Self-review of the whole head after the panel converged. One real defect,
reproduced verbatim before it was touched.
runner_version_of is a pipeline, and every forgejo-runner-* command runs under
set -euo pipefail. When the binary exits non-zero the pipeline fails, and
`PRESENT_VER="$(runner_version_of "$BIN")"` is an ASSIGNMENT — so install died
at that line, exit 1, printing nothing at all. The lib documented the opposite
("empty when it cannot answer"), and the refusal written for exactly this case
twenty lines later — "the download landed but cannot run" — was unreachable
code that could never have fired.
The shape is not hypothetical. `[ -x ]` yes, runnable no is what a truncated or
wrong-arch download leaves behind, and a ci-box's template preinstalls the
binary at mint — so the silent death sat on the one path this command family
exists to serve.
json_field, two files away, already carries `|| true` with this reasoning
written above it: "callers run under set -e with pipefail, where a grep that
matches nothing would otherwise kill the script with no message". The same
guard, for the same reason, at both sites: the lib reader and install's own
read of --version.
The test could not have caught it. vparse drove the lib through `bash -c` with
NO shell options, and its "bad" stub exits 0 — it proved garbage-in-empty-out
in a permissive shell, which is not where the function is used. vparse now runs
under set -euo pipefail, and a stub that exits non-zero is a third row.
Mutation-checked: that row exits 1 against the unpatched lib and 0 against the
fixed one. Install's site is grep-pinned, since reaching it for real needs root
and a downloaded binary.
748 passed (was 746), release 31, drill 43, shellcheck clean.
Three defects from review !110, all the same family — a stated contract the
code did not keep.
--version was swallowed on the path this command exists for. The download
block skipped on mere presence, copying runner-install.sh's shape without its
justification: actions/runner SELF-UPDATES, so freezing it would only make
GitHub refuse its jobs. forgejo-runner does not self-update, so nothing else
ever moves the version — and a ci-box's template preinstalls the binary at
mint, which meant the documented deterministic-pin lever could never fire on a
ci-box. It now converges toward the pin, downward included, because a pin is
an instruction and not a floor; absent a pin an existing binary is left alone,
since chasing latest would make a re-run an unrequested upgrade. The decision
moved to runner_download_decision in the lib as a pure function: the first
attempt at a test here grepped for a log string and survived the logic being
disabled, which is exactly the weak test the review warned about. The binary
is now renamed into place rather than written over — the converge path runs
while the daemon is live, and in-place is ETXTBSY.
.rig-labels outlived the registration it described. The write had escaped the
registration branch, where runner-install.sh correctly keeps its copy, so a
plain re-run stamped this invocation's labels over a registration made with
different ones and status then reported confidently wrong labels while Forgejo
still held the originals. Scoped again, and an EXPLICIT --labels on a re-run
now warns that Forgejo owns labels from registration time rather than letting
the request evaporate silently.
The checksum gate failed open. A missing .sha256 warned and installed anyway,
contradicting both the README and the template's own comment about unverified
root downloads. The original reasoning — do not let an upstream layout change
break installs — reasons about the wrong failure: a layout change breaks the
BINARY url too, so "binary yes, checksum no" is the shape of an interfered
fetch, which is precisely what the checksum exists to catch. Both paths refuse
now, with no bypass flag; if upstream really moves its assets that is a rig PR
editing the URL, not an operator improvising past a security gate.
Tests: the checksum paths are now DRIVEN against a stub curl through the real
template install.sh — matching, missing, mismatched and empty — instead of
grepped, and all three fixes were mutation-checked by reverting each and
confirming the suite goes red.
739/31/43 pass, shellcheck clean.
forgejo#109
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
rig's CI story was GitHub-shaped end to end. This makes it work against a
self-hosted Forgejo, in three pieces.
The registry fetch becomes forge-aware. templates_resolve hardcoded three
github.com archive URLs; RIG_TEMPLATES_HOST now selects the grammar, because
the forges genuinely differ — GitHub serves refs/tags, refs/heads and bare
paths, Forgejo serves exactly one, and emitting the other two there would mean
two guaranteed 404s per fetch and a failure message listing URLs that never
could have worked. Measured against forgejo.heavyduty.builders, not inferred.
