2026-07-18 00:01:15 +00:00
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
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# Dependency-free CLI assertions for box. Run: bash test/cli.sh
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#
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# Runnable by a NON-root user with NO Incus installed — that is the whole point.
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# Anything that needs a real incus daemon (every lifecycle command) is proven the
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# way rig proves its root-only paths: source the pure function and drive it against
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# a fixture, or grep the load-bearing line so a deleted guard cannot ship green.
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# Deliberately no `set -e` — the harness asserts on failing commands.
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set -u
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ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/.." && pwd)"
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PASS=0 FAIL=0
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# check <desc> <want_exit> <want_substr> <cmd...>
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# Runs cmd, asserts exit code and (if non-empty) that combined output
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# contains want_substr.
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check() {
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local desc="$1" want="$2" substr="$3"; shift 3
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local out rc
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out="$("$@" 2>&1)"; rc=$?
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if [ "$rc" -ne "$want" ]; then
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echo "FAIL: $desc — exit $rc, wanted $want"
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printf '%s\n' "$out" | sed 's/^/ /'
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FAIL=$((FAIL + 1)); return
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fi
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if [ -n "$substr" ] && ! printf '%s' "$out" | grep -qF -e "$substr"; then
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echo "FAIL: $desc — output missing '$substr'"
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printf '%s\n' "$out" | sed 's/^/ /'
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FAIL=$((FAIL + 1)); return
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fi
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echo "ok: $desc"; PASS=$((PASS + 1))
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}
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BOX="$ROOT/bin/box"
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# The CLI contract: dispatch, help, usage errors. No incus needed — these all
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# resolve before any daemon call. Exit codes are box's own (0 ok / 1 wrong /
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# 2 you-asked-wrong), read straight from bin/box and confirmed by running it.
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# box with no args is 'help' (cmd="${1:-help}"), which prints the general usage
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# and exits 0 — NOT rig's exit-2 bare-usage. Assert box's actual contract.
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check "no args → general help, exit 0" 0 "USAGE" "$BOX"
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check "no args help names the command form" 0 "box <command>" "$BOX"
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check "--help exits 0" 0 "USAGE" "$BOX" --help
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check "-h exits 0" 0 "USAGE" "$BOX" -h
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check "help exits 0" 0 "USAGE" "$BOX" help
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check "help <command> → that command's usage" 0 "usage: box new" "$BOX" help new
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check "--version exits 0" 0 "box" "$BOX" --version
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# Unknown command is a usage error (2), and it says so — the suggester may add a
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# 'did you mean', but the stem is stable.
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check "unknown command exits 2" 2 "unknown command" "$BOX" frobnicate
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check "unknown command points at help" 2 "box help" "$BOX" zzzzzz
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# Options before the command are the classic mistake; box names the fix.
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check "option before command exits 2" 2 "options come after the command" "$BOX" --json list
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# A missing required positional is a usage error carrying that command's synopsis.
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check "new without --name exits 2" 2 "usage: box new" "$BOX" new
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check "shell without a box exits 2" 2 "usage: box shell" "$BOX" shell
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check "restore without arg2 needs a box first" 2 "usage: box restore" "$BOX" restore
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# An unknown flag is refused, not swallowed as a positional (the --labl bug).
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check "unknown flag on list exits 2" 2 "unknown option" "$BOX" list --nope
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# A flag that needs a value and gets none.
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check "--name with no value exits 2" 2 "--name needs a value" "$BOX" new --name
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# A shim `id` on PATH: lets us drive install.sh's DEST branch with a canned uid +
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# group output, exactly the way rig drives assert_runner_repo against fixtures.
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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SHIMDIR="$(mktemp -d)"
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cat > "$SHIMDIR/id" <<'SHIM'
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
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# Fake `id`: -u prints $FAKE_UID, -nG prints $FAKE_GROUPS. Just enough for
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# install.sh's DEST branch, which only ever asks these two.
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case "${1:-}" in
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-u) printf '%s\n' "${FAKE_UID:-1000}" ;;
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-nG) printf '%s\n' "${FAKE_GROUPS:-}" ;;
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*) exit 0 ;;
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esac
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SHIM
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chmod +x "$SHIMDIR/id"
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# install.sh — #71 global/root install. bash -n first, then drive the actual
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# DEST/BINDIR branch with the shim id (the functional proof the contract asks
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# for), then grep the root-only pieces that a daemon-free run cannot exercise.
