claude-hdb
c1ca981f46
The repo has no tests and no CI, and everything in #9/#10/#13 was verified
against a stubbed incus. The interesting failures aren't in the bash — they're
in what Incus actually does, which is exactly what a stub gets wrong. So the
drill runs the real thing on a host you can format.
A. Incus semantics — the assumptions claudebox is built on, probed directly:
the user.claudebox=1 tag read (now on the path of every box command in
#13), the list filter, the CSV shape, the state string, whether rename
really refuses a running instance, the snapshot-list field order.
B. The claudebox surface — mint, list, info, snapshot, clone-from-snapshot-of-
a-renamed-box, rename, the escape hatch, the rm guard, the CLI contract —
and the boundary: an instance claudebox did NOT mint has down/rm/hatch
aimed at it, must refuse all three, and must still be standing after.
C. Isolation — from inside a real box: public egress works, box → host is
blocked, box → RFC1918 is dropped.
Destructive by design, and it says so before it starts: it asks for consent
(--yes to skip), and refuses outright with no TTY. Without /dev/kvm it reports
that the VM trust boundary was NOT validated rather than passing on a container.
|
||
|---|---|---|
| .. | ||
| drill.sh | ||
| README.md | ||
The drill
An end-to-end rehearsal of claudebox against a real Incus: install the CLI, set up the host, mint a box, drive the whole surface, and check that the isolation actually holds.
⚠ It rearranges the host it runs on. Incus, a systemd unit, a network, an ACL, a profile, and rewritten firewall rules. Run it on a machine you can format — a spare server, a cloud VM you'll destroy, a VM on your laptop. Not your workstation.
git clone https://github.com/heavy-duty/claudebox && cd claudebox
bash drill/drill.sh # asks before it touches anything
Useful flags: --yes (skip the prompt), --ref <branch> (drill a branch rather
than the default), --keep-boxes (leave the boxes up to poke at).
Exit 0 means every check passed. Roughly 15 minutes, most of it the cold box.
Why it exists
The repo has no tests and no CI, and the CLI is a shell script that shells out to
incus. That means the interesting failures are not in the bash — they are in
what Incus actually does, which is exactly what unit tests would stub out and get
wrong. The drill runs the real thing.
What it checks
A. Incus semantics. The assumptions claudebox is built on, probed directly:
that incus config get <inst> user.claudebox returns 1 (this is on the path of
every box command — if it lies, everything fails closed); that the
user.claudebox=1 list filter selects our instances and excludes an untagged
one; that --columns nstS gives four clean CSV fields; that the state column
reads RUNNING; that incus rename really does refuse a running instance; and
that snapshot-list's first CSV field is the label.
B. The surface. Mint, list, info, snapshot, clone-from-a-snapshot-of-a-
renamed-box, rename (running must refuse, stopped must work), the escape hatch
and its isolation warning, the rm confirmation guard, and the CLI contract
(typo'd command, typo'd flag, list <box>).
The boundary gets its own treatment: the drill launches an instance
claudebox did not mint, aims down, rm and the escape hatch at it, and
requires all three to refuse — and the instance to still be standing afterwards.
C. Isolation. From inside a real box: public egress works; the box cannot reach a listener on the host's claudenet gateway; RFC1918 is dropped.
What it does not check
claude /login — it's interactive by design, and the box is creds-free by
design. The drill confirms Claude Code is installed and runnable; authenticating
is yours.
If the host has no /dev/kvm, claudebox falls back to container mode. The drill
still runs, but it says loudly that the VM trust boundary was not validated
rather than passing quietly on a weaker one.