The default stays GitHub, so every existing caller is unchanged. install.sh's
snapshot reads the same variable through a byte-identical copy of the builder,
diffed by the tests: a snapshot cached from a forge converge would never fetch
from is worse than no snapshot, and the pin-in-the-name staleness guard cannot
catch a wrong-ORIGIN snapshot, only an old one.
ci-box is a tenant, not a machine role. The topology is a fleet machine
hosting boxes, one of which runs CI — a '-box' guest by rig's own family rule.
That also deletes the docker-in-docker layer the usual setup needs:
bootstrap-tenant.sh already installs Docker and adds the tenant user to the
group, and the isolation a privileged dind sidecar buys is already paid for by
a box that is network-isolated, inbound-less and disposable. rig runner
install refuses Docker for good reason — it converges a MACHINE, where the
blast radius is the machine. Here it is a guest that gets thrown away.
rig forgejo-runner is a new family beside rig runner, which is untouched.
Forgejo registers against an INSTANCE and the token carries the scope, so
there is no --repo to converge toward and nothing to compare; folding that
into one command would make every guard bimodal to share a flag name while the
contract underneath differs. assert_runner_instance asks the same
trust-boundary question about the axis Forgejo actually has. There is no
repoint and no --local, and both absences are explained where an operator
arriving from the GitHub sibling will hit them.
Forgejo's .runner holds the runner's own long-lived token, unlike GitHub's, so
it is installed 0600 and the mode is re-asserted on every converge — a mode
that drifted leaks the secret silently, since nothing fails and the runner
keeps working. status reports it and never prints the token.
Both downloads verify the published .sha256 before installing: this binary
lands as root and is executed by a systemd unit.
bootstrap --undo learns the guard for the same hazard on the other forge, and
it matters more here — Forgejo has no deregistration endpoint, so the ghost it
would strand has to be deleted by hand.
Known prerequisite, documented rather than assumed: the fetch is
unauthenticated by contract, and a Forgejo with REQUIRE_SIGNIN_VIEW=true
answers 404 for repos it reports as public. Hosting a registry there needs
FORGEJO__service__REQUIRE_SIGNIN_VIEW=false. The refusal names that case,
because it is indistinguishable from a wrong ref.
forgejo#109
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
json_string_array took the first "Tags" array anywhere in the document,
justified by Self-before-Peer field order. An untagged Self omits the key
entirely (Go omitempty), so the match fell through into Peer and returned
a peer's tag — false-refusing every login join and false-verifying
untagged authkey joins on any tailnet with a tagged node. Extract Self by
brace counting (Location nests an object, so slicing to the next key
would truncate) and read the array inside it.
Refs #160
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The security-trade paragraph lands verbatim in the README (its twin is in
rig-templates' README, per the issue's docs task), with the 2026-07-24
ruling recorded in place.
bootstrap-tenant.sh is one mechanism parameterized by a registry definition
(template.env parsed against the allowlist, install.sh run as root with the
tenant in its environment, creds.md spliced into the shared context
skeleton). staging-box stays in-tree — mechanism-adjacent, no agent. The
dispatch in bootstrap.sh moves to the '-box' family-suffix rule so a
template added to the registry is mintable with zero code changes here; an
unknown role's refusal lists what the resolved source actually contains,
naming the source. lib/tenant-config.sh — the per-tenant case-arm table —
is deleted: the hard cut, #76's discipline.
The role-template registry moves out of rig's tree (heavy-duty/rig-templates,
ruled 2026-07-24: pinned to the rig version by default, overridable per mint).
This is the schema-and-resolution half rig keeps: RIG_TEMPLATES_DIR >
RIG_TEMPLATES_REF > the in-tree RIG_TEMPLATES_PIN (the BOX_RELEASE
discipline), template.env parsed against an allowlist and never sourced,
every refusal naming the failing key, and the lint the registry repo's CI
will run on every definition.