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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check "install.sh is valid bash" 0 "" bash -n "$ROOT/install.sh"
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# Extract EXACTLY the DEST/BINDIR if/else/fi (the first `id -u -eq 0` block) and
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# print what it resolved — the same "run the pure block in isolation" trick rig
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# uses for its embedded dump script. Fail closed: a mangled extraction is caught
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# by the /opt/box grep below before any resolution is trusted.
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DBLOCK="$(mktemp)"
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awk '/id -u.*-eq 0/{f=1} f{print} f&&/^fi$/{exit}' "$ROOT/install.sh" > "$DBLOCK"
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# The $DEST/$BINDIR here are LITERAL text appended into the extracted block — they
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# must expand when that block RUNS, not when this printf writes it. Hence single
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# quotes; SC2016 is the intent.
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# shellcheck disable=SC2016
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printf '\nprintf "DEST=%%s BINDIR=%%s\\n" "$DEST" "$BINDIR"\n' >> "$DBLOCK"
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check "install.sh: DEST block extracted (guards the awk)" 0 "/opt/box" cat "$DBLOCK"
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check "install.sh: the extracted DEST block is valid bash" 0 "" bash -n "$DBLOCK"
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dest() { # dest <uid> [extra env assignments...] — resolve DEST/BINDIR
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local uid="$1"; shift
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FAKE_UID="$uid" HOME=/home/tester PATH="$SHIMDIR:$PATH" env "$@" bash "$DBLOCK"
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}
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# Root: the global path — a system tree other users can read (#71).
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check "install.sh: root → DEST=/opt/box" 0 "DEST=/opt/box" dest 0
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check "install.sh: root → BINDIR=/usr/local/bin" 0 "BINDIR=/usr/local/bin" dest 0
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# Non-root: unchanged, the solo path.
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check "install.sh: non-root → DEST=\$HOME/.local" 0 "DEST=/home/tester/.local/share/box" dest 1000
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check "install.sh: non-root → BINDIR=\$HOME/.local" 0 "BINDIR=/home/tester/.local/bin" dest 1000
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# BOX_HOME / BOX_BIN still win on BOTH branches — the scripting override.
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check "install.sh: BOX_HOME overrides the root default" 0 "DEST=/srv/box" dest 0 BOX_HOME=/srv/box
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check "install.sh: BOX_BIN overrides the root default" 0 "BINDIR=/srv/bin" dest 0 BOX_BIN=/srv/bin
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check "install.sh: BOX_HOME overrides the non-root default" 0 "DEST=/srv/box" dest 1000 BOX_HOME=/srv/box
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rm -f "$DBLOCK"
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# The root-only world-readable chmod (#71): the tree is EXECUTED by other users,
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# so root must open read+traverse. Grep it, and that it is root-guarded so the
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# per-user install stays byte-identical to before.
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# $DEST is a LITERAL in the grep pattern (install.sh's own variable) — single
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# quotes intended.
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# shellcheck disable=SC2016
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check "install.sh: root makes the tree world-readable (a+rX)" 0 "" \
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grep -qF 'chmod -R a+rX "$DEST"' "$ROOT/install.sh"
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check "install.sh: the a+rX is root-guarded" 0 "" \
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bash -c 'grep -B2 "chmod -R a+rX" "'"$ROOT"'/install.sh" | grep -q "id -u.*-eq 0"'
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# #66's flow, preserved: confirm-before-download, and no-op if already installed.
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check "install.sh: still confirms before downloading (#66)" 0 "" \
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grep -qF 'confirm "Install box from' "$ROOT/install.sh"
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check "install.sh: still no-ops on an existing install (#66)" 0 "" \
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grep -qF 'already installed' "$ROOT/install.sh"
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Templates — #65 tmux. `box tmux` runs `tmux new-session` INSIDE the box, so a
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# template that never installs tmux fails with "tmux: command not found". Every
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# template must carry it in its cloud-init package list.
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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for t in blank claude codex grok; do
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check "template '$t': installs tmux (#65)" 0 "" \
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grep -qE '^[[:space:]]*-[[:space:]]+tmux$' "$ROOT/templates/$t/user-data.yaml"
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done
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test+ci: the multi-user rehearsal, and CI that runs it on a real incus (#74)
drill/multiuser.sh: two throwaway users, real grants, real boxes, and the
contract measured from INSIDE them — #74's criteria (a)-(f) plus what the
findings added: the cross-user sibling drop, the closed private-bridge
escape hatches, incus-user re-sync survival, scoped revoke --purge. Its own
first runs are in RUNS.md (MU-1..3): both false FAILs were the instrument,
and both lessons (keep the mint's narration; probe a SIBLING's name, never
your own — /etc/hosts answers for you) are now comments in the script.
