box/CHANGELOG.md

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# Changelog
History before 0.5.0 lives in git and in [drill/RUNS.md](drill/RUNS.md),
which records not just what changed but what each drill run proved.
## Unreleased
### Added
- **The restricted tier: multi-user hosts** (#74, redesigning #72) — an admin
runs `box grant <user>` and that user gets their own boxes on the same
hardened `boxnet`, seeing nobody else's; `box revoke <user>` takes it back
(`--purge` deletes their world, and asserts the absence). The tier rides
incus-user, whose defaults miss box's contract three measured ways (Debian
13 / Incus 6.0.4): a private *unhardened* NAT bridge per user, snapshots
blocked, the `box-net` profile invisible — so grant is an idempotent
convergence: project narrowed to `boxnet` **and only boxnet** (listing the
private bridge too, the obvious fix, would keep an unhardened network one
`--network` flag away), snapshots allowed, the shipped profile installed
into their project. `box_tier()` (live credentials, argless `id -nG`)
drives the tier-aware surface: `expose` refuses honestly before any daemon
call, `setup-host` and `doctor` answer at the caller's tier. Rehearsed
end-to-end by `drill/multiuser.sh` (criteria al: confinement, lifecycle,
cross-user visibility, name collisions, the in-box isolation contract,
escape hatches, re-sync survival, revoke incl. the live-session case) —
42/42 on the design host, in both container and VM mode.
- **CI runs the multi-user rehearsal on a real Incus** — a second `rehearsal`
job stands up the full stack on the runner (setup-host, doctor, then
`multiuser.sh --container`), so every PR proves the tier's semantics
against a live daemon, not a mock. The VM trust boundary itself remains a
real-hardware ritual, like the full drill.
- **Global / root install** (#71) — run as root, box installs *once* to
`/opt/box` (world-readable) with the `box` symlink on `/usr/local/bin`, so
every operator on a shared host runs the same tree. Per-user installs are
unchanged (`$HOME/.local`); `BOX_HOME`/`BOX_BIN` still override. A per-user
tree under `/root` is `0700` and unreadable to everyone else — the whole fleet
got `command not found` — so the root branch lands in a system location and
`chmod -R a+rX`'s it (read for files, +search on dirs), guarded on root. This
unblocks "rig installs box" (rig#24's `box` role).
- **CI + a test suite** — `.github/workflows/ci.yml` (a `check` job: globstar
`shellcheck -x` over `bin/* **/*.sh`, then `bash test/cli.sh`) and `test/cli.sh`,
dependency-free and runnable by a non-root user with no Incus. It exercises the
`install.sh` DEST/BINDIR branch functionally (both tiers + `BOX_HOME`/`BOX_BIN`
overrides), the CLI contract, and grep-guards the daemon-gated invariants and
tmux in every template — the box was the repo with "no tests and no CI".
### Fixed
- **`box restore` never worked against Incus 6** — the command table
dispatched `incus restore`, a subcommand that does not exist (Incus 6
spells it `incus snapshot restore`), so every restore died on "unknown
command". Found by #74's rehearsal exercising the full lifecycle as a
restricted user; fixed for every tier, and the rehearsal + a grep-guard in
`test/cli.sh` now hold it.
- **`box tmux` works on every template** (#65) — `box tmux` runs
`tmux new-session` *inside* the box, but the templates did not install tmux, so
it failed with `tmux: command not found`. `tmux` is now in each template's
cloud-init package list (`blank`/`claude`/`codex`/`grok`).
- **`box setup-host` finishes in one run** (#63). When it had to add you to
`incus-admin` it stopped there and told you to re-login and re-run — an
`exit 0` that reported success having built none of the stack: no `boxnet`,
no ACL, no `box-net` profile, no firewall. It now re-execs itself under
`sg incus-admin` and completes in that one invocation. The membership check
was also asking the wrong question: `id -nG "$USER"` reads the group
database, which lists the group the moment `usermod` returns, so a
same-session re-run passed the check with credentials that still lacked the
group and died further down on a bare permission error from `incus`. Argless
`id -nG` asks the process what it actually holds.