The pin currently names the registry's pre-seed head; it bumps to the seeded
tree in this PR's course (the seed PR is the other half of the build task).
The fourth agent tenant, through the one parameterized mechanism
(lib/tenant-config.sh + bootstrap-tenant.sh) — never a fifth
hand-maintained copy. The official installer (code.kimi.com/install.sh)
is uv-managed and lands kimi in ~/.local/bin, run as the tenant user
(grok's lesson: a root-owned install under a 0700 home is a CLI that
exists and cannot run); no node, uv brings its own Python. The context
file lands at ~/.kimi/AGENTS.md — the <dotdir>/AGENTS.md convention —
with an honest note that kimi documents only project-level AGENTS.md
today.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
`sshd -t` folds two questions into one exit code — is the merged config
parseable, and is the privilege-separation directory there. Both call
sites ran it as `sshd -t 2>/dev/null` and read any non-zero exit as the
first question's answer, discarding the line that named the second.
Bootstrap aborted with "sshd rejects the merged config", a verdict sshd
never reached, and sent the operator to audit /etc/ssh files that were
never broken. /run is a tmpfs and /run/sshd is ssh.service's
RuntimeDirectory, so it is legitimately absent under socket activation
on a box whose SSH door is serving connections normally.
Classification is now a pure, sourceable sshd_privsep_gap: the status is
the verdict, the text only classifies a failure, so a passing sshd -t is
never diverted. sshd_config_ok repairs the gap with an idempotent
install -d and retests once. A genuine parse refusal still refuses and
the rollback is untouched.
Refusals now carry sshd's own stderr. users-close-root had the identical
three lines and now reaches the shared judgement through lib/sshd.sh
instead of keeping a second copy of it.
Fixes#92
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
manifest_value, manifest_has and manifest_foreign each read the file with a
bare `while read`, which stops at EOF without ever handing over a populated
partial line. An unterminated final line therefore read as ABSENT — and
absent is exactly the input both convergence rules key off, so the file's
last line was the one least able to survive the miss.
Three failures, in descending order of how much they cost:
- A file truncated mid-write ends AT bootstrapped_at, so the unreadable line
is the birth stamp itself. Rule 1 saw no at-stamp and regenerated the pair
as now() — overwriting the one field that can never be reconstructed. A
fixture born 2020-01-01 came back stamped with the current clock.
- A whole file whose last line is converged_at read as empty, so Rule 2's
one-time repair re-fired on EVERY run: the render stopped being a function
of (existing file, running version) and the clock reached the file after
all. This is the crux property of the feature, broken by a missing byte.
- manifest_foreign dropped an unterminated foreign line entirely, so the
writer ate a later command's provenance — the exact preservation contract
the function exists to keep.
The idiom is the repo's own: lib/users-config.sh:49 reads
`|| [ -n "$line" ]` for the same reason.
Reading the line correctly also repairs the file, since the rewritten copy
is newline-terminated — asserted as "the source plus the newline it was
missing, and nothing else", because a plain ends-in-newline check stays
green on an implementation that drops the final line.
7 tests, each observed RED against the unfixed reader.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A rig-managed machine recorded nothing about its own provenance. The entire
durable output of a bootstrap run was one line in /etc/rig/role, and that line
says what the box IS, never what built it. VERSION was read in exactly one
place (bin/rig:9, for --version) and reports the currently INSTALLED tree, not
the one that ran; there was no timestamp anywhere in the codebase.
bootstrap now stamps a second file beside the marker: schema=1, a birth pair
(bootstrapped_by/_at, pinned forever) and a latest pair (converged_by/_at).
key=value, one per line, 0644 — the one file that must stay readable on the
most broken machine in the fleet, where there is no YAML parser and no jq.
`rig manifest [<key>]` reads it back.
Only DECIDED facts go in, which is what keeps bootstrap.sh:3's convergence
contract intact: bootstrapped_* is first-write-wins, and converged_* updates
only when the version actually differs — it is the time the converging version
last changed, not the time of the last run. The renderer is pure, so a re-run
by the same rig is byte-identical no matter where the clock is, and the
cmp-guard stays silent. OBSERVED facts (cores, RAM, disk, kernel) stay out:
they go stale on their own and belong to `rig platform` (#64).
