3ae3e3fea3
Adds a non-root admin user (sudo group, never docker, NOPASSWD sudo, key-only) on every role, with its authorized_keys seeded ONCE from root's at creation — live proof the operator holds the private key. --admin-key composes an explicit key with the seed. Adds --lock-root (PermitRootLogin no), role-gated: refused (exit 2) on control-plane (Coolify self-SSH) and workload (needs Coolify's experimental non-root mode rig doesn't provision), allowed on runner. Before closing root's door it verifies the admin is reachable (account not expired, real shell, sane authorized_keys, sudo -n true, sshd -T -C resolution permits the login); any failure leaves the door open and says why. The PermitRootLogin no drop-in is 00-rig-root.conf, sorting BEFORE 00-rig.conf so first-wins sshd_config semantics actually apply it, installed with the same validate-before-restart + sshd -t + rollback + sshd -T effective-assert dance as the base hardening. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
496 lines
26 KiB
Bash
Executable file
496 lines
26 KiB
Bash
Executable file
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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# rig bootstrap — OS plumbing for a pristine Debian box.
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# Convergent: safe to re-run; a second run changes nothing.
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set -euo pipefail
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log() { printf 'rig-bootstrap: %s\n' "$*"; }
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warn() { printf 'rig-bootstrap: WARNING: %s\n' "$*" >&2; }
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die() { printf 'rig-bootstrap: ERROR: %s\n' "$1" >&2; exit "${2:-1}"; }
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usage() {
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cat <<'EOF'
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usage: rig bootstrap <control-plane|workload|runner> [--hostname <name>]
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[--ts-tag <tag>] [--admin-user <name>] [--admin-key <pubkey>]
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[--lock-root]
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--hostname system + tailnet hostname (default: the role name)
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--ts-tag tailnet tag to advertise (default: tag:server;
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role runner defaults to tag:ci and refuses tag:server —
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a CI box executes repo-controlled code, and your server
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tag's grants must never extend to it)
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--admin-user non-root admin account to create on every role (default: admin;
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refuses root). sudo group, key-only, NEVER the docker group.
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Its authorized_keys is seeded ONCE from root's at creation —
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you are connected as root with one of those keys right now, so
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the copy is live proof the private key is in your hands.
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--admin-key an extra public key to add to the admin account at creation,
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composed with the seed above (optional).
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--lock-root close root's SSH door (PermitRootLogin no) once the admin user
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is proven reachable. ROLE-GATED: refused on control-plane
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(Coolify SSHes to its OWN host) and on workload (needs Coolify's
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experimental non-root mode, which rig does not provision);
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allowed on runner.
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Provide the single-use tailscale pre-auth key via the TS_AUTHKEY env var, or
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enter it at the interactive prompt. It is used once and never written to disk.
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EOF
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}
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# --- args (validated before the root check, so errors are testable) ---------
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ROLE="${1:-}"
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case "$ROLE" in
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control-plane|workload|runner) shift ;;
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-h|--help) usage; exit 0 ;;
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"") usage >&2; die "role required (control-plane|workload|runner)" 2 ;;
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*) die "unknown role: $ROLE (want control-plane|workload|runner)" 2 ;;
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esac
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TS_HOSTNAME="$ROLE"
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if [ "$ROLE" = "runner" ]; then
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TS_TAG="tag:ci"
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else
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TS_TAG="tag:server"
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fi
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ADMIN_USER="admin" # generic default; nothing org-specific ever ships in rig
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ADMIN_KEY=""
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LOCK_ROOT=0
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while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do
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case "$1" in
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--hostname)
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[ $# -ge 2 ] || die "--hostname needs a value" 2
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TS_HOSTNAME="$2"; shift 2 ;;
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--ts-tag)
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[ $# -ge 2 ] || die "--ts-tag needs a value" 2
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TS_TAG="$2"; shift 2 ;;
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--admin-user)
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[ $# -ge 2 ] || die "--admin-user needs a value" 2
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ADMIN_USER="$2"; shift 2 ;;
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--admin-key)
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[ $# -ge 2 ] || die "--admin-key needs a value" 2
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ADMIN_KEY="$2"; shift 2 ;;
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--lock-root)
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LOCK_ROOT=1; shift ;;
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*) die "unknown flag: $1" 2 ;;
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esac
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done
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# A runner executes repo-controlled code; advertising the server tag would
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# extend every grant your servers hold to that code. Refused, not warned.