Make setup-host privilege-aware; make the drill prove the new contract Review found two real problems, both confirmed by reproducing them. setup-host hardcoded 'sudo' for every privileged call, so install.sh's deliberate root branch — the one that proceeds when id -u is 0 even with no sudo installed — handed off to a script that died on 'sudo: command not found' before doing anything (exit 127, reproduced with env -i and a minimal PATH). The root path was nominal, not real. Privilege is now resolved once: nothing at UID 0, sudo otherwise, a clear error if neither is possible. Two things fell out of that. Root does not need incus-admin at all (UID 0 opens the socket regardless), so adding root to the group was a no-op that also missed the human — under 'sudo install.sh' that is SUDO_USER, who is now the one granted the group. And apt must not hang: install.sh runs setup-host with nobody watching, while a fresh cloud image holds the dpkg lock in apt-daily for its first minutes, so the calls are now bounded and non-interactive. The drill did not exercise any of this. It ran setup-host immediately after install.sh, so the stack existed by the drill's own hand and a run passed identically whether or not install.sh had done a thing — a fresh run converged three times while its messages still described the pre-#63 "first pass may only add you to the group" behaviour. It now asserts the post-install stack in-group, before the clean or anything else mutates the host, which is the assertion that actually proves #64. setup-host then runs exactly once more, after the clean — that one is load-bearing, since the clean deliberately unsets dns.mode and something has to converge it back. DRILL_OWNS_SETUP=1 hands sequencing back to the drill. Pre-setup tripwires now read before install.sh, because install.sh is what triggers setup now; read afterwards they said nothing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-17 13:16:06 +00:00
- **`setup-host` works as root, with or without `sudo`** — every privileged
call was a hardcoded `sudo`, so on a minimal root image (no `sudo` package)
it died on `sudo: command not found` before doing anything. Privilege is now
resolved once: nothing at UID 0, `sudo` otherwise, and a clear error if
neither is possible. This is what made `install.sh`'s root path real rather
than nominal.
- **`setup-host` grants `incus-admin` to the human, not to root** — under
`sudo install.sh` it would have added `root` to the group: a no-op (UID 0
opens the socket regardless) that also left the actual user locked out of
their own boxes. It now derives the login user from `SUDO_USER`.
- **`box-firewall.service` now reports its state honestly** — the unit is
`Type=oneshot` and was missing `RemainAfterExit=yes`, so it went
`inactive (dead)` the instant it succeeded: a host whose isolation was
perfectly live read as one whose firewall unit had died. drill.sh sends you
to `systemctl status box-firewall` to diagnose exactly that, and
setup-host.sh's own comment already asserted the unit "is RemainAfterExit" —
it was not. Found by running the drill on a real host and mistrusting the
green: `nft list table bridge box` showed the drop live while the unit read
dead. `restart` was and remains correct either way.
Make setup-host privilege-aware; make the drill prove the new contract Review found two real problems, both confirmed by reproducing them. setup-host hardcoded 'sudo' for every privileged call, so install.sh's deliberate root branch — the one that proceeds when id -u is 0 even with no sudo installed — handed off to a script that died on 'sudo: command not found' before doing anything (exit 127, reproduced with env -i and a minimal PATH). The root path was nominal, not real. Privilege is now resolved once: nothing at UID 0, sudo otherwise, a clear error if neither is possible. Two things fell out of that. Root does not need incus-admin at all (UID 0 opens the socket regardless), so adding root to the group was a no-op that also missed the human — under 'sudo install.sh' that is SUDO_USER, who is now the one granted the group. And apt must not hang: install.sh runs setup-host with nobody watching, while a fresh cloud image holds the dpkg lock in apt-daily for its first minutes, so the calls are now bounded and non-interactive. The drill did not exercise any of this. It ran setup-host immediately after install.sh, so the stack existed by the drill's own hand and a run passed identically whether or not install.sh had done a thing — a fresh run converged three times while its messages still described the pre-#63 "first pass may only add you to the group" behaviour. It now asserts the post-install stack in-group, before the clean or anything else mutates the host, which is the assertion that actually proves #64. setup-host then runs exactly once more, after the clean — that one is load-bearing, since the clean deliberately unsets dns.mode and something has to converge it back. DRILL_OWNS_SETUP=1 hands sequencing back to the drill. Pre-setup tripwires now read before install.sh, because install.sh is what triggers setup now; read afterwards they said nothing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-17 13:16:06 +00:00
- **`setup-host`'s apt calls can no longer hang** — a fresh cloud image has
`apt-daily`/`unattended-upgrades` holding the dpkg lock, and a plain
`apt-get install` waits on it silently and indefinitely. Now bounded
(`DPkg::Lock::Timeout=300`) and non-interactive, which matters because
`install.sh` runs it with nobody watching.