/etc/rig/role is untouched.
Closes#61
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Caught in review. root_door_of matched unanchored substrings, so any value
that EXTENDS a real one resolved as that value: `root-door=closedish` read as
`closed` and PASSED close-root's gate -- the one arm in this repo that
authorizes an irreversible act -- and `class=humanoid` did the same through
the compat arm. Both contradicted the function's own header, which promises a
value outside the set resolves empty and fails closed.
Only reachable by hand-editing a marker, so it was never a live incident. It
gets fixed anyway because this is the single function every consumer trusts --
close-root's gate, apply's root-SSH note, and bootstrap-tenant's machine
guard all ask it -- and a resolver that is nearly right about a root door is
the wrong kind of nearly.
The marker is one line of space-separated key=value fields (bootstrap writes
it with a single printf), so padding both ends and matching on field
boundaries is exact rather than heuristic. Whitespace is normalised first so a
hand-edit using tabs still reads correctly -- anchoring must not trade one
silent misread for another.
BOTH vocabularies are anchored. Fixing only the current spelling would have
left the hole open on every box bootstrapped before #77, which is precisely
the population the compat arm exists to serve.
Tests pin the resolver and the end-to-end refusal, since the resolver
returning "" is only safe because consumers treat it as one. Reverting the
anchoring turns the suite red (447/4); restoring it returns 451/0. The
original compat proof still holds: removing the class= arm gives 441/10.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The trait was named for who lives on a box; what it decides is whether
root SSH stays open as the control plane's automation door. Those are
different questions, and `dev-server` proved it: an unattended VM-host
appliance nobody lives on, correctly class=human because its root door
must close. After #76 gave `-server` the job of naming the machine
family, that box carried a suffix saying server and a trait saying
human. `dev-server --root-door closed` says what is true, once.
Unlike #76's role rename this field is read back on live machines, so
the compat read is mandatory rather than courteous: one resolver,
root_door_of, reads both vocabularies and every consumer goes through
it — close-root's gate, apply's note, and bootstrap-tenant's
machine-marker guard, which used the presence of `class=` as its "is
this a real fleet machine?" test and would otherwise have let a tenant
converge clobber a live box. New markers are written as `root-door=`
only. Markers carrying both fields in disagreement, or neither, fail
closed with a re-run-bootstrap repair.
Fixture markers are kept deliberately at the retired spelling (the
convention #76's pre-rename-cp fixture established) and pinned at both
consumers; deleting the compat arm turns ten checks red.
Closes#77
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The other half of #76. claude -> claude-box, codex -> codex-box, grok ->
grok-box, staging -> staging-box, so a role name always says which family it
belongs to: -server builds a fleet machine, -box converges a guest a box
minted. With both halves in, the two families can no longer collide on a
word the way `staging` did.
The role carries the suffix; nothing inside the guest does. A tenant user is
the account the box SEED created (BOX_USER) and each agent CLI reads its own
dotdir, so claude-box still converges the `claude` user and still writes
~/.claude/CLAUDE.md. Every rename here is a $ROLE comparison or a case arm --
no CLI binary name, no dotdir path, and no account moved. README's tenant
table now shows role and user in adjacent columns, because that distinction
stopped being cosmetic the moment they differed.
Hard cut, no aliases. The old names are refused as unknown at BOTH
entrypoints -- `rig bootstrap <name>` and bootstrap-tenant.sh directly -- and
the suite asserts each of the four at each, because bootstrap.sh keeps its
own dispatch list and a name could survive in one and not the other. An alias
left in for a single tenant is the shape that survives review: the taxonomy
reads complete while one old name still quietly converges.
The consequence is cross-repo. A seed carrying BOX_BOOTSTRAP_ROLE="claude"
now fails its own mint-time bootstrap, so heavy-duty/box#123 updates the
seeds and must land after this.
Closes#76 (tenant half)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
users apply consulted the host= trait only when group incus was ABSENT,
so a host=no or marker-less box that nonetheless carried the group handed
box-role users a bare `usermod -aG incus` — the socket with no tier, which
incus-user answers by lazily building an unhardened project under whoever
opens it.
