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3 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Claude
9bdc4db575 feat(users): declarative operators — apply/status over a users file, every class
Operators become a declared fact, not an accumulation of adduser runs: a
line-based, bash-parseable users file (no YAML, no jq — a rig box has
neither) names each user, their roles, and their keys, and apply converges
the box to exactly that. Roles map to groups (admin→rig-admin with full
NOPASSWD sudo, rig→rig sudo for the rig binary only, box→incus with no
sudo — box's setup-host owns Incus, rig only asserts the group). Every
password stays locked always; the SSH key at the door is the
authentication. A user dropped from the file is found via the /etc/rig/users
ledger and locked, never deleted — deleting frees the uid and rots
attribution. The sudoers drop-in lands only after visudo -c passes, because
a bad file under sudoers.d takes down all of sudo. Class never gates apply
(#26: a shared root login is unattributable, so operators belong on every
class); the marker only colors what root SSH does next. The whole file is
validated in one pass before the root check, every error named with its
line, so refusals are provable in the non-root harness through the sourced
parser.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-17 19:23:47 +00:00
Claude
92fa2a9860 bootstrap: infer the tailnet tag from the pre-auth key, verify the granted tag
rig used to pass --ts-tag to `tailscale up --advertise-tags`, stating the
tailnet tag a second time with no way to know whether its request and the
key's own tags agreed. It asserted the tag it REQUESTED, never the tag control
GRANTED — the sshd first-wins bug in a different hat, and the same scar (both
M900s joined tag:server, retagged by hand, unnoticed).

Collapse the two sources of truth onto one: the key.

- `tailscale up` drops --advertise-tags; the key's tags apply.
- After join, poll `tailscale status --json` for `.Self.Tags` (netmap ground
  truth, not `debug prefs`) until tags appear or BackendState=Running, on BOTH
  the fresh-join and already-joined paths.
- UNTAGGED -> hard refusal: `tailscale logout` to back the user-owned node out,
  then die naming the fix (mint a tagged key).
- Role policy moves onto the effective tag: a runner must not have tag:server
  among the tags the key actually granted. Strictly stronger than before.
- --ts-tag is removed, and dies exit 2 with a message pointing at the key
  (consuming its value), not an "unknown flag".
- New array-aware reader json_string_array in lib/runner-config.sh (jq-free,
  never fails under set -e), with its own unit tests; bootstrap sources the lib.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-17 15:27:09 +00:00
d4ab362964 fix(runner): install refuses a box registered to another repo
`rig runner install --repo <B>` on a box already registered to repo A
treated the mere existence of .runner as "already registered", skipped
configure, restarted the service still pointed at A, and reported success.
--repo was accepted, validated, and then ignored — leaving B with zero
runners and its `runs-on` jobs queued against one that will never come.

This is the natural next command after a partial `repoint`, and the failure
is worse than a no-op: moving a runner between repos is a trust-boundary
act, so quietly putting it back on the old one defeats the point of the move.

Gate install on the repo .runner actually names. Convergence — the property
worth keeping — is untouched: re-running against the repo the box is already
on still skips registration, never prompts for a token, and exits 0.
Skipping when the repo *differs* was never convergence, only a silently
ignored argument, so it now fails and names both repos, pointing at
`runner repoint` (move) or `runner remove` (start over). An unreadable
.runner is refused too — it is no licence to assume a match.

The .runner reader that `status` and `repoint` each carried is lifted into
commands/lib/runner-config.sh, which now also holds the guard. Its json_field
no longer dies bare under `set -o pipefail` when a key is missing, which is
what `status`'s own ${REPO_URL:-unknown} fallback always assumed.

Tests: the guard is exercised against a fixture .runner (refuses another repo
naming both, points at repoint, no-ops on the same repo, passes an
unregistered box, refuses an unreadable one) plus an ordering assertion that
it precedes svc.sh start — reaching it through the CLI would need root and a
really-registered runner, which the dependency-free harness cannot fabricate.
All three mutants (guard deleted, guard comparing nothing, guard moved below
the service start) go red.

Closes #13
2026-07-13 14:57:28 +00:00