test/cli.sh: box_tier() driven against a shim id for all five cases
(including both-groups → admin: membership wins at the socket), the two
copies diffed byte-identical, the tier scripts' usage contracts driven for
real, and grep-guards on every load-bearing line a daemon-free run cannot
exercise — the expose guard's position, the boxnet-and-only-boxnet
narrowing, the snapshot allow, 'incus:snapshot restore'.
ci.yml: a second job stands up the real stack on the runner (setup-host,
doctor, then the rehearsal in container mode) — every PR now proves the
tier's semantics against a live daemon. The tier's mechanics are
instance-type-independent (the drop, the ACL, dns.mode and port_isolation
bind to boxnet, not the instance); the VM trust boundary itself stays a
real-hardware ritual, like the full drill.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-18 04:09:48 +00:00
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# The restricted tier (#74). box_tier() is the decision the whole tier hangs
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# on, so it is DRIVEN, not grepped: extracted from bin/box, sourced, and run
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# against a shim id for every case — including the one that bites (a user in
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# BOTH groups is admin: membership wins at the socket, and the function must
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# not substring-match 'incus' inside 'incus-admin').
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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TIERFN="$(mktemp)"
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awk '/^box_tier\(\) \{/,/^\}/' "$ROOT/bin/box" > "$TIERFN"
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check "box_tier: extracted from bin/box (guards the awk)" 0 "incus-admin" cat "$TIERFN"
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check "box_tier: the extracted function is valid bash" 0 "" bash -n "$TIERFN"
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tier() { # tier <uid> <groups...>
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local uid="$1"; shift
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FAKE_UID="$uid" FAKE_GROUPS="$*" PATH="$SHIMDIR:$PATH" \
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bash -c ". '$TIERFN'; box_tier"
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}
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check "box_tier: uid 0 → admin" 0 "admin" tier 0
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check "box_tier: incus-admin → admin" 0 "admin" tier 1000 "users incus-admin"
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check "box_tier: incus only → restricted" 0 "restricted" tier 1000 "users incus"
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check "box_tier: both groups → admin (membership wins at the socket)" \
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0 "admin" tier 1000 "users incus incus-admin"
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check "box_tier: neither → none" 0 "none" tier 1000 "users dialout"
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rm -f "$TIERFN"
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# setup-host.sh must decide the tier BEFORE any install tree exists, so it
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# carries its own copy — and a drifted copy is two tiers pretending to be one.
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# Byte-identical, asserted.
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BINFN="$(mktemp)"; HOSTFN="$(mktemp)"
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awk '/^box_tier\(\) \{/,/^\}/' "$ROOT/bin/box" > "$BINFN"
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awk '/^box_tier\(\) \{/,/^\}/' "$ROOT/host/setup-host.sh" > "$HOSTFN"
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check "box_tier: bin/box and setup-host.sh copies are byte-identical" 0 "" \
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diff "$BINFN" "$HOSTFN"
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rm -f "$BINFN" "$HOSTFN"
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# The tier scripts parse and refuse bad usage without a daemon — drive them.
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check "grant: no argument is a usage error" 2 "usage: box grant" bash "$ROOT/host/grant-user.sh"
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check "grant: a flag is not a user" 2 "usage: box grant" bash "$ROOT/host/grant-user.sh" --frob
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check "revoke: no argument is a usage error" 2 "usage: box revoke" bash "$ROOT/host/revoke-user.sh"
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check "revoke: two users is a usage error" 2 "usage: box revoke" bash "$ROOT/host/revoke-user.sh" a b
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check "box grant with no user exits 2 (via the CLI table)" 2 "usage: box grant" "$BOX" grant
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check "box revoke with no user exits 2 (via the CLI table)" 2 "usage: box revoke" "$BOX" revoke
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check "help grant names the hardened network" 0 "boxnet" "$BOX" help grant
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check "help revoke names --purge" 0 "purge" "$BOX" help revoke
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# Load-bearing lines a daemon-free run cannot exercise — grepped so a deleted
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# guard cannot ship green (the house test discipline).
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# The expose guard must fire before ANY incus call in cmd_expose: line order.