The marker now decides in both directions through one pure gate,
assert_marker_hosts_vms, so the verdict is identical whether or not the
group exists. The marker wins over the machine deliberately — it is the
box's declared identity and every other host= decision already treats it
as authoritative — but not silently: when the group exists and the trait
disagrees, the skip names the contradiction and rig bootstrap as the fix.
Closes#58
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
box templates collapse to thin, creds-free seeds (box#81); everything a
tenant machine BECOMES moves here, as convergent, re-runnable roles with
effective-state asserts. One mechanism (bootstrap-tenant.sh) parameterized
per tenant through a pure lib (tenant-config.sh) — never four copies —
dispatched from bootstrap.sh so 'rig bootstrap <role>' stays the single
entrypoint.
The agent tenants land the toolbelt (git, gh, tmux, …), docker, the agent's
CLI on the SYSTEM path (box exec shells read no rc files, #15), and the
agent-context file — rendered from ONE shared template that carries the
box#80 guard note once: never run box setup-host or the drill inside a box;
the box you are in is not a host you own. staging lands box#69's server
posture — docker + sshd hardening — through lib/sshd.sh, extracted verbatim
from bootstrap.sh so both families converge ONE drop-in with one converger;
its tailnet workload join stays operator-run, exactly the creds split #69
designed. Everything is asserted on effective state: the CLI must ANSWER as
the tenant user (the grok template's linked-but-cannot-run scar), docker
must answer, sshd -T must resolve.
'staging' therefore moves from the VM-host preset to the tenant role — the
thing box#81's seed will auto-run. The host shape lost nothing: it is
'dev --class server' (or custom with all three traits), the catch-all
effective-tag refusal still owns its tag policy, and a pre-#31 staging host
re-running its old command gets a loud refusal naming the new spelling —
tenants refuse host=yes boxes, agents refuse any machine-role box, staging
tolerates the workload-joined guest and leaves its marker alone.
Harness: the arg/refusal surface, the marker guards off fixture markers,
the pure parameter table, the rendered context file (guard included, all
three agents), creds-free-by-absence greps (no tailscale, no prompt), the
CLI-verified-not-trusted pin, marker-after-converge ordering, and the
re-pointed sshd-lib pins. 241 passed, 0 failed; shellcheck -x clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Round-2 convergence (codex + claude-bot): sshd enforces the group
directives against the candidate's ACTUAL membership, and the gate read
only the *Users pair — an admin outside 'AllowGroups sudo' still
reached ADMIN_OK=1, and root closed on a false proof. The gate now
resolves id -Gn and judges both group directives with the *Users
discipline: DenyGroups flags on a held-group literal or ANY
pattern/host-qualified token; AllowGroups, when set, passes only on a
literal token naming a held group (a pattern that would admit proves
nothing — over-refusing stays the safe error). id failing yields no
groups, which makes a set AllowGroups flag: fail closed there too.
Both requested regressions ride the sourced lib (unmet AllowGroups,
DenyGroups naming a held group) plus the pattern/pass cases, and grep
guards pin the shipped gate to the verdicts and to real membership.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
All three reviewers, same substance, and they were right that it was
lockout-adjacent: the literal grep passed a candidate whom a DenyUsers
PATTERN really denies ('DenyUsers dan*' vs admin 'dan'), and the door
closed on a false proof. The judgment now lives in the lib as a pure
deny_verdict: a literal hit flags, and so does ANY pattern or
host-qualified token — a token the check cannot prove irrelevant counts
as a hit, never as a pass. The asymmetry with AllowUsers is now the
same direction on both sides: every error closes toward repair, never
toward a welded-shut door.
Also (claude-bot): the -C probe resolves Match blocks against a
synthetic addr=127.0.0.1, so Match Address is out of the local proof's
scope — named in --help, the README, and the gate's comment, so the
separate-session advisory reads as load-bearing, not ceremony.