### Changed
Make setup-host privilege-aware; make the drill prove the new contract Review found two real problems, both confirmed by reproducing them. setup-host hardcoded 'sudo' for every privileged call, so install.sh's deliberate root branch — the one that proceeds when id -u is 0 even with no sudo installed — handed off to a script that died on 'sudo: command not found' before doing anything (exit 127, reproduced with env -i and a minimal PATH). The root path was nominal, not real. Privilege is now resolved once: nothing at UID 0, sudo otherwise, a clear error if neither is possible. Two things fell out of that. Root does not need incus-admin at all (UID 0 opens the socket regardless), so adding root to the group was a no-op that also missed the human — under 'sudo install.sh' that is SUDO_USER, who is now the one granted the group. And apt must not hang: install.sh runs setup-host with nobody watching, while a fresh cloud image holds the dpkg lock in apt-daily for its first minutes, so the calls are now bounded and non-interactive. The drill did not exercise any of this. It ran setup-host immediately after install.sh, so the stack existed by the drill's own hand and a run passed identically whether or not install.sh had done a thing — a fresh run converged three times while its messages still described the pre-#63 "first pass may only add you to the group" behaviour. It now asserts the post-install stack in-group, before the clean or anything else mutates the host, which is the assertion that actually proves #64. setup-host then runs exactly once more, after the clean — that one is load-bearing, since the clean deliberately unsets dns.mode and something has to converge it back. DRILL_OWNS_SETUP=1 hands sequencing back to the drill. Pre-setup tripwires now read before install.sh, because install.sh is what triggers setup now; read afterwards they said nothing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-17 13:16:06 +00:00
- **`drill.sh` proves the new contract instead of masking it** — the drill ran
`setup-host` itself right after installing, so the stack existed by its own
hand and a run passed identically whether or not `install.sh` had done a
thing; a fresh run converged the stack three times, while the messages still
described the pre-#63 "first pass may only add you to the group" behaviour.
It now asserts the post-install stack in-group before touching the host, and
runs `setup-host` exactly once more — after the clean, which deliberately
unsets `dns.mode` and so has to be converged back. `DRILL_OWNS_SETUP=1`
hands sequencing back to the drill. Pre-setup tripwires now read *before*
`install.sh`, since that is what triggers setup now.
Redesign install flow: confirm, no-op if installed, opt-in host setup Implements the flow @danmt specified on #66. The installer now asks before it acts, and never overwrites itself. 1. "Install box?" — prompted before anything is downloaded. 2. If box is already installed: say so and stop. A re-run changes nothing, so curl|bash can no longer clobber a working tree or rebuild the host stack under live boxes. Upgrading is explicit — uninstall, then install fresh. 3. On a fresh host: download, install, link onto PATH. 4. "Set up this machine as a box host now?" — a separate decision, because the CLI and the host are not the same choice (you may host boxes elsewhere). This replaces the version-diff refusal from the previous round with the simpler rule Dan asked for: installed at all => no-op. It dissolves the same class of "the upgrade ate my boxes" errors without the installer having to reason about versions or enumerate boxes at all — you cannot lose boxes to an install that refuses to touch an existing one. Prompts read /dev/tty, because under curl|bash the script itself is stdin and a plain read would eat the installer's own remaining lines. With no terminal (CI, a pipe) BOX_YES=1 assumes yes and is required to proceed unattended; without it we refuse rather than invent consent. BOX_SKIP_SETUP_HOST=1 declines the second prompt. The drill uninstalls before installing (the no-op rule would otherwise refuse to re-lay the tree it re-proves each run) and sets BOX_YES=1 for the prompts; BOX_FORCE_UPGRADE is gone with the refusal it drove. Verified on a real host: cancel, fresh install, no-op re-run, and both prompts driven through a pty (y/n and y-then-n), plus the no-tty refusal. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-17 16:10:34 +00:00
- **`install.sh` asks, sets up the host, and no-ops on re-run** (#64) — it now
prompts *"Install box?"*, then on a fresh host installs the tree and asks a
second question, *"Set up this machine as a box host now?"*, running the whole
isolation stack if you say yes (previously it only printed a warning and left
you a command, so the install reported success and `box new` died on a host
with no Incus). Prompts read `/dev/tty`, since under `curl | bash` the script
itself is stdin; `BOX_YES=1` answers yes unattended (required where there is
no terminal), `BOX_SKIP_SETUP_HOST=1` declines the host-setup step.