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# shellcheck disable=SC2016 # the $-strings are literals in the target file
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check "expose: the restricted guard precedes the first incus call" 0 "" bash -c '
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fn="$(awk "/^cmd_expose\(\) \{/,/^\}/" "'"$ROOT"'/bin/box")"
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guard="$(printf "%s\n" "$fn" | grep -n "box_tier" | head -1 | cut -d: -f1)"
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first="$(printf "%s\n" "$fn" | grep -n "incus config" | head -1 | cut -d: -f1)"
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[ -n "$guard" ] && [ -n "$first" ] && [ "$guard" -lt "$first" ]'
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# cmd_new refuses before minting when the placement contract is absent, and
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# the message is tier-aware (a restricted user is sent to 'box grant', not
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# to setup-host they cannot run).
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check "new: pre-flights the box-net profile" 0 "" bash -c '
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awk "/^cmd_new\(\) \{/,/^\}/" "'"$ROOT"'/bin/box" | grep -q "incus profile show box-net"'
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check "new: the restricted fix names box grant" 0 "" bash -c '
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awk "/^cmd_new\(\) \{/,/^\}/" "'"$ROOT"'/bin/box" | grep -q "box grant"'
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# grant converges to boxnet and ONLY boxnet — "boxnet,incusbr" would keep the
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# unhardened private bridge one --network flag away (the #74 measured hole).
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check "grant: narrows access to boxnet alone" 0 "" \
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grep -qE 'restricted\.networks\.access boxnet($| )' "$ROOT/host/grant-user.sh"
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check "grant: never grants the private bridge" 1 "" \
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grep -qE 'networks\.access[^#]*incusbr' "$ROOT/host/grant-user.sh"
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check "grant: allows snapshots (the clone workflow)" 0 "" \
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grep -qF 'restricted.snapshots allow' "$ROOT/host/grant-user.sh"
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# shellcheck disable=SC2016 # the $-strings are literals in the target file
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check "grant: installs the SHIPPED profile into the project" 0 "" \
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grep -qF 'profile edit box-net < "$here/profiles/box-net.yaml"' "$ROOT/host/grant-user.sh"
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check "grant: unpins the private-bridge eth0 from the default profile" 0 "" \
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grep -qF 'profile device remove default eth0' "$ROOT/host/grant-user.sh"
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check "grant: refuses an incus-admin member (nothing tighter to grant)" 0 "" \
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grep -qF 'incus-admin' "$ROOT/host/grant-user.sh"
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check "revoke: group removal is the lockout" 0 "" \
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grep -qF 'gpasswd -d' "$ROOT/host/revoke-user.sh"
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revoke/grant: survive the live-session case — the review's one real hole (#74)
Supplementary groups are read at LOGIN, so 'gpasswd -d' does nothing to a
session the user already holds — and after --purge, a stale-group process
could touch incus-user and lazily RECREATE the project with stock defaults:
the unhardened NAT bridge, un-narrowed, strictly worse than the granted
state. Adversarial review caught it; verified live, then closed:
- revoke --purge terminates the user's sessions first (loginctl, then
pkill), and refuses to purge under processes it cannot kill
- bare revoke says out loud that held sessions keep the socket until they
end, and names the loginctl command — instead of claiming a lockout it
did not deliver (help/README/design doc reworded to match)
- a failed grant backs out its own group-add on exit (trap, disarmed on
success): no half-granted user holding an un-narrowed socket while the
admin reads the error. Verified by injecting a bad profile YAML
- the rehearsal now holds a session open across the purge and demands it
dies with the tier (criterion l, 42nd check)
Smaller review findings, same pass: the escape-hatch probes assert the
refusal's REASON instead of any nonzero exit (an image hiccup must not read
as 'the escape is closed'); probe_from maps an outer-timeout kill to
dropped, not reachable; the rehearsal cleanup keeps the account when a purge
fails so doctor can name the leftovers; the purge asserts the trust
certificate's absence; cmd_new distinguishes a dead daemon from a missing
stack before prescribing setup-host; grant's success message names the
user-<uid> bridge variant correctly on big-uid hosts.
Rehearsal after: 42/42 (containers). test/cli.sh: 76 checks.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-18 05:11:20 +00:00
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# Group membership is read at login: purge must terminate live sessions (a
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# stale-group process could recreate the project unhardened AFTER the purge),
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# and a bare revoke must say the socket survives in held sessions.