Regressions ride the sourced lib: wildcard (the review's dan* case),
'?', USER@HOST, literal hit, irrelevant-literals pass, plus a grep
guard that the shipped gate consults deny_verdict.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
#17's table said runner 'can close root once an admin user is proven'; the
class model (#26) superseded the per-role call, and close-root refuses on
class=server — runner's class. The gate does not change: the refusal message
now explains itself (server-class machines are automation identities whose
management plane IS root SSH; a CI box meant to be administered like a human
machine is --class human at bootstrap, not an exception), and the README's
identity-model section records the divergence in one paragraph. README also
documents the @root seed token and close-root's reachability proofs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The headline of #17: rig can verify a lot locally, but never that the
operator HOLDS the admin's private key. Seeding authorized_keys from root's
current /root/.ssh/authorized_keys turns that unprovable claim into a proven
one — the operator is connected as root right now using one of those keys.
The users file gains the literal key-field token '@root', shape-validated in
the parse pass (exit 2, pre-root-check, testable non-root); apply resolves
it once after the root check, dies with the repair when root has no keys to
seed, copies key lines verbatim (options included — rig will not silently
widen what a key can do), and writes seeded keys first with literal lines
appended, so the cmp-guard keeps re-runs convergent to root's then-current
keys plus the literals.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Seven review findings on the users family, each with the harness check that
would have caught it:
- Invoker gate (apply + close-root): %rig's sudoers rule is binary-scoped but
not argument-scoped, so `sudo rig users apply --file <me-as-admin>` made
role rig silently root-equivalent through the very command that granted it.
Identity management now refuses any sudo invoker outside rig-admin; direct
root (bring-up, a root shell) proceeds.
- Offboarding revokes SSH, not just the password: a '!'-locked password is
not a closed door under UsePAM — Debian sshd still honors the pubkey. A
dropped user's account is now expired (usermod -L -e 1, the switch PAM
actually enforces) and authorized_keys is renamed to
authorized_keys.revoked-by-rig — access revoked, data kept, convergence
never destroys. Present users get their expiry cleared idempotently, so a
re-added user comes back to life.
- The ledger remembers: two-field lines ('name active' / 'name revoked',
legacy bare names read as active), so dropped users no longer vanish from
rig's memory on the next rewrite. status now reports the ledger state
corroborated by the account's real expiry — passwd -S read L for everyone
(apply locks all passwords always), so its locked/active was meaningless —
and flags a mismatch loudly as drift.
- Perms are part of the converged state: ~/.ssh and authorized_keys ownership
and mode converge on every run, not only when content changes — StrictModes
treats them as load-bearing, so drifted perms were a broken login that
"already converged" lied about. Only the content write stays cmp-guarded.
- close-root's admin-door gate checks the StrictModes shape per candidate —
ownership, group/world-writability of home/.ssh/authorized_keys, a real
login shell, an unexpired account — and names which check failed. It proves
the door SHOULD open, not that it does; the separate-session advisory stays
load-bearing.
- Usernames are validated in the parser's one-pass refusal matrix
(^[a-z_][a-z0-9_-]{0,31}$): 'fo|o' corrupted the parser's own '|'-delimited
stream, and a leading '-' read as a useradd flag mid-convergence.
- The box role is trait-aware: on a host=no box an absent incus group skips
the role with a warning and converges everything else — one box-role user
in a fleet-wide file must not abort apply everywhere VMs don't live.