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if [ "$ROLE" = "runner" ] && [ "$TS_TAG" = "tag:server" ]; then
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die "role runner must not advertise tag:server" 2
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fi
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# The admin account is the non-root human door; making it "root" is a
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# contradiction in terms. Refused, not warned — same spirit as runner-install
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# refusing --user root.
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[ "$ADMIN_USER" != "root" ] || die "--admin-user must not be root" 2
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# Role-aware root policy. --lock-root means exactly `PermitRootLogin no` (see the
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# lock-root block far below for why not the other four "lock root" techniques),
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# and on the two Coolify roles that is a self-inflicted fleet outage, so it is
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# REFUSED here (exit 2) rather than warned — a flag that silently bricks a box's
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# only door is worse than no flag. Validated before the root check so the
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# refusal is unit-testable without a live box.
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if [ "$LOCK_ROOT" -eq 1 ]; then
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case "$ROLE" in
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control-plane)
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die "role control-plane must not --lock-root: Coolify reaches its OWN host over SSH (host.docker.internal) and non-root localhost is unsupported upstream (coollabsio/coolify#4245); PermitRootLogin no would cut the control plane off from itself" 2 ;;
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workload)
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die "role workload must not --lock-root: closing root here needs Coolify's experimental non-root mode — a 'coolify' user with NOPASSWD: ALL (root by another name), which rig does not provision. Get attribution cheaper via sshd key-fingerprint logging + auditd. Revisit when Coolify ships granular sudo" 2 ;;
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runner)
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: ;; # no Coolify on a runner; lock-root is allowed once the admin proves reachable
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esac
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fi
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# --- guards ------------------------------------------------------------------
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[ "$(id -u)" -eq 0 ] || die "must run as root"
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if [ -r /etc/os-release ]; then
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# Sourced in a subshell: os-release defines VERSION, NAME, ID, etc. —
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# sourcing it in the main shell silently clobbers same-named script vars.
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# shellcheck source=/dev/null
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OS_FAMILY="$(. /etc/os-release && printf '%s %s' "${ID:-}" "${ID_LIKE:-}")"
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case "$OS_FAMILY" in
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*debian*) ;;
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*) warn "not a Debian-family system (${OS_FAMILY:-unknown}); proceeding anyway" ;;
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esac
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else
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warn "cannot read /etc/os-release; proceeding anyway"
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fi
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# The pre-auth key is acquired LATER, in the tailscale block — and only if the
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# box has not already joined. rig is convergent by contract, so re-running it to
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# pick up a fix (e.g. the 2026-07-12 sshd first-wins fix) must not demand a
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# credential it will never spend: prompting up front made the repair path cost a
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# throwaway Tailscale key, which is exactly the friction that stops people from
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# re-running it.
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# --- packages ----------------------------------------------------------------
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export DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive
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log "installing base packages"
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apt-get update -qq
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# openssh-server: a rig box is managed over SSH (Coolify SSHes in as root),
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# and the hardening drop-in below targets /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/ — which
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# only exists once the package is installed. Cloud images ship it; pristine
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# container/VM images (the Incus rehearsal) do not.
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# sudo: the admin user below is placed in the sudo group, which the sudo
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# package creates — and the lock-root verification runs `sudo -n true` under
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# the admin before it will close root's door. A pristine Debian container ships
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# neither the package nor the group; cloud images do.
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apt-get install -y -qq curl ca-certificates unattended-upgrades openssh-server sudo
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# enable periodic unattended upgrades (canonical file; idempotent overwrite)
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cat > /etc/apt/apt.conf.d/20auto-upgrades <<'EOF'
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APT::Periodic::Update-Package-Lists "1";
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APT::Periodic::Unattended-Upgrade "1";
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EOF
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# --- sshd hardening (restart only when the drop-in actually changed) ---------
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# The name must sort BEFORE cloud-init's drop-in. sshd_config is FIRST-wins
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# ("for each keyword, the first obtained value will be used" — sshd_config(5)),
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# and Include expands the glob in lexical order. Cloud images ship
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# /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/50-cloud-init.conf carrying `PasswordAuthentication
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# yes`, so the old 99-rig.conf was read second and silently lost every keyword
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# it set. 00- wins. (Found 2026-07-12: every Hetzner box rig had bootstrapped
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# was still serving `passwordauthentication yes`. The Incus rehearsal never
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# caught it — a pristine Debian container has no cloud-init drop-in.)
