b1c1357f2b
The trait was named for who lives on a box; what it decides is whether root SSH stays open as the control plane's automation door. Those are different questions, and `dev-server` proved it: an unattended VM-host appliance nobody lives on, correctly class=human because its root door must close. After #76 gave `-server` the job of naming the machine family, that box carried a suffix saying server and a trait saying human. `dev-server --root-door closed` says what is true, once. Unlike #76's role rename this field is read back on live machines, so the compat read is mandatory rather than courteous: one resolver, root_door_of, reads both vocabularies and every consumer goes through it — close-root's gate, apply's note, and bootstrap-tenant's machine-marker guard, which used the presence of `class=` as its "is this a real fleet machine?" test and would otherwise have let a tenant converge clobber a live box. New markers are written as `root-door=` only. Markers carrying both fields in disagreement, or neither, fail closed with a re-run-bootstrap repair. Fixture markers are kept deliberately at the retired spelling (the convention #76's pre-rename-cp fixture established) and pinned at both consumers; deleting the compat arm turns ten checks red. Closes #77 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
580 lines
31 KiB
Bash
Executable file
580 lines
31 KiB
Bash
Executable file
#!/usr/bin/env bash
|
|
# rig users apply — converge named operator accounts from a declarative users
|
|
# file, on every box. Humans always enter as themselves and elevate via
|
|
# sudo: a shared root login is unattributable, so operators belong on servers
|
|
# too — the root-door trait never gates this command, it only decides root
|
|
# SSH's fate AFTER users exist (close-root on root-door=closed, kept as the
|
|
# control plane's automation door on root-door=open). Convergent: a second
|
|
# identical run changes nothing and says so.
|
|
set -euo pipefail
|
|
|
|
HERE="$(cd "$(dirname "$(readlink -f "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")")" && pwd)"
|
|
# shellcheck source=SCRIPTDIR/lib/users-config.sh
|
|
. "$HERE/lib/users-config.sh"
|
|
|
|
log() { printf 'rig-users: %s\n' "$*"; }
|
|
warn() { printf 'rig-users: WARNING: %s\n' "$*" >&2; }
|
|
die() { printf 'rig-users: ERROR: %s\n' "$1" >&2; exit "${2:-1}"; }
|
|
|
|
usage() {
|
|
cat <<'EOF'
|
|
usage: rig users apply --file <path>
|
|
|
|
--file <path> users file (required; '-' reads it from stdin)
|
|
|
|
The file is line-based and bash-parseable on purpose — a rig box has no YAML
|
|
parser and no jq, and gets neither for this. Whitespace-separated: user,
|
|
comma-joined roles, then the SSH public key (the rest of the line). '#'
|
|
comments and blank lines are fine. Repeated username lines add authorized
|
|
keys; the roles must be identical on every line of one user.
|
|
|
|
# user roles ssh public key
|
|
dan admin,box ssh-ed25519 AAAA... dan@laptop
|
|
maria rig,box ssh-ed25519 AAAA... maria@mac
|
|
|
|
The key field may also be the literal token '@root': this user's
|
|
authorized_keys is seeded from root's CURRENT /root/.ssh/authorized_keys.
|
|
You provably hold a root private key — you SSHed in with it to run apply at
|
|
all — so the seeded key is the one key that cannot lock you out. '@root'
|
|
mixes with literal key lines: seeded keys land first, literal keys are
|
|
appended after them, and every re-run re-seeds from root's then-current file
|
|
(convergent to it — a seeded key you remove from the admin by hand returns;
|
|
switch the line to literal keys to pin them). Root's key lines are copied
|
|
verbatim, options included — a from= or command= restriction on a root key
|
|
follows it to the user. Apply dies if root has no authorized_keys to seed.
|
|
|
|
roles:
|
|
admin group rig-admin — full NOPASSWD sudo
|
|
rig group rig — NOPASSWD sudo for /usr/local/bin/rig only
|
|
box group incus — Incus restricted tier, no sudo. On host=yes apply
|
|
calls 'box grant <user>', which is the tier: the
|
|
group is only its socket, the user-<uid> project,
|
|
the boxnet-only narrowing, snapshots, backups and
|
|
the box-net profile are the rest of it. Dropping
|
|
the role hands the group back through
|
|
'box revoke' — never --purge: convergence removes
|
|
access, never someone's running boxes. box's
|
|
setup-host owns the Incus install; rig only
|
|
asserts it, and defers BOTH directions to box.