host=yes still dies pointing at box setup-host; a classless marker warns
toward a bootstrap re-run.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
class decides root SSH's fate, and this is human's: install
/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-rig-users.conf (PermitRootLogin no), where the NAME
is the mechanism — sshd_config is first-wins, the Include glob expands
lexically, and '-' sorts before '.', so it is read before bootstrap's
00-rig.conf and wins. Gated three ways, no --force: a marker must exist
(never shut the root door blind), it must say class=human (on a server root
is the control plane's automation identity — closing it severs fleet
management), and some rig-admin member must already hold a non-empty
authorized_keys (never close the only door). The gate's policy lives in the
lib as assert_marker_human so the harness proves every refusal against
fixture markers as non-root; RIG_ROLE_MARKER keeps the command pointable at
the same fixtures. Apply is bootstrap's validate-then-apply shape verbatim —
cmp-guard, sshd -t on the merged config before the restart with rollback,
then the sshd -T effective assertion. Bootstrap's own permitrootlogin
assertion widens to accept 'no': the closed door is strictly harder, never
broken, and by first-wins bootstrap cannot reopen it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Operators become a declared fact, not an accumulation of adduser runs: a
line-based, bash-parseable users file (no YAML, no jq — a rig box has
neither) names each user, their roles, and their keys, and apply converges
the box to exactly that. Roles map to groups (admin→rig-admin with full
NOPASSWD sudo, rig→rig sudo for the rig binary only, box→incus with no
sudo — box's setup-host owns Incus, rig only asserts the group). Every
password stays locked always; the SSH key at the door is the
authentication. A user dropped from the file is found via the /etc/rig/users
ledger and locked, never deleted — deleting frees the uid and rots
attribution. The sudoers drop-in lands only after visudo -c passes, because
a bad file under sudoers.d takes down all of sudo. Class never gates apply
(#26: a shared root login is unattributable, so operators belong on every
class); the marker only colors what root SSH does next. The whole file is
validated in one pass before the root check, every error named with its
line, so refusals are provable in the non-root harness through the sourced
parser.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
rig used to pass --ts-tag to `tailscale up --advertise-tags`, stating the
tailnet tag a second time with no way to know whether its request and the
key's own tags agreed. It asserted the tag it REQUESTED, never the tag control
GRANTED — the sshd first-wins bug in a different hat, and the same scar (both
M900s joined tag:server, retagged by hand, unnoticed).
Collapse the two sources of truth onto one: the key.
- `tailscale up` drops --advertise-tags; the key's tags apply.
- After join, poll `tailscale status --json` for `.Self.Tags` (netmap ground
truth, not `debug prefs`) until tags appear or BackendState=Running, on BOTH
the fresh-join and already-joined paths.
- UNTAGGED -> hard refusal: `tailscale logout` to back the user-owned node out,
then die naming the fix (mint a tagged key).
- Role policy moves onto the effective tag: a runner must not have tag:server
among the tags the key actually granted. Strictly stronger than before.
- --ts-tag is removed, and dies exit 2 with a message pointing at the key
(consuming its value), not an "unknown flag".
- New array-aware reader json_string_array in lib/runner-config.sh (jq-free,
never fails under set -e), with its own unit tests; bootstrap sources the lib.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
`rig runner install --repo <B>` on a box already registered to repo A
treated the mere existence of .runner as "already registered", skipped
configure, restarted the service still pointed at A, and reported success.
--repo was accepted, validated, and then ignored — leaving B with zero
runners and its `runs-on` jobs queued against one that will never come.
This is the natural next command after a partial `repoint`, and the failure
is worse than a no-op: moving a runner between repos is a trust-boundary
act, so quietly putting it back on the old one defeats the point of the move.
Gate install on the repo .runner actually names. Convergence — the property
worth keeping — is untouched: re-running against the repo the box is already
on still skips registration, never prompts for a token, and exits 0.
Skipping when the repo *differs* was never convergence, only a silently
ignored argument, so it now fails and names both repos, pointing at
`runner repoint` (move) or `runner remove` (start over). An unreadable
.runner is refused too — it is no licence to assume a match.
The .runner reader that `status` and `repoint` each carried is lifted into
commands/lib/runner-config.sh, which now also holds the guard. Its json_field
no longer dies bare under `set -o pipefail` when a key is missing, which is
what `status`'s own ${REPO_URL:-unknown} fallback always assumed.
Tests: the guard is exercised against a fixture .runner (refuses another repo
naming both, points at repoint, no-ops on the same repo, passes an
unregistered box, refuses an unreadable one) plus an ordering assertion that
it precedes svc.sh start — reaching it through the CLI would need root and a
really-registered runner, which the dependency-free harness cannot fabricate.
All three mutants (guard deleted, guard comparing nothing, guard moved below
the service start) go red.
Closes#13