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DROPIN=/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-rig.conf
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LEGACY_DROPIN=/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/99-rig.conf
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TMP="$(mktemp)"
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cat > "$TMP" <<'EOF'
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PermitRootLogin prohibit-password
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PasswordAuthentication no
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EOF
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if ! cmp -s "$TMP" "$DROPIN" 2>/dev/null || [ -e "$LEGACY_DROPIN" ]; then
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BACKUP=""
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[ -e "$DROPIN" ] && { BACKUP="$(mktemp)"; cp -a "$DROPIN" "$BACKUP"; }
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install -m 0644 "$TMP" "$DROPIN"
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rm -f "$LEGACY_DROPIN" # sweep the losing file from already-bootstrapped boxes
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# Validate the MERGED config BEFORE bouncing the daemon. On a box whose only
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# door is SSH, `systemctl restart ssh` against a config sshd refuses to parse
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# leaves no listener and no way back in. `sshd -t` parses everything sshd
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# would parse — our drop-in, cloud-init's, and any third-party file — so a
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# broken neighbour is caught here rather than after the door has shut.
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if ! sshd -t 2>/dev/null; then
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if [ -n "$BACKUP" ]; then cp -a "$BACKUP" "$DROPIN"; else rm -f "$DROPIN"; fi
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rm -f "$TMP" "$BACKUP"
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die "sshd rejects the merged config; drop-in rolled back, daemon untouched. Run 'sshd -t' to see which file is bad."
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fi
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rm -f "$BACKUP"
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systemctl restart ssh
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log "sshd hardening drop-in installed"
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else
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log "sshd hardening drop-in already in place"
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fi
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rm -f "$TMP"
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# Assert the EFFECTIVE config, not the file's existence — asserting the file is
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# what let the first-wins bug ship green. `sshd -T` is what the daemon actually
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# resolved, cloud-init and all.
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eff="$(sshd -T 2>/dev/null)" || die "sshd -T failed; refusing to claim a hardened box"
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echo "$eff" | grep -qx 'passwordauthentication no' \
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|| die "sshd still resolves passwordauthentication=yes — a drop-in is beating ${DROPIN}; check ls /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/"
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# `no` is accepted here too, not just the two prohibit-password spellings: once
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# --lock-root has installed 00-rig-root.conf (below), the effective policy is
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# `no`, which is STRICTLY MORE restrictive (root cannot log in at all, password
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# or key). Refusing it would make the very first re-run of a locked box die in
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# the base-hardening assert — breaking convergence exactly where it matters
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# most. `no` still means "no root password login", so it satisfies the intent.
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echo "$eff" | grep -qxE 'permitrootlogin (prohibit-password|without-password|no)' \
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|| die "sshd still permits root password login — check ls /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/"
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log "sshd hardening verified (sshd -T: passwordauthentication no)"
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# --- admin user (a non-root human door on every role) ------------------------
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# rig hardens the SSH door but, until now, never created a human to walk through
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# it: every box was administered as root, survivable only because of the
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# prohibit-password drop-in above. The admin is a non-root account in the sudo
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# group with an SSH key — and NEVER the docker group: the docker socket is a
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# root API and docker-group membership is root-equivalent, a gratuitous path to
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# root that runner-install refuses for the same reason. sudo is the ONLY
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# supplementary group it gets. Created on every role (control-plane included,
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# where root must stay) so there is always a human door even where root's stays
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# open.
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ADMIN_HOME="$(getent passwd "$ADMIN_USER" 2>/dev/null | cut -d: -f6)"
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if [ -z "$ADMIN_HOME" ]; then
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log "creating admin user ${ADMIN_USER} (sudo group, no docker)"
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useradd --create-home --shell /bin/bash "$ADMIN_USER"
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usermod -aG sudo "$ADMIN_USER"
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ADMIN_HOME="$(getent passwd "$ADMIN_USER" | cut -d: -f6)"
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# NOPASSWD sudo for the admin — and yes, this is the same NOPASSWD the issue
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# warns against for Coolify's service user. The distinction is who holds the
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# account: the admin is a HUMAN who authenticates with an SSH key they hold
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# and has NO password (useradd leaves the password locked). Requiring a sudo
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# password they do not have would make sudo unusable — a non-root user who
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# cannot escalate is not an admin. Key-only + NOPASSWD sudo is exactly what
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# Debian/Ubuntu cloud images do for their default user. It is wrong for
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# Coolify's user (a non-human identity you are trying to CONSTRAIN, where
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# NOPASSWD hands an attacker who takes the account full root and makes
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# attribution merely cooperative); it is right for a human you are EMPOWERING.