|
|
|
|
All passwords stay locked, always — the SSH key at the door is the
|
|
authentication, and NOPASSWD sudo does not weaken it. Convergent: membership
|
|
in the three rig-managed groups is made exact (other groups are never
|
|
touched), authorized_keys becomes exactly the file's keys, and a user dropped
|
|
from the file is REVOKED: account expired (which blocks SSH keys too, not
|
|
just the password), authorized_keys renamed to authorized_keys.revoked-by-rig,
|
|
rig groups stripped — home kept, nothing deleted, and re-adding the user
|
|
brings them back. Run as root; under sudo, only rig-admin members may — the
|
|
users family changes who holds root, so role rig's scoped sudo does not reach
|
|
it.
|
|
EOF
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# --- args (validated before the root check, so errors are testable) ---------
|
|
FILE=""
|
|
while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do
|
|
case "$1" in
|
|
--file)
|
|
[ $# -ge 2 ] || die "--file needs a value" 2
|
|
FILE="$2"; shift 2 ;;
|
|
-h|--help) usage; exit 0 ;;
|
|
*) die "unknown flag: $1" 2 ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
done
|
|
[ -n "$FILE" ] || die "--file <path> is required" 2
|
|
|
|
# stdin is read ONCE into a temp: the file is parsed for validation and then
|
|
# walked again to converge, and a pipe only plays once.
|
|
if [ "$FILE" = "-" ]; then
|
|
STDIN_TMP="$(mktemp)"
|
|
cat > "$STDIN_TMP"
|
|
FILE="$STDIN_TMP"
|
|
fi
|
|
[ -r "$FILE" ] || die "cannot read users file: $FILE" 2
|
|
|
|
# File parsing is argument validation: every error in the file is reported in
|
|
# one pass, exit 2, still before the root check.
|
|
PARSED="$(parse_users_file "$FILE")" \
|
|
|| die "invalid users file: $FILE — every error is listed above; nothing was changed" 2
|
|
|
|
declare -A USER_ROLES=() USER_KEYS=() USER_SEED=()
|
|
USERS=()
|
|
BOX_USERS=()
|
|
NEED_SUDO=0
|
|
NEED_INCUS=0
|
|
NEED_SEED=0
|
|
while IFS='|' read -r u r k; do
|
|
[ -n "$u" ] || continue
|
|
if [ -z "${USER_ROLES[$u]:-}" ]; then
|
|
USERS+=("$u")
|
|
USER_ROLES[$u]="$r"
|
|
case ",$r," in *,box,*) BOX_USERS+=("$u") ;; esac
|
|
fi
|
|
# '@root' is a key SOURCE, not a key: remember who seeds and resolve the
|
|
# actual lines after the root check — /root/.ssh is unreadable before it.
|
|
if [ "$k" = "@root" ]; then
|
|
USER_SEED[$u]=1
|
|
NEED_SEED=1
|
|
else
|
|
USER_KEYS[$u]="${USER_KEYS[$u]:-}$k"$'\n'
|
|
fi
|
|
case ",$r," in *,admin,*|*,rig,*) NEED_SUDO=1 ;; esac
|
|
case ",$r," in *,box,*) NEED_INCUS=1 ;; esac
|
|
done <<< "$PARSED"
|
|
|
|
# --- guards ------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
[ "$(id -u)" -eq 0 ] || die "must run as root"
|
|
|
|
# Identity management gates its INVOKER, not just its uid: %rig's sudoers rule
|
|
# is binary-scoped but not argument-scoped, so without this gate a rig-role
|
|
# user could run `sudo rig users apply --file <me-as-admin>` — the scoped
|
|
# grant silently root-equivalent through this very command. Direct root (no
|
|
# SUDO_USER: bring-up, a root shell) proceeds.
|
|
if [ -n "${SUDO_USER:-}" ] && [ "$SUDO_USER" != "root" ] \
|
|
&& ! id -nG "$SUDO_USER" 2>/dev/null | tr ' ' '\n' | grep -qx rig-admin; then
|
|
die "the users family changes who holds root — only rig-admin members (or root itself) may run it; role rig grants operational rig use, not identity management (invoker: $SUDO_USER)"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# --- @root seed source (#17) -------------------------------------------------
