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11 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Claude
b8e8e79b87 fix(users): the host= marker gates the box role, not the incus group
users apply consulted the host= trait only when group incus was ABSENT,
so a host=no or marker-less box that nonetheless carried the group handed
box-role users a bare `usermod -aG incus` — the socket with no tier, which
incus-user answers by lazily building an unhardened project under whoever
opens it.

The marker now decides in both directions through one pure gate,
assert_marker_hosts_vms, so the verdict is identical whether or not the
group exists. The marker wins over the machine deliberately — it is the
box's declared identity and every other host= decision already treats it
as authoritative — but not silently: when the group exists and the trait
disagrees, the skip names the contradiction and rig bootstrap as the fix.

Closes #58

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-19 17:29:20 +00:00
dan-claude-bot
739db6e633 feat(bootstrap): box tenant roles — claude, codex, grok, staging (#31)
box templates collapse to thin, creds-free seeds (box#81); everything a
tenant machine BECOMES moves here, as convergent, re-runnable roles with
effective-state asserts. One mechanism (bootstrap-tenant.sh) parameterized
per tenant through a pure lib (tenant-config.sh) — never four copies —
dispatched from bootstrap.sh so 'rig bootstrap <role>' stays the single
entrypoint.

The agent tenants land the toolbelt (git, gh, tmux, …), docker, the agent's
CLI on the SYSTEM path (box exec shells read no rc files, #15), and the
agent-context file — rendered from ONE shared template that carries the
box#80 guard note once: never run box setup-host or the drill inside a box;
the box you are in is not a host you own. staging lands box#69's server
posture — docker + sshd hardening — through lib/sshd.sh, extracted verbatim
from bootstrap.sh so both families converge ONE drop-in with one converger;
its tailnet workload join stays operator-run, exactly the creds split #69
designed. Everything is asserted on effective state: the CLI must ANSWER as
the tenant user (the grok template's linked-but-cannot-run scar), docker
must answer, sshd -T must resolve.

'staging' therefore moves from the VM-host preset to the tenant role — the
thing box#81's seed will auto-run. The host shape lost nothing: it is
'dev --class server' (or custom with all three traits), the catch-all
effective-tag refusal still owns its tag policy, and a pre-#31 staging host
re-running its old command gets a loud refusal naming the new spelling —
tenants refuse host=yes boxes, agents refuse any machine-role box, staging
tolerates the workload-joined guest and leaves its marker alone.

Harness: the arg/refusal surface, the marker guards off fixture markers,
the pure parameter table, the rendered context file (guard included, all
three agents), creds-free-by-absence greps (no tailscale, no prompt), the
CLI-verified-not-trusted pin, marker-after-converge ordering, and the
re-pointed sshd-lib pins. 241 passed, 0 failed; shellcheck -x clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-18 19:49:20 +00:00
dan-claude-bot
a32d2b04cb fix(close-root): the gate judges AllowGroups/DenyGroups too — same door, other hinge
Round-2 convergence (codex + claude-bot): sshd enforces the group
directives against the candidate's ACTUAL membership, and the gate read
only the *Users pair — an admin outside 'AllowGroups sudo' still
reached ADMIN_OK=1, and root closed on a false proof. The gate now
resolves id -Gn and judges both group directives with the *Users
discipline: DenyGroups flags on a held-group literal or ANY
pattern/host-qualified token; AllowGroups, when set, passes only on a
literal token naming a held group (a pattern that would admit proves
nothing — over-refusing stays the safe error). id failing yields no
groups, which makes a set AllowGroups flag: fail closed there too.

Both requested regressions ride the sourced lib (unmet AllowGroups,
DenyGroups naming a held group) plus the pattern/pass cases, and grep
guards pin the shipped gate to the verdicts and to real membership.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-18 17:17:39 +00:00
dan-claude-bot
a5b48d5b2c fix(close-root): DenyUsers judged fail-closed — patterns and USER@HOST flag
All three reviewers, same substance, and they were right that it was
lockout-adjacent: the literal grep passed a candidate whom a DenyUsers
PATTERN really denies ('DenyUsers dan*' vs admin 'dan'), and the door
closed on a false proof. The judgment now lives in the lib as a pure
deny_verdict: a literal hit flags, and so does ANY pattern or
host-qualified token — a token the check cannot prove irrelevant counts
as a hit, never as a pass. The asymmetry with AllowUsers is now the
same direction on both sides: every error closes toward repair, never
toward a welded-shut door.

Also (claude-bot): the -C probe resolves Match blocks against a
synthetic addr=127.0.0.1, so Match Address is out of the local proof's
scope — named in --help, the README, and the gate's comment, so the
separate-session advisory reads as load-bearing, not ceremony.