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# visudo -cf validates before install: a malformed sudoers file breaks sudo
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# for everyone, and we are about to (maybe) close root's door behind it.
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SUDOERS_TMP="$(mktemp)"
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printf '%s ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD:ALL\n' "$ADMIN_USER" > "$SUDOERS_TMP"
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if visudo -cf "$SUDOERS_TMP" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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install -m 0440 -o root -g root "$SUDOERS_TMP" "/etc/sudoers.d/90-rig-${ADMIN_USER}"
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else
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rm -f "$SUDOERS_TMP"
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die "generated sudoers file for ${ADMIN_USER} failed visudo -c; not installed"
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fi
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rm -f "$SUDOERS_TMP"
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# Seed authorized_keys from ROOT's — ONCE, at creation, and never again.
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# WHY seed from root: the operator is connected as root RIGHT NOW using one
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# of root's keys, so copying them into the admin account is live proof the
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# matching private key is in their hands — strictly better than any check
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# rig could invent, needs no new argument, and a public key is not a secret,
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# so "no credential, ever" does not bend.
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# WHY only once: re-seeding on every run would resurrect a key the operator
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# DELIBERATELY removed from the admin account. Seed-once is therefore, in
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# strict honesty, NOT convergent — an exception named here rather than
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# papered over. An existing admin user (the else branch) is left untouched.
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install -d -m 0700 -o "$ADMIN_USER" -g "$ADMIN_USER" "$ADMIN_HOME/.ssh"
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ADMIN_KEYS="$ADMIN_HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys"
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: > "$ADMIN_KEYS"
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if [ -r /root/.ssh/authorized_keys ]; then
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# Two hazards make a blind copy wrong:
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# - Coolify writes its OWN key into root's authorized_keys when it
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# registers a server. We cannot tell it from the operator's, so we cannot
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# drop it; on control-plane/workload the operator should audit the seeded
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# file (documented in the README).
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# - Cloud images can carry command="…"/from="…" forced-command or source
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# restrictions on a key. Copied verbatim those silently follow to the
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# admin (a from="1.2.3.4" that no longer matches would lock the admin out
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# just as surely). We SKIP any line whose first field is not a bare key
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# type — i.e. one carrying leading options — and warn, rather than seed a
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# key that behaves differently than it reads. Pass it via --admin-key if
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# the restriction is intended.
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while IFS= read -r line; do
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case "$line" in
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""|\#*) continue ;;
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ssh-*|ecdsa-*|sk-ssh-*|sk-ecdsa-*)
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printf '%s\n' "$line" >> "$ADMIN_KEYS" ;;
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*)
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warn "skipping a restricted key line (command=/from=/…) while seeding ${ADMIN_USER} from root; re-add it with --admin-key if intended" ;;
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esac
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done < /root/.ssh/authorized_keys
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fi
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# --admin-key composes with the seed: an explicit key the operator supplies,
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# added at creation alongside whatever was copied from root.
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if [ -n "$ADMIN_KEY" ]; then
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printf '%s\n' "$ADMIN_KEY" >> "$ADMIN_KEYS"
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log "added --admin-key to ${ADMIN_USER}"
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fi
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chown -R "$ADMIN_USER:$ADMIN_USER" "$ADMIN_HOME/.ssh"
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chmod 0600 "$ADMIN_KEYS"
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if [ ! -s "$ADMIN_KEYS" ]; then
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warn "${ADMIN_USER} has an EMPTY authorized_keys (root had none to seed and no --admin-key given) — it cannot log in yet; add a key before relying on it"
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fi
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log "admin user ${ADMIN_USER} created"
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else
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# Convergent: an existing admin user is left completely alone — no re-seeding
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# (see the seed-once note above), no group changes, no sudoers rewrite.
