped BOTH directions (the nft drop is the host's), name enumeration blocked. The scoped guarantee is now stated in box-design.md and measured on every run: box-minted instances carry per-NIC port_isolation; raw attachments keep every network- and host-owned control, losing only that redundant L2 layer. Instrument lesson kept as MU-5: the probe's first cut minted the non-cloud image — no DHCP client, no lease, and a dead NIC passes every negative probe vacuously; it now requires the lease before believing its own answers. Rehearsal: 54/54 (containers). test/cli.sh: 82 checks. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
202 lines
11 KiB
Bash
202 lines
11 KiB
Bash
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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# box grant <user> — give a host user the restricted tier (#74).
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#
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# The tier rides incus-user: the user lands in an auto-created project
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# user-<uid> and can only ever see their own instances. What incus-user does
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# NOT do is put them on box's hardened network — it auto-creates a private
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# bridge incusbr-<uid> (a plain NAT bridge: no ACL, no DNS isolation, IPv6 on,
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# none of box's contract) and pins the project to it. Measured on Debian 13 /
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# Incus 6.0.4; the full write-up is in docs/plans/2026-07-18-restricted-tier.md.
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#
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# So granting is a per-user CONVERGENCE, and it must be run by an admin:
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# 1. put the user in the 'incus' group (not incus-admin — that is the tier)
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# 2. touch incus-user AS the user, so the lazy project exists to converge
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# 3. unpin the private bridge (drop eth0 from the project's default profile)
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# 4. restrict the project's network access to boxnet and ONLY boxnet —
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# "boxnet,incusbr-<uid>" would leave an unhardened NAT bridge one
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# '--network' flag away from any box they mint
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# 5. allow snapshots (incus-user blocks them; box's clone workflow is built
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# on them)
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# 6. install the shipped box-net profile into their project
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#
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# Idempotent: every step converges, so re-running (including after a box
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# upgrade, to refresh the profile) is safe. incus-user never rewrites a
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# project it already created (verified against its source: setup is skipped
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# once the project exists and the user's certificate is trusted), so nothing
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# here is fighting a re-sync.
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set -euo pipefail
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self="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)/$(basename "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")"
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here="$(dirname "$(dirname "$self")")"
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usage() { echo "usage: box grant <user>" >&2; exit 2; }
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[ $# -eq 1 ] || usage
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user="$1"
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case "$user" in -*) usage ;; esac
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# Root, or sudo — same decision, same reasons as setup-host.sh: granting
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# needs usermod and a run-as-the-user touch, both root's to give.
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if [ "$(id -u)" -eq 0 ]; then
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SUDO=""
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elif command -v sudo >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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SUDO="sudo"
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else
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echo "ERROR: box grant needs root and 'sudo' was not found." >&2
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echo " re-run as root: $self $user" >&2
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exit 1
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fi
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# Run a command as the granted user. 'runuser' when we are root (sudo may not
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# exist there), sudo -u otherwise. -H so incus's client state lands in THEIR
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# home, not the admin's. stdin pinned: an incus client with a terminal on
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# stdin can go interactive and wedge a script that will never answer it.
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run_as() {
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local u="$1"; shift
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if [ -n "$SUDO" ]; then $SUDO -u "$u" -H -- "$@" </dev/null
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else runuser -u "$u" -- "$@" </dev/null
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fi
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}
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getent passwd "$user" >/dev/null || { echo "box grant: no such user: $user" >&2; exit 1; }
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uid="$(id -u "$user")"
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[ "$uid" -eq 0 ] && { echo "box grant: root does not need a tier — UID 0 owns the daemon socket outright." >&2; exit 1; }
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# An incus-admin member already holds the full socket; "granting" them the
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# restricted tier would not restrict anything (admin membership wins at the
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# socket), it would only mislead whoever reads the group list later.
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if id -nG "$user" | tr ' ' '\n' | grep -qx incus-admin; then
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echo "box grant: $user is in incus-admin — they already have the admin tier; there is nothing tighter to grant." >&2
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exit 1
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fi
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# The stack the tier converges ONTO must exist first. Checked via the daemon,
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# not config files: setup-host is the only thing that builds boxnet.
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incus network show boxnet >/dev/null 2>&1 </dev/null \
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|| { echo "box grant: no boxnet on this host — build the stack first: box setup-host" >&2; exit 1; }
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# incus-user is the mechanism under the whole tier. Debian 13 and Ubuntu 24.04
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# ship it in the incus package; a host without it cannot hold this tier at all.
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if ! systemctl is-active --quiet incus-user.socket; then
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$SUDO systemctl enable --now incus-user.socket 2>/dev/null \
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|| { echo "box grant: incus-user.socket is not available — this Incus cannot serve the restricted tier (see #74)." >&2; exit 1; }
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fi
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# 1. The group. 'incus' is the restricted socket; membership takes effect at
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# the user's next login, but run_as below starts a fresh process with the
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# database's groups, so the grant itself never waits on a re-login.
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#
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# If THIS run granted the group and a later step fails, take it back on the
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# way out: a half-granted user would otherwise hold live socket access to an
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# UN-NARROWED project — the stock unhardened bridge attachable — until an
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# admin re-runs. Backing out the group closes that window completely for a
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# fresh grant (their existing sessions predate the membership, so no process
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# holds it yet). A user who was already in the group keeps it: not ours to
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# take on a re-run's failure.
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added_group=0; was_member=0
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backout() {
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if [ "$added_group" -eq 1 ]; then
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$SUDO gpasswd -d "$user" incus >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
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# VERIFY the removal — an unverified rollback printing a security
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# guarantee is a lie waiting for its day. Exact-token match, live DB.
