60 lines
2.7 KiB
Markdown
60 lines
2.7 KiB
Markdown
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# The drill
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An end-to-end rehearsal of claudebox against a **real** Incus: install the CLI,
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set up the host, mint a box, drive the whole surface, and check that the
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isolation actually holds.
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> ⚠ **It rearranges the host it runs on.** Incus, a systemd unit, a network, an
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> ACL, a profile, and rewritten firewall rules. **Run it on a machine you can
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> format** — a spare server, a cloud VM you'll destroy, a VM on your laptop.
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> Not your workstation.
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```sh
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git clone https://github.com/heavy-duty/claudebox && cd claudebox
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bash drill/drill.sh # asks before it touches anything
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```
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Useful flags: `--yes` (skip the prompt), `--ref <branch>` (drill a branch rather
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than the default), `--keep-boxes` (leave the boxes up to poke at).
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Exit 0 means every check passed. Roughly 15 minutes, most of it the cold box.
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## Why it exists
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The repo has no tests and no CI, and the CLI is a shell script that shells out to
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`incus`. That means the interesting failures are not in the bash — they are in
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what Incus actually does, which is exactly what unit tests would stub out and get
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wrong. The drill runs the real thing.
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## What it checks
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**A. Incus semantics.** The assumptions claudebox is built on, probed directly:
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that `incus config get <inst> user.claudebox` returns `1` (this is on the path of
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*every* box command — if it lies, everything fails closed); that the
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`user.claudebox=1` list filter selects our instances and excludes an untagged
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one; that `--columns nstS` gives four clean CSV fields; that the state column
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reads `RUNNING`; that `incus rename` really does refuse a running instance; and
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that snapshot-list's first CSV field is the label.
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**B. The surface.** Mint, list, info, snapshot, clone-from-a-snapshot-of-a-
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renamed-box, rename (running must refuse, stopped must work), the escape hatch
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and its isolation warning, the `rm` confirmation guard, and the CLI contract
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(typo'd command, typo'd flag, `list <box>`).
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**The boundary** gets its own treatment: the drill launches an instance
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claudebox did *not* mint, aims `down`, `rm` and the escape hatch at it, and
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requires all three to refuse — and the instance to still be standing afterwards.
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**C. Isolation.** From inside a real box: public egress works; the box cannot
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reach a listener on the host's claudenet gateway; RFC1918 is dropped.
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## What it does not check
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`claude /login` — it's interactive by design, and the box is creds-free by
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design. The drill confirms Claude Code is installed and runnable; authenticating
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is yours.
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If the host has no `/dev/kvm`, claudebox falls back to container mode. The drill
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still runs, but it says loudly that **the VM trust boundary was not validated**
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rather than passing quietly on a weaker one.
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