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log "admin user ${ADMIN_USER} already exists; leaving it and its keys untouched"
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fi
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# --- lock root's SSH door (--lock-root, role-permitted only) ------------------
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# Reached only when --lock-root was given AND the role passed the policy gate
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# above (control-plane/workload already died at exit 2; only runner arrives
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# here). "Lock root" is FOUR different actions that do NOT behave alike
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# (measured on OpenSSH 10 / Debian 13):
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# passwd -l root key-based root SSH still WORKS (near no-op)
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# PermitRootLogin prohibit key SSH works (what rig does today)
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# usermod --expiredate 1 BREAKS root SSH via PAM
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# root shell -> nologin BREAKS (and then chsh fails too)
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# PermitRootLogin no BREAKS root SSH <-- the ONLY one we want
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# We want exactly `PermitRootLogin no`. The other break-paths (expiredate,
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# nologin) would also break rig's OWN convergence: rig is run as root over SSH,
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# so a re-run to pick up a fix would find the door bolted from a direction sshd
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# cannot reopen. `PermitRootLogin no` leaves the account intact and reopenable
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# by deleting one drop-in.
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if [ "$LOCK_ROOT" -eq 1 ]; then
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log "verifying ${ADMIN_USER} is reachable before closing root's door"
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# NEVER close root's door in the same breath as opening the admin's without
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# these checks passing. What rig CANNOT verify is that the operator holds the
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# admin's private key — which is exactly why we seeded authorized_keys from
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# root's (the key they are connected with right now). Everything else, we can:
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fail() { die "refusing --lock-root: $1 (root's door stays OPEN)" 1; }
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# 1. Account exists.
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id -u "$ADMIN_USER" >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "admin user ${ADMIN_USER} does not exist"
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# 2. Account not expired/disabled. A locked PASSWORD is fine (key auth is
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# unaffected — that is the whole lesson of this issue), but an EXPIRED
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# account (shadow field 8 in the past, i.e. `usermod --expiredate 1`) is
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# refused by PAM and would block the admin's SSH too. Field 8 empty = never.
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expire_days="$(getent shadow "$ADMIN_USER" | cut -d: -f8)"
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if [ -n "$expire_days" ]; then
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today_days=$(( $(date -u +%s) / 86400 ))
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[ "$expire_days" -gt "$today_days" ] 2>/dev/null \
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|| fail "admin account ${ADMIN_USER} is expired/disabled (shadow expire=${expire_days})"
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fi
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# 3. Valid, real login shell — not nologin/false (which PAM/login refuse).
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admin_shell="$(getent passwd "$ADMIN_USER" | cut -d: -f7)"
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case "$admin_shell" in
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*/nologin|*/false|"") fail "admin ${ADMIN_USER} has no usable login shell (${admin_shell:-none})" ;;
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esac
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[ -x "$admin_shell" ] || fail "admin ${ADMIN_USER}'s shell ${admin_shell} is not executable"
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# 4. authorized_keys non-empty, sane ownership + perms. sshd silently ignores
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# a keys file that is group/world-writable or not owned by the user, so a
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# present-but-rejected file is as good as no key.
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akeys="$ADMIN_HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys"
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[ -s "$akeys" ] || fail "admin ${ADMIN_USER} has an empty/missing authorized_keys (${akeys})"
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owner="$(stat -c '%U' "$akeys" 2>/dev/null)"
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[ "$owner" = "$ADMIN_USER" ] || fail "authorized_keys is owned by ${owner:-?}, not ${ADMIN_USER}"
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perms="$(stat -c '%a' "$akeys" 2>/dev/null)"
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case "$perms" in
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600|640|644|400|440) ;; # not group/world writable
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*) fail "authorized_keys perms ${perms} are too open (sshd would ignore it); want 0600" ;;
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esac
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# 5. sudo actually works for the admin, non-interactively, as the box will use
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# it. runuser (not su) mirrors the runner-install precedent.
|
|
runuser -u "$ADMIN_USER" -- sudo -n true >/dev/null 2>&1 \
|
|
|| fail "sudo -n true fails for ${ADMIN_USER} (no working passwordless sudo)"