|
|
# The lockout-avoidance move: the operator SSHed in as root to run this at
|
|
# all, so root's CURRENT authorized_keys provably contains a key they hold —
|
|
# the one claim no local check can make about a pasted literal. Resolved ONCE
|
|
# here (post-root-check: /root/.ssh needs root) and copied verbatim, options
|
|
# included: a from=/command= restriction on a root key line follows it to the
|
|
# user, which is honest — rig will not silently widen what a key can do.
|
|
# Comments and blanks are dropped so the seeded block is exactly key lines;
|
|
# an empty result is a hard stop, because seeding nothing would converge the
|
|
# admin's authorized_keys to empty and close-root would then refuse — better
|
|
# to name the real problem now.
|
|
ROOT_SEED_KEYS=""
|
|
if [ "$NEED_SEED" -eq 1 ]; then
|
|
ROOT_SEED_KEYS="$(grep -Ev '^[[:space:]]*(#|$)' /root/.ssh/authorized_keys 2>/dev/null || true)"
|
|
[ -n "$ROOT_SEED_KEYS" ] \
|
|
|| die "a user's keys seed from @root but root has no authorized_keys (/root/.ssh/authorized_keys missing or without key lines) — @root's whole point is copying a key you provably hold; list a literal key instead"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# The root-door trait is a note here, never a refusal: #26's call is that
|
|
# operators belong on EVERY box — what differs is root SSH's fate once they
|
|
# exist. Resolved through root_door_of so this note and close-root's gate read
|
|
# one marker the same way, pre-#77 class= spellings included (#77): a box whose
|
|
# note says the door will shut must be a box where close-root agrees it shuts.
|
|
APPLY_MARKER="$(read_role_marker "${RIG_ROLE_MARKER:-/etc/rig/role}")"
|
|
if [ -z "$APPLY_MARKER" ]; then
|
|
warn "no /etc/rig/role marker — re-run rig bootstrap so this box knows what it is"
|
|
else
|
|
case "$(root_door_of "$APPLY_MARKER")" in
|
|
open) log "root-door=open: root SSH stays — it is the control plane's automation door" ;;
|
|
closed) log "root-door=closed: once your admin key works, 'rig users close-root' shuts the root door" ;;
|
|
# A marker naming both vocabularies in disagreement, or naming no door
|
|
# policy at all, is exactly where close-root will refuse. Apply still
|
|
# converges operators — that is the point of #26 — but it must not stay
|
|
# quiet about the refusal waiting at the end of the sequence it just
|
|
# pointed the operator at.
|
|
conflict) warn "marker names both root-door= and the pre-#77 class= and they disagree ($APPLY_MARKER) — 'rig users close-root' will refuse until you re-run rig bootstrap" ;;
|
|
*) warn "marker names no root-door policy ($APPLY_MARKER) — 'rig users close-root' will refuse until you re-run rig bootstrap" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
CHANGED=0
|
|
|
|
# --- sudo (only when some role actually grants through it) -------------------
|
|
if [ "$NEED_SUDO" -eq 1 ] && ! command -v sudo >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
|
log "installing sudo (admin/rig grants go through it)"
|
|
DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y -qq sudo
|
|
CHANGED=1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# --- groups ------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