Regressions ride the sourced lib: wildcard (the review's dan* case),
'?', USER@HOST, literal hit, irrelevant-literals pass, plus a grep
guard that the shipped gate consults deny_verdict.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-18 17:02:48 +00:00
dan-claude-bot
ceceb71e34 docs(users): own the runner-row divergence from #17 — server class keeps root, deliberately, runner included
#17's table said runner 'can close root once an admin user is proven'; the
class model (#26) superseded the per-role call, and close-root refuses on
class=server — runner's class. The gate does not change: the refusal message
now explains itself (server-class machines are automation identities whose
management plane IS root SSH; a CI box meant to be administered like a human
machine is --class human at bootstrap, not an exception), and the README's
identity-model section records the divergence in one paragraph. README also
documents the @root seed token and close-root's reachability proofs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-18 14:54:03 +00:00
dan-claude-bot
fff45a9835 feat(users): @root seeds the admin's keys from root's own — the one source that cannot lock you out
The headline of #17: rig can verify a lot locally, but never that the
operator HOLDS the admin's private key. Seeding authorized_keys from root's
current /root/.ssh/authorized_keys turns that unprovable claim into a proven
one — the operator is connected as root right now using one of those keys.
The users file gains the literal key-field token '@root', shape-validated in
the parse pass (exit 2, pre-root-check, testable non-root); apply resolves
it once after the root check, dies with the repair when root has no keys to
seed, copies key lines verbatim (options included — rig will not silently
widen what a key can do), and writes seeded keys first with literal lines
appended, so the cmp-guard keeps re-runs convergent to root's then-current
keys plus the literals.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-18 14:53:30 +00:00
Claude
3eeab687d0 fix(users): review findings — invoker gate, real SSH revocation, StrictModes-shaped close-root gate, trait-aware box role
Seven review findings on the users family, each with the harness check that
would have caught it:

- Invoker gate (apply + close-root): %rig's sudoers rule is binary-scoped but
  not argument-scoped, so `sudo rig users apply --file <me-as-admin>` made
  role rig silently root-equivalent through the very command that granted it.
  Identity management now refuses any sudo invoker outside rig-admin; direct
  root (bring-up, a root shell) proceeds.

- Offboarding revokes SSH, not just the password: a '!'-locked password is
  not a closed door under UsePAM — Debian sshd still honors the pubkey. A
  dropped user's account is now expired (usermod -L -e 1, the switch PAM
  actually enforces) and authorized_keys is renamed to
  authorized_keys.revoked-by-rig — access revoked, data kept, convergence
  never destroys. Present users get their expiry cleared idempotently, so a
  re-added user comes back to life.

- The ledger remembers: two-field lines ('name active' / 'name revoked',
  legacy bare names read as active), so dropped users no longer vanish from
  rig's memory on the next rewrite. status now reports the ledger state
  corroborated by the account's real expiry — passwd -S read L for everyone
  (apply locks all passwords always), so its locked/active was meaningless —
  and flags a mismatch loudly as drift.

- Perms are part of the converged state: ~/.ssh and authorized_keys ownership
  and mode converge on every run, not only when content changes — StrictModes
  treats them as load-bearing, so drifted perms were a broken login that
  "already converged" lied about. Only the content write stays cmp-guarded.

- close-root's admin-door gate checks the StrictModes shape per candidate —
  ownership, group/world-writability of home/.ssh/authorized_keys, a real
  login shell, an unexpired account — and names which check failed. It proves
  the door SHOULD open, not that it does; the separate-session advisory stays
  load-bearing.

- Usernames are validated in the parser's one-pass refusal matrix
  (^[a-z_][a-z0-9_-]{0,31}$): 'fo|o' corrupted the parser's own '|'-delimited
  stream, and a leading '-' read as a useradd flag mid-convergence.

