claude-hdb
a0400606c2
Two bugs, one in each direction. setup-host's new assertion ran 'nft list table bridge claudebox' without sudo. nft needs root, so it failed with permission denied and printed "the box-to-box drop is NOT active" about a rule that was demonstrably there. A check that cries wolf is worse than no check. And the deeper one: every check so far has asked the CONFIG whether boxes are isolated. The config is a claim. Incus can accept security.port_isolation and the kernel can still leave 'isolated off' on the tap — and then boxes reach each other while every config in sight says they cannot. That is precisely the shape of the original bug: the ACL looked airtight and never saw the traffic. So the doctor now reads the kernel's own view — 'bridge -d link show' on claudenet's ports — and reports the isolated flag as the fact it is. If the profile says true and the kernel says off, we learn that in a second instead of after another ten-minute drill. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
97 lines
4.9 KiB
Bash
Executable file
97 lines
4.9 KiB
Bash
Executable file
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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# One-time host setup: install Incus, create the isolated network + ACL and
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# the claude-dev profile. Idempotent. Ubuntu 24.04 / Debian 13.
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set -euo pipefail
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here="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/.." && pwd)"
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if ! command -v incus >/dev/null; then
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sudo apt-get update
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sudo apt-get install -y incus
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fi
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if ! id -nG "$USER" | grep -qw incus-admin; then
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sudo usermod -aG incus-admin "$USER"
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echo "NOTE: added $USER to incus-admin — re-login (or 'sg incus-admin') and re-run."
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exit 0
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fi
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# Storage pool + base config (safe to re-run; init is a no-op if configured)
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incus storage show default >/dev/null 2>&1 || incus admin init --minimal
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# Isolated NAT network. IPv6 off: one less egress path to reason about.
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incus network show claudenet >/dev/null 2>&1 || incus network create claudenet \
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ipv4.address=10.87.0.1/24 ipv4.nat=true ipv6.address=none
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# ACL: default egress allow (internet), explicit drops for private space.
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# Gateway carve-out first so instance DNS (dnsmasq on 10.87.0.1) survives.
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if ! incus network acl show claude-isolate >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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incus network acl create claude-isolate
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incus network acl rule add claude-isolate egress action=allow destination=10.87.0.1/32
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incus network acl rule add claude-isolate egress action=drop destination=10.0.0.0/8
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incus network acl rule add claude-isolate egress action=drop destination=172.16.0.0/12
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incus network acl rule add claude-isolate egress action=drop destination=192.168.0.0/16
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incus network acl rule add claude-isolate egress action=drop destination=169.254.0.0/16
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incus network acl rule add claude-isolate egress action=drop destination=100.64.0.0/10
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fi
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incus network set claudenet security.acls=claude-isolate \
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security.acls.default.egress.action=allow \
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security.acls.default.ingress.action=drop
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# A box must not be able to ENUMERATE its siblings, either. dnsmasq on the
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# gateway serves DNS (that carve-out is what makes egress resolution work) and
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# it holds a record for every instance on the network — so 'getent hosts <box>'
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# from inside one box resolved another's name and address. Connection blocked,
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# reconnaissance wide open. dns.mode=none stops it registering instance records;
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# forwarding for public names is unaffected (verified live).
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incus network set claudenet dns.mode=none
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# Sibling isolation itself is NOT an ACL rule — an L3 ACL never sees frames
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# switched between two ports of one bridge. It lives in claudebox-firewall.sh
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# as an nftables bridge-family rule. See the comment there; it is the reason
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# boxes cannot reach each other.
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# IPv6 stays off (ipv6.address=none, above). Every rule in the ACL and every
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# rule in the firewall is IPv4-only, so IPv6 would be an uncovered path, not a
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# feature. That is a contract, not a default.
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# --- Firewall coexistence ---------------------------------------------------
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# Hosts running UFW (INPUT drop) and/or Docker (FORWARD drop) silently eat
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# claudenet traffic. Punch minimal, ordered holes; the Incus ACL still layers
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# on top. The trailing deny also blocks instance -> host's own (public) IPs,
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# which the RFC1918-only ACL cannot express. Rules live in
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# claudebox-firewall.sh; a boot-time systemd unit re-applies the runtime-only
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# parts (nft table, DOCKER-USER) after every reboot.
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# The no-UFW path drives nft directly, and a stock Debian 13 cloud image ships
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# neither nftables nor UFW — install the dependency we are about to use.
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if ! command -v ufw >/dev/null 2>&1 && ! command -v nft >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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sudo apt-get install -y nftables
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fi
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sudo install -m 755 "$here/host/claudebox-firewall.sh" /usr/local/sbin/claudebox-firewall
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sudo install -m 644 "$here/host/claudebox-firewall.service" /etc/systemd/system/
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sudo systemctl daemon-reload
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sudo systemctl enable claudebox-firewall.service
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# RESTART, not 'enable --now'. The unit is RemainAfterExit, so once it has run
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# it stays "active" forever — and 'enable --now' does nothing to an active unit.
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# Re-running setup-host after upgrading claudebox therefore installed the new
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# rules to /usr/local/sbin and never applied them: the host kept the old
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# firewall, silently, and the box→box hole stayed open through a release that
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# claimed to close it. Restart re-runs the script, which is idempotent by design.
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sudo systemctl restart claudebox-firewall.service
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# Profile
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if ! incus profile show claude-dev >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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incus profile create claude-dev
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fi
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incus profile edit claude-dev < "$here/profiles/claude-dev.yaml"
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# The sibling drop is the one rule whose absence is invisible: everything keeps
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# working, and boxes can simply reach each other. Assert it landed.
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if sudo nft list table bridge claudebox >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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echo "Isolation: box-to-box drop is live (nft bridge table 'claudebox')."
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else
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echo "WARNING: the box-to-box drop is NOT active — boxes can reach each other." >&2
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echo " check: sudo /usr/local/sbin/claudebox-firewall ; sudo nft list table bridge claudebox" >&2
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fi
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echo "Host ready. Launch with: claudebox new --name <box>"
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