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check "revoke: purge terminates live sessions first" 0 "" \
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grep -qF 'loginctl terminate-user' "$ROOT/host/revoke-user.sh"
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check "revoke: purge refuses under unkillable sessions" 0 "" \
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grep -qF 'refusing to purge under them' "$ROOT/host/revoke-user.sh"
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check "revoke: bare revoke warns about held sessions" 0 "" \
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grep -qF 'live sessions' "$ROOT/host/revoke-user.sh"
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check "revoke: the purge asserts the certificate's absence too" 0 "" \
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bash -c 'grep -A6 "Assert absence" "'"$ROOT"'/host/revoke-user.sh" | grep -q "config trust list"'
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# A failed grant must not leave a half-granted user: if THIS run added the
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# group, the exit path takes it back (and the trap disarms only on success).
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check "grant: backs out its own group-add on failure" 0 "" \
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grep -qF 'trap backout EXIT' "$ROOT/host/grant-user.sh"
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check "grant: the back-out disarms on success" 0 "" \
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grep -qF 'trap - EXIT' "$ROOT/host/grant-user.sh"
|
grant/rehearsal: the codex round — verified rollback, loud partial states, and the raw-attach guarantee measured (#75)
Review 4727756972 (A2): the backout no longer trusts gpasswd — it re-reads
the live group database after removal; verified-absent gets the safe
message, anything else screams ROLLBACK INCOMPLETE, exits nonzero, and
names the exact remediation. The concurrent-login window (a session begun
between usermod and backout keeps the group) is CLOSED to the extent the
database can't reach: the backout detects live processes and names
loginctl terminate-user, and the success wording claims only what was
verified.
Review 4727641752 (A1): a failed grant for a user whose membership predates
the run (the hand-added-user scenario) now fails LOUDLY — they retain
socket access on part-converged policy, and the message says so with both
remediations (box revoke now, or fix and re-run). Their membership is not
stripped: breaking a working user over a failed re-grant is its own hazard.
The default-profile eth0 removal is deliberately not restored on failure —
that mutation only reduces capability, and restoring it would move the
failure state AWAY from fail-closed. Injected-failure coverage is criterion
(n), both flavors: fresh-user backout (fault at the LAST mutation, so the
rollback runs after every earlier one) with the group's absence verified
and a converging re-run; blocked narrowing staged for real with an
instance-local NIC parked on the private bridge.
Review A3, resolution 3 with the measurement demanded: criterion (m)
launches exactly 'incus launch --network boxnet' as the restricted user and
probes the raw NIC from inside — egress works, RFC1918 dropped (the ACL is
the network's), sibling probes dropped BOTH directions (the nft drop is the
host's), name enumeration blocked. The scoped guarantee is now stated in
box-design.md and measured on every run: box-minted instances carry per-NIC
port_isolation; raw attachments keep every network- and host-owned control,
losing only that redundant L2 layer. Instrument lesson kept as MU-5: the
probe's first cut minted the non-cloud image — no DHCP client, no lease,
and a dead NIC passes every negative probe vacuously; it now requires the
lease before believing its own answers.
Rehearsal: 54/54 (containers). test/cli.sh: 82 checks.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-18 06:41:05 +00:00
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# The backout must VERIFY the removal and scream when it cannot — an
|
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|
|
# unverified rollback printing a security guarantee is the review's A2.
|
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check "grant: the backout verifies against the group database" 0 "" \
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bash -c 'awk "/^backout\(\) \{/,/^\}/" "'"$ROOT"'/host/grant-user.sh" | grep -q "id -nG"'
|
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|
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check "grant: an unverifiable rollback screams" 0 "" \
|
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|
grep -qF 'ROLLBACK INCOMPLETE' "$ROOT/host/grant-user.sh"
|
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|
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check "grant: a failed re-grant warns the pre-existing member is untouched" 0 "" \
|
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|
|
grep -qF 'still holding socket access' "$ROOT/host/grant-user.sh"
|
|
|
|
|
check "grant: the mid-grant login window is named" 0 "" \
|
|
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|
|
bash -c 'awk "/^backout\(\) \{/,/^\}/" "'"$ROOT"'/host/grant-user.sh" | grep -q "loginctl terminate-user"'
|
|
|
|
|
# The scoped guarantee (raw --network boxnet) is measured, not prose:
|
|
|
|
|
check "rehearsal: measures the raw boxnet attach (criterion m)" 0 "" \
|
|
|
|
|
grep -qF -- '--network boxnet' "$ROOT/drill/multiuser.sh"
|
|
|
|
|
# shellcheck disable=SC2016 # the $-string is a literal in the target file
|
|
|
|
|
check "rehearsal: injects grant failures (criterion n)" 0 "" \
|
|
|
|
|
grep -qF 'grant-user.sh" "$U3"' "$ROOT/drill/multiuser.sh"
|
test+ci: the multi-user rehearsal, and CI that runs it on a real incus (#74)
drill/multiuser.sh: two throwaway users, real grants, real boxes, and the
contract measured from INSIDE them — #74's criteria (a)-(f) plus what the
findings added: the cross-user sibling drop, the closed private-bridge
escape hatches, incus-user re-sync survival, scoped revoke --purge. Its own
first runs are in RUNS.md (MU-1..3): both false FAILs were the instrument,
and both lessons (keep the mint's narration; probe a SIBLING's name, never
your own — /etc/hosts answers for you) are now comments in the script.