groupadd -f rig-admin
|
|
groupadd -f rig
|
|
# rig NEVER installs Incus: box's setup-host owns the daemon and its group.
|
|
#
|
|
# Whether the box role applies AT ALL is the host= trait's call, decided here,
|
|
# once, from the marker alone — never from what groups happen to exist on the
|
|
# machine (#58). The box role binds where VMs live; a users file is fleet-wide,
|
|
# its box grants are not. Apply used to ask the trait only when group incus was
|
|
# ABSENT, which meant a host=no or marker-less box that nonetheless carried the
|
|
# group (setup-host ran, then the box was re-bootstrapped with other traits)
|
|
# handed box-role users a bare `usermod -aG incus` — the socket with no tier
|
|
# behind it, and incus-user answers a socket it is given by lazily creating an
|
|
# UNHARDENED project under whoever opens it. The trait now decides the same way
|
|
# in both directions: BOX_ROLE_OK is the single gate, and the group's presence
|
|
# only ever answers the narrower question of whether a box that DOES claim to
|
|
# host VMs is ready to.
|
|
#
|
|
# The rejected alternative was letting the machine overrule the marker — treat
|
|
# a real incus group as evidence the box hosts VMs and converge anyway, warning
|
|
# that the marker disagrees. It reads reasonable, but it inverts what the rest
|
|
# of this family does with host=: the marker is the box's declared identity, and
|
|
# bootstrap is the one thing that writes it. Provisioning a VM-host tier onto a
|
|
# box that does not claim to be a VM host is rig deciding it knows better than
|
|
# the declaration, on evidence (a leftover group) that survives exactly the
|
|
# repurposing that makes the marker right and the group stale. The cost of
|
|
# choosing the marker is a genuine VM host mislabelled host=no that stops
|
|
# provisioning — so this does not do it SILENTLY: the skip warning below names
|
|
# the contradiction and names `rig bootstrap` as the one-line repair.
|
|
#
|
|
# Consequence worth stating plainly: on such a box the exact-membership
|
|
# convergence below will now STRIP box-role users out of incus rather than
|
|
# leave them there. That is the same call, not a second one. A membership
|
|
# inherited from a previous life is the identical half-grant state as one
|
|
# freshly added — socket, no tier — and rig's promise for its three managed
|
|
# groups is exactness, not "exact except where drift got there first".
|
|
INCUS_OK=0
|
|
if getent group incus >/dev/null; then INCUS_OK=1; fi
|
|
BOX_ROLE_OK=0
|
|
BOX_ROLE_WHY=""
|
|
if BOX_ROLE_WHY="$(assert_marker_hosts_vms "${RIG_ROLE_MARKER:-/etc/rig/role}")"; then
|
|
BOX_ROLE_OK=1
|
|
fi
|
|
if [ "$NEED_INCUS" -eq 1 ] && [ "$BOX_ROLE_OK" -eq 0 ]; then
|
|
# The group being present while the trait says otherwise is the marker/reality
|
|
# mismatch — the case that used to slip through — so it gets its own sentence
|
|
# rather than the generic skip. Never a die: a fleet-wide users file naming a
|
|
# box-role user somewhere must not abort the admins it also carries here.
|
|
if [ "$INCUS_OK" -eq 1 ]; then
|
|
warn "box role skipped for ${BOX_USERS[*]}: $BOX_ROLE_WHY — yet group incus EXISTS here, so this box's marker and this box's reality disagree. rig believes the marker and grants nothing (the group alone is only the socket; without the tier behind it incus-user would lazily build an unhardened project under whoever opens it). If this machine really does host VMs, re-run rig bootstrap with --host yes and apply again; everything else converges"
|
|
else
|
|
warn "box role skipped for ${BOX_USERS[*]}: $BOX_ROLE_WHY; everything else converges"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if [ "$NEED_INCUS" -eq 1 ] && [ "$BOX_ROLE_OK" -eq 1 ] && [ "$INCUS_OK" -eq 0 ]; then
|
|
die "a user carries role box and this box hosts VMs (host=yes) but group incus is absent — install the box CLI and run 'box setup-host' first; rig never installs Incus"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# --- the box TIER, not just its socket (#49) ---------------------------------