|
|
|
|
# 6. sshd's EFFECTIVE resolution for THIS user must permit a key login. An
|
|
# AllowUsers/AllowGroups/DenyUsers/DenyGroups or Match block elsewhere can
|
|
# silently exclude the admin even though the account is perfect. We assert
|
|
# against `sshd -T -C user=<admin>` — the daemon's own resolution — not the
|
|
# file we wrote, same discipline as the base hardening above. (A Match on
|
|
# address cannot be resolved without a real connection; that residual gap
|
|
# is what the second-terminal rehearsal covers.)
|
|
actx="$(sshd -T -C user="$ADMIN_USER" 2>/dev/null)" \
|
|
|| fail "sshd -T -C user=${ADMIN_USER} failed to resolve"
|
|
echo "$actx" | grep -qx 'pubkeyauthentication yes' \
|
|
|| fail "sshd does not offer publickey auth to ${ADMIN_USER}"
|
|
admin_groups=" $(id -nG "$ADMIN_USER" 2>/dev/null) "
|
|
au="$(echo "$actx" | sed -n 's/^allowusers //p')"
|
|
if [ -n "$au" ]; then
|
|
printf '%s' " $au " | grep -qF " $ADMIN_USER " \
|
|
|| fail "sshd AllowUsers excludes ${ADMIN_USER}"
|
|
fi
|
|
du="$(echo "$actx" | sed -n 's/^denyusers //p')"
|
|
if [ -n "$du" ] && printf '%s' " $du " | grep -qF " $ADMIN_USER "; then
|
|
fail "sshd DenyUsers lists ${ADMIN_USER}"
|
|
fi
|
|
ag="$(echo "$actx" | sed -n 's/^allowgroups //p')"
|
|
if [ -n "$ag" ]; then
|
|
permitted=0
|
|
for g in $ag; do
|
|
case "$admin_groups" in *" $g "*) permitted=1; break ;; esac
|
|
done
|
|
[ "$permitted" -eq 1 ] || fail "sshd AllowGroups admits none of ${ADMIN_USER}'s groups"
|
|
fi
|
|
dg="$(echo "$actx" | sed -n 's/^denygroups //p')"
|
|
if [ -n "$dg" ]; then
|
|
for g in $dg; do
|
|
case "$admin_groups" in *" $g "*) fail "sshd DenyGroups lists ${ADMIN_USER}'s group ${g}" ;; esac
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
log "admin ${ADMIN_USER} verified reachable (account, shell, keys, sudo, sshd resolution)"
|
|
|
|
# Only NOW do we touch root's door — with the exact validate-before-restart +
|
|
# sshd -t + rollback + sshd -T effective-assert dance the base drop-in uses.
|
|
# The file sorts BEFORE 00-rig.conf, on purpose: sshd_config is FIRST-wins, so
|
|
# `PermitRootLogin no` in a 10-* file would be read AFTER 00-rig.conf's
|
|
# `prohibit-password` and silently discarded — the same first-wins trap that
|
|
# cost this repo a month of boxes serving passwordauthentication=yes. 00-rig-
|
|
# root.conf sorts first ('-' < '.'), so it wins over both 00-rig.conf and
|
|
# cloud-init. (Reopening root is a deliberate manual act: rm this file and
|
|
# restart ssh — rig does not silently reopen it on a re-run without --lock-root.)
|
|
ROOT_DROPIN=/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-rig-root.conf
|
|
RTMP="$(mktemp)"
|
|
printf 'PermitRootLogin no\n' > "$RTMP"
|
|
if ! cmp -s "$RTMP" "$ROOT_DROPIN" 2>/dev/null; then
|
|
RBACK=""
|
|
[ -e "$ROOT_DROPIN" ] && { RBACK="$(mktemp)"; cp -a "$ROOT_DROPIN" "$RBACK"; }
|
|
install -m 0644 "$RTMP" "$ROOT_DROPIN"
|
|
if ! sshd -t 2>/dev/null; then
|
|
if [ -n "$RBACK" ]; then cp -a "$RBACK" "$ROOT_DROPIN"; else rm -f "$ROOT_DROPIN"; fi
|
|
rm -f "$RTMP" "$RBACK"
|
|
die "sshd rejects the merged config with PermitRootLogin no; rolled back, daemon untouched, root's door still OPEN. Run 'sshd -t'."