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if id -nG "$user" 2>/dev/null | tr ' ' '\n' | grep -qx incus; then
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echo "box grant: ROLLBACK INCOMPLETE — the grant failed AND $user is still in the 'incus' group." >&2
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echo " remove it by hand NOW: gpasswd -d $user incus (then fix the cause and re-run)" >&2
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exit 1
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fi
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echo "box grant: FAILED — removed $user from 'incus' again (verified against the group database); fix the cause and re-run" >&2
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# The one window the database cannot close: a login STARTED between our
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# usermod and this backout keeps the group in its session credentials.
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# For a fresh grant that is a rare race, but rare is not never — name it
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# and the remedy instead of overclaiming.
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if pgrep -u "$user" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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echo "box grant: NOTE — $user has live processes; a session begun during this grant would still hold" >&2
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echo " the group until it ends: sudo loginctl terminate-user $user" >&2
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fi
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elif [ "$was_member" -eq 1 ]; then
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# A user who was ALREADY in the group keeps it — stripping a membership
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# this run did not add could break a working user over a failed re-run.
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# But silence here would leave them holding a socket onto part-converged
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# policy without the admin being told. Loud, with both remediations.
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echo "box grant: FAILED with $user still holding socket access (their membership predates this run)." >&2
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echo " their project may be part-converged — harmless in itself, and a re-run converges the rest." >&2
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echo " if their access is not acceptable while you fix the cause: box revoke $user" >&2
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fi
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}
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trap backout EXIT
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if id -nG "$user" | tr ' ' '\n' | grep -qx incus; then
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was_member=1
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echo "group: $user already in 'incus'"
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else
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$SUDO usermod -aG incus "$user"
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added_group=1
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echo "group: added $user to 'incus' (their next login picks it up; the grant does not wait)"
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fi
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project="user-$uid"
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# 2. The project is created LAZILY, on the user's first contact with
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# incus-user — an admin cannot pre-create it (incus-user would fight over
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# it), so make that first contact happen now, as the user.
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if ! incus project show "$project" >/dev/null 2>&1 </dev/null; then
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echo "project: touching incus-user as $user to create $project..."
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run_as "$user" timeout 60 incus project list >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
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incus project show "$project" >/dev/null 2>&1 </dev/null \
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|| { echo "box grant: incus-user did not create $project — is incus-user.socket healthy? (journalctl -u incus-user)" >&2; exit 1; }
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echo "project: $project created"
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else
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echo "project: $project already exists"
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fi
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# 3. Unpin the private bridge. incus-user's default profile carries an eth0
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# on incusbr-<uid>; while ANY profile references that bridge, the narrowing
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# below is rejected by incus's own validation. Removing the device is also
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# what it looks like: the default profile in this project places no network —
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# box-net is the only door, which is the placement contract working.
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if incus --project "$project" profile device get default eth0 type >/dev/null 2>&1 </dev/null; then
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incus --project "$project" profile device remove default eth0 >/dev/null </dev/null
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echo "profile: removed the private-bridge eth0 from $project's default profile"
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fi
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# 4. boxnet, and ONLY boxnet. The auto-created incusbr-<uid> is a stock NAT
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# bridge with none of box's hardening — listing it here would keep a
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# one-flag escape from the isolation contract open forever. Narrowed, the
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# hardened network is not the default placement but the only one possible.
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# This can fail honestly: an instance the user already parked on the private
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# bridge blocks the narrowing, and incus's error names it.
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if ! err="$(incus project set "$project" restricted.networks.access boxnet 2>&1 </dev/null)"; then
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echo "box grant: could not restrict $project to boxnet:" >&2
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echo " $err" >&2
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echo " (an instance still on the private bridge blocks this — move or delete it, then re-run)" >&2
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exit 1
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fi
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# The private bridge's name follows incus-user's own rule (revoke-user.sh
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# mirrors it too): incusbr-<uid>, or user-<uid> when that would not fit an
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# interface name — naming the wrong one here would be a true claim with the
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# wrong noun on big-uid (SSSD/AD) hosts.
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bridge="incusbr-$uid"; [ "${#bridge}" -gt 15 ] && bridge="user-$uid"
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echo "network: $project restricted to boxnet (the private $bridge is unreferenced and unreachable)"
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# 5. Snapshots. incus-user projects block them by default, and box's whole
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# reuse story — log in once, snapshot, clone forever — is snapshots.
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incus project set "$project" restricted.snapshots allow </dev/null
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echo "snapshots: allowed"
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# 6. The placement contract itself, installed into their project. Created if
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# missing, refreshed unconditionally — same convergence discipline as
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# setup-host's own profile handling, so a box upgrade propagates by re-run.
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incus --project "$project" profile show box-net >/dev/null 2>&1 </dev/null \
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|| incus --project "$project" profile create box-net >/dev/null </dev/null
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incus --project "$project" profile edit box-net < "$here/profiles/box-net.yaml"
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echo "profile: box-net installed in $project"
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# Prove the grant from the USER's side of the socket — the only side that
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# matters. This catches the failure the steps above cannot see one at a time:
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# a converged project the user still cannot reach.
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run_as "$user" timeout 30 incus profile show box-net >/dev/null 2>&1 \
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|| { echo "box grant: converged, but $user cannot see the box-net profile through incus-user — check journalctl -u incus-user" >&2; exit 1; }
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trap - EXIT # converged and verified: the grant stands
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echo "granted: $user has the restricted tier — their 'box new' lands on the hardened boxnet."
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echo " (their boxes are theirs alone; 'box revoke $user' takes the tier back)"
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