|
|
# Group incus is step 1 of the five 'box grant' performs: the group is the
|
|
# SOCKET, while the tier is the per-user convergence behind it — the
|
|
# user-<uid> project, its narrowing to boxnet and only boxnet, the snapshot
|
|
# and backup allowances clone and 'box export' ride, and the shipped box-net
|
|
# profile installed into that project. rig doing step 1 alone left every
|
|
# box-role user's first 'box new' refusing ("your project has no box-net
|
|
# profile"), so apply's promise — the users file is the fleet's source of
|
|
# truth — was not kept for this role. It is kept by CALLING box's own grant
|
|
# rather than reimplementing four fifths of it: 'box grant' is idempotent,
|
|
# root-or-sudo (which apply already is), stdin-pinned so no incus client can
|
|
# wedge waiting on an answer, and does its own run-as-the-user touch, so the
|
|
# granted user never has to log in first for the lazy project to exist.
|
|
#
|
|
# Only on host=yes. The box role binds where VMs live, and the two other
|
|
# arms of the host= decision above are deliberately untouched: host=no keeps
|
|
# its skip-with-warning, and a marker with no host= trait keeps its own.
|
|
# Granting a tier on a box that does not host VMs would be converging policy
|
|
# into a daemon that is not there to enforce it.
|
|
#
|
|
# The box CLI's ABSENCE is a host-level fact, so it dies here, in the same
|
|
# register and for the same reason as the missing-incus-group die above: a
|
|
# host=yes box carrying box-role users but no box CLI is a broken VM host,
|
|
# not a per-user accident, and no amount of continuing converges it.
|
|
BOX_GRANT=0
|
|
if [ "$NEED_INCUS" -eq 1 ] && [ "$INCUS_OK" -eq 1 ]; then
|
|
case "$(read_role_marker "${RIG_ROLE_MARKER:-/etc/rig/role}")" in
|
|
*host=yes*)
|
|
command -v box >/dev/null 2>&1 \
|
|
|| die "a user carries role box and this box hosts VMs (host=yes) but the box CLI is not on PATH — the incus group is only the socket; the restricted tier is 'box grant', which rig calls rather than reimplements. Install the box CLI (rig bootstrap does it on host=yes) and re-run"
|
|
BOX_GRANT=1 ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
in_group() { id -nG "$1" 2>/dev/null | tr ' ' '\n' | grep -qx "$2"; }
|
|
|
|
# --- dropping role box: give the group back to the tool that owns it (#50) ---
|
|
# rig-admin and rig are rig's own groups, and `gpasswd -d` is the whole story
|
|
# for them. incus is not rig's: box's setup-host creates it, `box grant` hands
|
|
# it out, and `box revoke` takes it back — doing strictly MORE than removing
|
|
# the membership. It says out loud what removing the membership does not do:
|
|
# supplementary groups are read at LOGIN, so a session the dropped operator
|
|
# already holds keeps the Incus socket until that session dies, and the remedy
|
|
# is `loginctl terminate-user <user>`. rig's bare `gpasswd -d` logged "removed
|
|
# <user> from incus" and left it there, so an operator who dropped someone from
|
|
# the users file and watched apply succeed believed the VM access was gone —
|
|
# and was wrong for as long as that user held a session.
|
|
#
|
|
# So box takes its own group back. The fallback below exists for the host where
|
|
# box is not installed (someone else built the Incus stack, or box was removed
|
|
# from under it), and it carries the session warning ITSELF: the silence is the
|
|
# bug being fixed, not the gpasswd call.
|
|
#
|
|
# NEVER --purge from here. A bare revoke ends access and leaves the user's
|
|
# project and boxes intact — still RUNNING, because revoking a person does not
|
|
# kill their workloads. Deleting them is irreversible and is not a convergence
|
|
# step: an edit to the users file must never destroy someone's machines behind
|
|
# an admin's back. `box revoke <user> --purge`, run deliberately, is where that
|
|
# lives.
|
|
#
|
|
# The absent-group case needs no guard of its own: `id -nG` cannot report a
|
|
# group that does not exist, so every caller's `in_group` test is already false
|
|
# on a host=no box or one where `box setup-host` never ran — there is nothing
|
|
# to revoke, and apply says nothing and moves on.
|
|
drop_incus() { # drop_incus <user> — hand group 'incus' back to box
|
|
local u="$1"
|
|
if command -v box >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
|
# Don't trust the exit code — prove the effective state (the #12 lesson,
|
|
# the same one bootstrap applies to box's installer). A revoke that exits
|
|
# 0 having left the membership in place would otherwise be reported as a
|
|
# removal; the membership is what closes the socket, so it gets checked.
|
|
if box revoke "$u" && ! in_group "$u" incus; then
|
|
log "removed $u from incus (via 'box revoke' — box owns that group)"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
warn "'box revoke $u' did not remove the incus group — removing it directly; check box on this host"
|
|
fi
|
|
if in_group "$u" incus; then
|
|
gpasswd -d "$u" incus >/dev/null
|
|
log "removed $u from incus"
|
|
fi
|
|
# box's warning, in rig's voice, because rig is the one that took the group
|
|
# here. pgrep decides whether it applies; if pgrep is absent rig cannot tell,
|
|
# and an unnecessary warning costs an operator one command while a missing
|
|
# one costs them a wrong belief about who can reach the daemon.
|
|
if ! command -v pgrep >/dev/null 2>&1 || pgrep -u "$u" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
|
warn "$u may hold live sessions, and group membership is read at login — those sessions keep the Incus socket until they end. To end them now: loginctl terminate-user $u"
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# --- converge each user ------------------------------------------------------
|
|
for u in "${USERS[@]}"; do
|
|
if ! id -u "$u" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
|
useradd -m -s /bin/bash "$u"
|
|
log "created user $u"
|
|
CHANGED=1
|
|
fi
|
|
# Locked always, created or found: no password ever exists to guess or
|
|
# rotate — the SSH key at the door is the authentication. The expiry is
|
|
# cleared just as idempotently: revocation below IS an expiry date, so a
|
|
# user dropped once and re-added comes back to life on this line.
|
|
usermod -L -e '' "$u"