- **`install.sh` never overwrites an existing install** — if box is already
installed it says so and changes nothing, so a stray re-run can no longer
clobber a working tree or rebuild the host stack under live boxes. Upgrading
is explicit: uninstall (`rm -rf ~/.local/share/box ~/.local/bin/box`, boxes
preserved first) and install fresh. This replaces the earlier version-diff
refusal with a simpler rule that dissolves the same class of errors. The
version-aware upgrade that migrates boxes instead is #67; a portable
`box export` so a box survives its own deletion is #70.
## 0.5.0 — 2026-07-15
The release the project was renamed in: the repo is `heavy-duty/box`, matching
the CLI it ships. Everything legacy-facing is honored forever — the
`user.claudebox=1` tag, the `.claudebox/` runbook folder, the old symlink the
installer retires — but nothing current carries the old name.
### Added
- **`codex` and `grok` templates** — OpenAI Codex CLI and xAI Grok CLI boxes,
creds-free like every template. The template mechanic (image + user +
resources, never a network or a `security.*` key) now has three tenants
beside `blank`, and the drill mints all of them cold.
- **`box expose <box> <port> [<host-port>]`** — a deliberate, loopback-only
door to a port inside a box, for seeing a dev server in your browser. The
listen side is always the host's `127.0.0.1` (no flag to widen it), the door
is per-port, `--list`/`--remove` manage it, and `box info` shows open
exposures — a box with a hole says so.
- **Inline resource overrides on `new`** — `--cpu <n> --memory <size>
--disk <size>` (#57). Resolution most-specific-first: flag > `BOX_CPU` /
`BOX_MEMORY` / `BOX_DISK` environment (the scripting form) > template
`box.env` > defaults. Values pass to Incus verbatim; resources are all a
flag can touch. `--from` refuses them — a clone carries its source's
resources.
- **Host lifecycle as verbs** — `box setup-host`, `box teardown-host`, and
`box migrate-host`, which re-homes pre-0.4.0 boxes onto the current stack
(`--box <n>` / `--all-boxes`, authed state preserved) and retires the legacy
bridge once empty (`--retire-legacy`).
- **The `.box/` recipe convention** — the agent-facing runbook folder a repo
can ship, renamed from `.claudebox/` (both spellings read).
### Fixed
- **VM mints no longer hang at GRUB** — Incus defaults VMs to Secure Boot on,
and a cloud image whose shim the host's OVMF doesn't trust dies with "bad
shim signature" forever. Boxes now launch with `security.secureboot=false`;
the VM boundary, not boot attestation, is the box threat model.
- **`box expose` actually delivers packets** — a trilogy of drill-found
absences: the NAT proxy needs the box's boxnet lease pinned as a static
`ipv4.address` (Incus resolves `connect=0.0.0.0` against device config, not
the lease); a loopback-sourced packet needs `route_localnet` plus a
masquerade on the bridge to leave the host and be answerable; and the box's
replies need a `ct state established,related` accept ahead of the host
firewall's input drop, which was eating them statelessly. Boxes still
cannot initiate toward the host — a box-originated SYN is a NEW flow.
- **Firewall rules now converge on upgrade** — `box-firewall.sh` rebuilds its
chains every run (add + flush + re-add) instead of skipping when they
exist, which had pinned every host to the rule set of the release that
first ran there.
- **Failed mints tell you why** — cloud-init failures print the box's own log
excerpts and leave the box up to inspect; a mint that never boots names the
likely cause (corrupt image, Secure Boot, GRUB hang) and ships a sanitized
console dump; the installer asserts it landed the ref it was asked for.
- **`grok` installs the binary it actually ships** — the installer was read,
not guessed at, and the CLI lands on the non-interactive PATH (same fix
class as codex).
### Changed
- **Debrand complete** — env vars, install dir, docs, template descriptions
and the README all say `box`; the install URL is
`heavy-duty/box` (GitHub redirects the old one, `BOX_REPO` overrides).
- **The drill grew from 47 to 84 checks** — the expose door opened, exercised
and shut (with the contract re-probed around it), every template minted
cold, a faithful pre-0.4.0 box re-homed through `migrate-host`, and the
inline resource flags asserted (including their precedence over the
environment).