|
|
fi
|
|
rm -f "$RBACK"
|
|
systemctl restart ssh
|
|
log "root SSH door closed (PermitRootLogin no drop-in installed)"
|
|
else
|
|
log "root SSH door already closed (00-rig-root.conf in place)"
|
|
fi
|
|
rm -f "$RTMP"
|
|
|
|
# Assert the EFFECTIVE policy, never the file — assert-the-file is what let the
|
|
# first-wins bug ship green once already.
|
|
reff="$(sshd -T 2>/dev/null)" || die "sshd -T failed after locking root; investigate before trusting this box" 1
|
|
echo "$reff" | grep -qx 'permitrootlogin no' \
|
|
|| die "root door did NOT take effect (sshd -T still permits root login) — a drop-in is beating ${ROOT_DROPIN}; check ls /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/" 1
|
|
log "root door verified closed (sshd -T: permitrootlogin no) — from now on re-run rig THROUGH the ${ADMIN_USER} account"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# --- system hostname ----------------------------------------------------------
|
|
# Set the SYSTEM hostname too, not just the tailnet one. Until 2026-07-12 rig
|
|
# passed --hostname only to `tailscale up`, so a box reached as `coolify-box`
|
|
# still greeted the operator with Hetzner's default (`root@internal-tooling`).
|
|
# The shell prompt is the operator's only "am I on the right box" signal before
|
|
# they run something destructive, and it was lying on every box rig built.
|
|
if [ "$(hostname)" != "$TS_HOSTNAME" ]; then
|
|
log "setting system hostname to ${TS_HOSTNAME}"
|
|
hostnamectl set-hostname "$TS_HOSTNAME"
|
|
# keep 127.0.1.1 in step, or sudo/sshd warn about an unresolvable host
|
|
if grep -qE '^127\.0\.1\.1[[:space:]]' /etc/hosts; then
|
|
sed -i -E "s/^127\.0\.1\.1[[:space:]].*/127.0.1.1\t${TS_HOSTNAME}/" /etc/hosts
|
|
else
|
|
printf '127.0.1.1\t%s\n' "$TS_HOSTNAME" >> /etc/hosts
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
log "system hostname already ${TS_HOSTNAME}"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# --- tailscale ----------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
if ! command -v tailscale >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
|
log "installing tailscale"
|
|
curl -fsSL https://tailscale.com/install.sh | sh
|
|
fi
|
|
if tailscale status >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
|
log "tailnet already joined; skipping tailscale up (no pre-auth key needed)"
|
|
# ...but skipping `tailscale up` also skipped --hostname, so the TAILNET name
|
|
# never converged: a box that joined under the wrong name (e.g. --hostname
|
|
# omitted, so it defaulted to the ROLE) stayed misnamed forever, and re-running
|
|
# rig — the documented repair — could not fix it. rig is convergent by
|
|
# contract; this was the one field that wasn't. `tailscale set` converges it
|
|
# without a re-auth or a pre-auth key.
|
|
#
|
|
# Safe by construction here: Tailscale ACLs cannot bind a rule's dst to a
|
|
# hostname (it must be a tag, an IP, or a `hosts` alias — which is exactly why
|
|
# acl.hujson pins coolify-box to an IP), so a rename cannot silently void a
|
|
# grant. It also will NOT clobber a deliberate rename: a machine renamed in the
|
|
# admin console keeps that name, and the device hostname no longer overrides it.
|
|
current_ts_name="$(tailscale status --peers=false 2>/dev/null | awk 'NR==1 {print $2}')"
|
|
if [ -n "$current_ts_name" ] && [ "$current_ts_name" != "$TS_HOSTNAME" ]; then
|
|
log "tailnet hostname is '${current_ts_name}', want '${TS_HOSTNAME}' — converging"
|
|
tailscale set --hostname="$TS_HOSTNAME" \
|
|
|| warn "tailscale set --hostname failed; rename '${current_ts_name}' -> '${TS_HOSTNAME}' in the admin console"
|
|
else
|
|
log "tailnet hostname already ${TS_HOSTNAME}"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
# env override, else prompt; never touches disk
|
|
if [ -z "${TS_AUTHKEY:-}" ]; then
|
|
read -rsp "tailscale pre-auth key (single-use, tagged, <=1h expiry): " TS_AUTHKEY
|
|
echo
|
|
fi
|
|
[ -n "${TS_AUTHKEY:-}" ] || die "empty pre-auth key"
|
|
log "joining tailnet as ${TS_HOSTNAME} (${TS_TAG})"
|
|
tailscale up --authkey="$TS_AUTHKEY" --hostname="$TS_HOSTNAME" --advertise-tags="$TS_TAG"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
log "done — role ${ROLE}, hostname ${TS_HOSTNAME}"
|
|
if [ "$ROLE" = "control-plane" ]; then
|
|
log "next: rig coolify install --version <pin>"
|
|
elif [ "$ROLE" = "runner" ]; then
|
|
log "next: rig runner install --repo <owner/repo> --version <pin>"
|
|
fi
|