|
|
|
|
# Membership in the three rig-managed groups is made EXACT — added and
|
|
# removed to match the file. Other groups are never touched: they are not
|
|
# rig's to converge.
|
|
roles="${USER_ROLES[$u]}"
|
|
want=""
|
|
case ",$roles," in *,admin,*) want="$want rig-admin" ;; esac
|
|
case ",$roles," in *,rig,*) want="$want rig" ;; esac
|
|
# incus joins the wanted set only when the box role APPLIES to this box —
|
|
# the host= trait's call, made once above — and only when the group is
|
|
# actually there. Deliberately a gate on whether the role applies, not on
|
|
# the add: it is the same question no matter who performs the add, so it
|
|
# keeps answering correctly if the add itself later moves elsewhere (#53
|
|
# defers it to `box grant`). BOX_ROLE_OK=1 already implies the group exists
|
|
# (the arm above dies otherwise), but INCUS_OK is kept in the condition
|
|
# because converging membership in a conjured group would hand the daemon's
|
|
# arrival an audience it never granted, and that must not depend on a
|
|
# neighbouring branch staying fatal.
|
|
case ",$roles," in *,box,*) if [ "$BOX_ROLE_OK" -eq 1 ] && [ "$INCUS_OK" -eq 1 ]; then want="$want incus"; fi ;; esac
|
|
for g in rig-admin rig incus; do
|
|
case " $want " in
|
|
*" $g "*)
|
|
# incus stays in the WANTED set — that is what keeps the exact
|
|
# convergence below from stripping a box-role user's socket — but on
|
|
# a host where we are about to run 'box grant', the ADD is deferred to
|
|
# grant itself. Two reasons, both load-bearing:
|
|
#
|
|
# Grant's rollback only reaches a membership THAT RUN added: a user it
|
|
# finds already in incus keeps it when a later step trips
|
|
# (box/host/grant-user.sh's was_member branch), by design — stripping
|
|
# a membership it did not add could break a working user over a failed
|
|
# re-run. So if rig opens the socket first, grant can no longer close
|
|
# it, and a grant that fails midway leaves the user holding live
|
|
# access to an UN-narrowed project: the stock unhardened incusbr-<uid>
|
|
# one --network flag away. That state is strictly worse than no grant
|
|
# at all, which is the sharp end of #49. Deferring makes the socket and
|
|
# the tier land together or fail together.
|
|
#
|
|
# And grant is the authority on whether the group belongs at all: for
|
|
# an incus-admin member it deliberately does NOT add incus (admin
|
|
# membership already wins at the socket, so the row would only mislead
|
|
# whoever reads the group list later). rig adding it here would put a
|
|
# membership on that user which box has decided against — not a loop
|
|
# that oscillates, but rig overruling box on box's own tier, which is
|
|
# exactly the boundary this whole change is respecting.
|
|
if [ "$g" = incus ] && [ "$BOX_GRANT" -eq 1 ]; then continue; fi
|
|
if ! in_group "$u" "$g"; then
|
|
usermod -aG "$g" "$u"
|
|
log "added $u to $g"
|
|
CHANGED=1
|
|
fi ;;
|
|
*)
|
|
if in_group "$u" "$g"; then
|
|
if [ "$g" = incus ]; then
|
|
drop_incus "$u"
|
|
else
|
|
gpasswd -d "$u" "$g" >/dev/null
|
|
log "removed $u from $g"
|
|
fi
|
|
CHANGED=1
|
|
fi ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
# The tier itself. AFTER the account exists — 'box grant' opens with a
|
|
# getent passwd and refuses an unknown user — and after the other groups,
|
|
# so a user whose grant fails still lands with everything rig owns outright.
|
|
#
|
|
# Per-user failures WARN and continue, matching the governing call the
|
|
# host= split above already makes: one box-role user somewhere in the fleet
|
|
# must not stop apply everywhere VMs don't live, and a project that would
|
|
# not converge is exactly that shape of local fact. Host-level facts still
|
|
# die, but they die before this loop — the missing group and the missing
|
|
# CLI both. What is left here (project creation refused, an instance still
|
|
# parked on the private bridge blocking the narrowing, an incus-user socket
|
|
# that will not answer) is per-user by construction.
|
|
if [ "$BOX_GRANT" -eq 1 ]; then
|
|
case ",$roles," in
|
|
*,box,*)
|
|
had_socket=0
|
|
if in_group "$u" incus; then had_socket=1; fi
|
|
log "granting $u the box restricted tier (box grant $u)"
|
|
grant_rc=0
|
|
box grant "$u" || grant_rc=$?