- The box role is trait-aware: on a host=no box an absent incus group skips
  the role with a warning and converges everything else — one box-role user
  in a fleet-wide file must not abort apply everywhere VMs don't live.
  host=yes still dies pointing at box setup-host; a classless marker warns
  toward a bootstrap re-run.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-17 20:01:19 +00:00
Claude
2dc396d557 feat(users): close-root — shut the human-class root door once an admin key works
class decides root SSH's fate, and this is human's: install
/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-rig-users.conf (PermitRootLogin no), where the NAME
is the mechanism — sshd_config is first-wins, the Include glob expands
lexically, and '-' sorts before '.', so it is read before bootstrap's
00-rig.conf and wins. Gated three ways, no --force: a marker must exist
(never shut the root door blind), it must say class=human (on a server root
is the control plane's automation identity — closing it severs fleet
management), and some rig-admin member must already hold a non-empty
authorized_keys (never close the only door). The gate's policy lives in the
lib as assert_marker_human so the harness proves every refusal against
fixture markers as non-root; RIG_ROLE_MARKER keeps the command pointable at
the same fixtures. Apply is bootstrap's validate-then-apply shape verbatim —
cmp-guard, sshd -t on the merged config before the restart with rollback,
then the sshd -T effective assertion. Bootstrap's own permitrootlogin
assertion widens to accept 'no': the closed door is strictly harder, never
broken, and by first-wins bootstrap cannot reopen it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-17 19:28:25 +00:00
Claude
9bdc4db575 feat(users): declarative operators — apply/status over a users file, every class
Operators become a declared fact, not an accumulation of adduser runs: a
line-based, bash-parseable users file (no YAML, no jq — a rig box has
neither) names each user, their roles, and their keys, and apply converges
the box to exactly that. Roles map to groups (admin→rig-admin with full
NOPASSWD sudo, rig→rig sudo for the rig binary only, box→incus with no
sudo — box's setup-host owns Incus, rig only asserts the group). Every
password stays locked always; the SSH key at the door is the
authentication. A user dropped from the file is found via the /etc/rig/users
ledger and locked, never deleted — deleting frees the uid and rots
attribution. The sudoers drop-in lands only after visudo -c passes, because
a bad file under sudoers.d takes down all of sudo. Class never gates apply
(#26: a shared root login is unattributable, so operators belong on every
class); the marker only colors what root SSH does next. The whole file is
validated in one pass before the root check, every error named with its
line, so refusals are provable in the non-root harness through the sourced
parser.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-17 19:23:47 +00:00
Claude
92fa2a9860 bootstrap: infer the tailnet tag from the pre-auth key, verify the granted tag
rig used to pass --ts-tag to `tailscale up --advertise-tags`, stating the
tailnet tag a second time with no way to know whether its request and the
key's own tags agreed. It asserted the tag it REQUESTED, never the tag control
GRANTED — the sshd first-wins bug in a different hat, and the same scar (both
M900s joined tag:server, retagged by hand, unnoticed).

Collapse the two sources of truth onto one: the key.

- `tailscale up` drops --advertise-tags; the key's tags apply.
- After join, poll `tailscale status --json` for `.Self.Tags` (netmap ground
  truth, not `debug prefs`) until tags appear or BackendState=Running, on BOTH
  the fresh-join and already-joined paths.
- UNTAGGED -> hard refusal: `tailscale logout` to back the user-owned node out,
  then die naming the fix (mint a tagged key).
- Role policy moves onto the effective tag: a runner must not have tag:server
  among the tags the key actually granted. Strictly stronger than before.
- --ts-tag is removed, and dies exit 2 with a message pointing at the key
  (consuming its value), not an "unknown flag".
- New array-aware reader json_string_array in lib/runner-config.sh (jq-free,
  never fails under set -e), with its own unit tests; bootstrap sources the lib.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-17 15:27:09 +00:00
d4ab362964 fix(runner): install refuses a box registered to another repo
`rig runner install --repo <B>` on a box already registered to repo A
treated the mere existence of .runner as "already registered", skipped
configure, restarted the service still pointed at A, and reported success.
--repo was accepted, validated, and then ignored — leaving B with zero
runners and its `runs-on` jobs queued against one that will never come.

This is the natural next command after a partial `repoint`, and the failure
is worse than a no-op: moving a runner between repos is a trust-boundary
act, so quietly putting it back on the old one defeats the point of the move.

Gate install on the repo .runner actually names. Convergence — the property
worth keeping — is untouched: re-running against the repo the box is already
on still skips registration, never prompts for a token, and exits 0.
Skipping when the repo *differs* was never convergence, only a silently
ignored argument, so it now fails and names both repos, pointing at
`runner repoint` (move) or `runner remove` (start over). An unreadable
.runner is refused too — it is no licence to assume a match.

The .runner reader that `status` and `repoint` each carried is lifted into
commands/lib/runner-config.sh, which now also holds the guard. Its json_field
no longer dies bare under `set -o pipefail` when a key is missing, which is
what `status`'s own ${REPO_URL:-unknown} fallback always assumed.

Tests: the guard is exercised against a fixture .runner (refuses another repo
naming both, points at repoint, no-ops on the same repo, passes an
unregistered box, refuses an unreadable one) plus an ordering assertion that
it precedes svc.sh start — reaching it through the CLI would need root and a
really-registered runner, which the dependency-free harness cannot fabricate.
All three mutants (guard deleted, guard comparing nothing, guard moved below
the service start) go red.

Closes #13
2026-07-13 14:57:28 +00:00