test/cli.sh: box_tier() driven against a shim id for all five cases
(including both-groups → admin: membership wins at the socket), the two
copies diffed byte-identical, the tier scripts' usage contracts driven for
real, and grep-guards on every load-bearing line a daemon-free run cannot
exercise — the expose guard's position, the boxnet-and-only-boxnet
narrowing, the snapshot allow, 'incus:snapshot restore'.
ci.yml: a second job stands up the real stack on the runner (setup-host,
doctor, then the rehearsal in container mode) — every PR now proves the
tier's semantics against a live daemon. The tier's mechanics are
instance-type-independent (the drop, the ACL, dns.mode and port_isolation
bind to boxnet, not the instance); the VM trust boundary itself stays a
real-hardware ritual, like the full drill.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-18 04:09:48 +00:00
|
|
|
# shellcheck disable=SC2016 # the $-strings are literals in the target file
|
|
|
|
|
check "revoke: purge deletes instances one at a time" 0 "" \
|
|
|
|
|
grep -qF 'delete -f "$inst"' "$ROOT/host/revoke-user.sh"
|
|
|
|
|
check "revoke: purge removes the trust-store certificate" 0 "" \
|
|
|
|
|
grep -qF 'config trust remove' "$ROOT/host/revoke-user.sh"
|
|
|
|
|
# shellcheck disable=SC2016 # the $-strings are literals in the target file
|
|
|
|
|
check "setup-host: the restricted gate precedes the sudo resolution" 0 "" bash -c '
|
|
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|
|
gate="$(grep -n "restricted tier" "'"$ROOT"'/host/setup-host.sh" | head -1 | cut -d: -f1)"
|
|
|
|
|
sudo="$(grep -n "^elif command -v sudo" "'"$ROOT"'/host/setup-host.sh" | head -1 | cut -d: -f1)"
|
|
|
|
|
[ -n "$gate" ] && [ -n "$sudo" ] && [ "$gate" -lt "$sudo" ]'
|
|
|
|
|
check "setup-host: enables incus-user.socket for the tier" 0 "" \
|
|
|
|
|
grep -qF 'incus-user.socket' "$ROOT/host/setup-host.sh"
|
|
|
|
|
check "doctor: honors BOX_TIER" 0 "" \
|
|
|
|
|
grep -qF 'BOX_TIER' "$ROOT/drill/doctor.sh"
|
|
|
|
|
check "box exports BOX_TIER to the doctor" 0 "" \
|
|
|
|
|
grep -qF 'export BOX_TIER' "$ROOT/bin/box"
|
|
|
|
|
# 'box restore' must speak incus 6 ('snapshot restore'); bare 'incus restore'
|
|
|
|
|
# does not exist and the verb was broken for everyone until #74's rehearsal hit it.
|
|
|
|
|
check "restore: dispatches 'incus snapshot restore'" 0 "" \
|
|
|
|
|
grep -qF '^incus:snapshot restore^' "$ROOT/bin/box"
|
|
|
|
|
# The rehearsal itself stays runnable: syntax-checked here, run on real hosts.
|
|
|
|
|
check "multiuser.sh is valid bash" 0 "" bash -n "$ROOT/drill/multiuser.sh"
|
|
|
|
|
check "multiuser.sh refuses without the env gate" 2 "opt in" \
|
|
|
|
|
bash "$ROOT/drill/multiuser.sh" --yes
|
|
|
|
|
check "grant-user.sh is valid bash" 0 "" bash -n "$ROOT/host/grant-user.sh"
|
|
|
|
|
check "revoke-user.sh is valid bash" 0 "" bash -n "$ROOT/host/revoke-user.sh"
|
2026-07-18 00:01:15 +00:00
|
|
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|
|
|
|
echo "---"
|
|
|
|
|
echo "$PASS passed, $FAIL failed"
|
|
|
|
|
rm -rf "$SHIMDIR"
|
|
|
|
|
[ "$FAIL" -eq 0 ]
|