|
|
if [ "$grant_rc" -eq 0 ]; then
|
|
# CHANGED is a claim about what apply DID, and the only part of the
|
|
# grant rig can observe from out here is the group transition —
|
|
# every other step converges inside incus's own state, with no cheap
|
|
# "already converged?" probe short of redoing the work. So report
|
|
# the transition when it happens and stay silent otherwise: a
|
|
# convergent call that changed nothing must not turn "already
|
|
# converged; no changes" into a permanent lie on every host=yes box.
|
|
if [ "$had_socket" -eq 0 ] && in_group "$u" incus; then
|
|
log "granted $u the restricted tier (incus group, user-$(id -u "$u") project, boxnet-only, box-net profile)"
|
|
CHANGED=1
|
|
fi
|
|
elif in_group "$u" incus-admin; then
|
|
# Today 'box grant' refuses incus-admin members outright — it reads
|
|
# their admin membership as "there is nothing tighter to grant",
|
|
# which conflates permission with provisioning: they hold the full
|
|
# socket but have no project of their own. heavy-duty/box#99 makes
|
|
# grant provision them instead of refusing, at which point this
|
|
# branch simply stops being reached — no rig change needed, because
|
|
# rig asks for the tier and lets box decide what that means. Until
|
|
# then the honest report is that nothing was lost: they still hold
|
|
# strictly more access than the tier would give them.
|
|
warn "box grant $u exited $grant_rc and $u is in incus-admin, which box refuses to grant today — they keep the full socket (incus-admin is strictly stronger than the tier), but they get no user-<uid> project of their own and land in the shared default project alongside every other admin. Blocked on heavy-duty/box#99; everything else converged, and a later apply picks the tier up once box stops refusing"
|
|
else
|
|
warn "box grant $u exited $grant_rc: $u has their account, keys and rig groups, but NOT the box restricted tier — no user-<uid> project, no boxnet narrowing, no box-net profile, so their 'box new' will refuse. box's own output above names the cause; fix it and re-run apply (or 'box grant $u' by hand). Every other user still converged — one box-role user must not stop apply for the fleet"
|
|
fi ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# authorized_keys becomes exactly the file's keys — only the content WRITE
|
|
# is cmp-guarded, so an unchanged file is a clean no-op. Ownership and mode
|
|
# converge UNCONDITIONALLY: sshd's StrictModes treats them as load-bearing
|
|
# (a group-writable .ssh is a rejected key), so drifted perms behind
|
|
# matching content would otherwise stay broken while apply logs "already
|
|
# converged". Perms are part of the converged state.
|
|
home="$(getent passwd "$u" | cut -d: -f6)"
|
|
ugroup="$(id -gn "$u")"
|
|
mkdir -p "$home/.ssh"
|
|
# Seeded (@root) keys land FIRST, literal lines append after — fixed order
|
|
# so the cmp-guard sees identical bytes on identical state and re-runs
|
|
# converge to root's then-current keys plus the literals (#17). A literal
|
|
# that duplicates a seeded key writes twice; sshd does not mind and the
|
|
# bytes stay deterministic.
|
|
AK_TMP="$(mktemp)"
|
|
{
|
|
if [ -n "${USER_SEED[$u]:-}" ]; then printf '%s\n' "$ROOT_SEED_KEYS"; fi
|
|
printf '%s' "${USER_KEYS[$u]:-}"
|
|
} > "$AK_TMP"
|
|
if ! cmp -s "$AK_TMP" "$home/.ssh/authorized_keys" 2>/dev/null; then
|
|
install -m 0600 -o "$u" -g "$ugroup" "$AK_TMP" "$home/.ssh/authorized_keys"
|
|
log "authorized_keys for $u: $(grep -c . "$AK_TMP") key(s)"
|
|
CHANGED=1
|
|
fi
|
|
rm -f "$AK_TMP"
|
|
chmod 0700 "$home/.ssh"
|
|
chown "$u:$ugroup" "$home/.ssh"
|
|
chmod 0600 "$home/.ssh/authorized_keys"
|
|
chown "$u:$ugroup" "$home/.ssh/authorized_keys"
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
# --- previously managed users no longer in the file --------------------------
|
|
# The ledger is what lets a REMOVED user be found at all — so it must REMEMBER
|
|
# them: two-field lines, 'name active' / 'name revoked' (a legacy bare name
|
|
# reads as active). Revoked, not deleted: deleting frees the uid for reuse and
|
|
# orphans file ownership — attribution would rot. Home stays for the same
|
|
# reason. But revoked must actually mean revoked: a '!'-locked password is not
|
|
# a closed door under UsePAM — Debian sshd still honors the pubkey — so the
|
|
# lock alone left a dropped operator with working SSH. Account expiry (a date
|
|
# in the past) is the switch PAM actually enforces, against every auth method
|
|
# including keys; the keys themselves are renamed, never deleted — access
|
|
# revoked, data kept, convergence never destroys.
|
|
LEDGER=/etc/rig/users
|
|
REVOKED=()
|
|
if [ -r "$LEDGER" ]; then
|
|
while read -r prev pstate _; do
|
|
[ -n "$prev" ] || continue
|
|
case " ${USERS[*]:-} " in *" $prev "*) continue ;; esac
|
|
id -u "$prev" >/dev/null 2>&1 || continue
|
|
usermod -L -e 1 "$prev"
|
|
prevhome="$(getent passwd "$prev" | cut -d: -f6)"
|
|
if [ -f "$prevhome/.ssh/authorized_keys" ]; then
|
|
mv "$prevhome/.ssh/authorized_keys" "$prevhome/.ssh/authorized_keys.revoked-by-rig"
|
|
fi
|
|
# incus goes back through box here too — a user dropped from the file
|
|
# entirely is exactly the offboarding this warning was written for, and it
|
|
# would be perverse for the full revocation to be the quiet one. It fires
|
|
# once, on the transition: the membership is gone on the next run, so
|
|
# in_group is false and an already-revoked user stays a clean no-op.
|
|
for g in rig-admin rig incus; do
|
|
if in_group "$prev" "$g"; then
|
|
if [ "$g" = incus ]; then
|
|
drop_incus "$prev"
|
|
else
|
|
gpasswd -d "$prev" "$g" >/dev/null
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
REVOKED+=("$prev")
|
|
# Warn on the TRANSITION only: an already-revoked user is converged above
|
|
# (quietly — repairing drift, not announcing news) so a second identical
|
|
# run stays a clean no-op.
|
|
if [ "${pstate:-active}" != "revoked" ]; then
|
|
warn "$prev is no longer in the file: account expired (blocks SSH keys too, not just the password), authorized_keys renamed to authorized_keys.revoked-by-rig, rig groups stripped (home kept — rig never deletes a user)"
|
|
CHANGED=1
|
|
fi
|
|
done < "$LEDGER"
|
|
fi
|
|
LEDGER_TMP="$(mktemp)"
|
|
if [ "${#USERS[@]}" -gt 0 ]; then printf '%s active\n' "${USERS[@]}" > "$LEDGER_TMP"; fi
|
|
if [ "${#REVOKED[@]}" -gt 0 ]; then printf '%s revoked\n' "${REVOKED[@]}" >> "$LEDGER_TMP"; fi
|
|
if ! cmp -s "$LEDGER_TMP" "$LEDGER" 2>/dev/null; then
|
|
mkdir -p /etc/rig
|
|
install -m 0644 "$LEDGER_TMP" "$LEDGER"
|
|
CHANGED=1
|
|
fi
|
|
rm -f "$LEDGER_TMP"
|
|
|
|
# --- sudoers -----------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
# Both group rules ship in one drop-in whether or not both roles are in use:
|
|
# the groups exist and the rules are inert without members. visudo gates the
|
|
# install because a bad file under /etc/sudoers.d can take down ALL of sudo —
|
|
# locking every admin out of the very escalation path apply just granted.
|
|
SUDOERS_TMP="$(mktemp)"
|
|
cat > "$SUDOERS_TMP" <<'EOF'
|
|
# Managed by `rig users apply` — do not edit; the next apply converges it.
|
|
%rig-admin ALL=(ALL:ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL
|
|
%rig ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/local/bin/rig
|
|
EOF
|
|
if command -v visudo >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
|
visudo -c -f "$SUDOERS_TMP" >/dev/null \
|
|
|| die "sudoers candidate failed validation — /etc/sudoers.d untouched; candidate kept at $SUDOERS_TMP for inspection"
|
|
if ! cmp -s "$SUDOERS_TMP" /etc/sudoers.d/rig-roles 2>/dev/null; then
|
|
install -m 0440 "$SUDOERS_TMP" /etc/sudoers.d/rig-roles
|
|
log "sudoers role rules installed (/etc/sudoers.d/rig-roles)"
|
|
CHANGED=1
|
|
fi
|
|
rm -f "$SUDOERS_TMP"
|
|
else
|
|
# No sudo on the box means no role needed it (the install above would have
|
|
# run otherwise): rules for a binary that is not there can wait for the
|
|
# apply that brings a sudo-bearing role.
|
|
rm -f "$SUDOERS_TMP"
|
|
log "sudo not installed and no role needs it; skipping the sudoers drop-in"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [ "$CHANGED" -eq 0 ]; then
|
|
log "already converged; no changes"
|
|
else
|
|
log "converged ${#USERS[@]} user(s)"
|
|
fi
|