rig/docs/templates/ci-box/install.sh

#!/usr/bin/env bash
# ci-box — the forgejo-runner binary. Run BY THE MECHANISM as root, with
# TENANT_USER/TENANT_HOME/TENANT_GROUP/ROLE exported.
#
# This lands the BINARY ONLY. Registration is deliberately not here: it needs a
# short-lived token from the Forgejo instance, and a tenant install is
# creds-free by contract — box auto-runs it at mint, holding nothing. The
# operator registers afterwards, out loud:
#
#   box shell ci-box
#   sudo rig forgejo-runner install --instance https://forgejo.example.com
#
# Same split as staging-box's tailnet join, for the same reason.
#
# Root-owned under /usr/local/bin rather than the tenant's home: unlike an
# agent CLI, this binary is run by a systemd unit as the tenant user, and a
# tenant-writable binary that root's unit executes is a trivial path to root
# inside the box.
set -euo pipefail

# fetch_and_verify_sha256 <asset-url> <file> <sumfile> <label>
#
# The whole checksum POLICY, in one place: fetch the published .sha256 beside
# an asset and prove the download matches it. Prints the reason on stderr and
# returns 1 on any failure; the caller supplies the refusal in its own voice.
#
# BYTE-IDENTICAL to the copy in commands/forgejo-runner-install.sh, diffed by
# test/cli.sh — the valid_version / templates_archive_urls precedent. The two
# downloaders cannot share a lib: that one sources commands/lib/, and this one
# is a REGISTRY DEFINITION that runs standalone inside a mint from a fetched
# tarball, with rig's tree nowhere in reach. So the pin is the only mechanism
# that keeps one policy from becoming two.
#
# Review !110 is the evidence for why that matters: a fail-open branch lived in
# BOTH copies while a grep for "checksum mismatch" passed against both, because
# the string it looked for sat right beside the branch it could not see. The
# next checksum-policy change must not be able to land in one file only.
#
# AN UNFETCHABLE CHECKSUM REFUSES — it is a gate, not a courtesy. The earlier
# reasoning ("do not let an upstream layout change break installs") reasons
# about the wrong failure: a layout change moves the BINARY url too, so the
# download would already have died. "Binary yes, checksum no" is not what a
# layout change looks like — it is what an interfered fetch looks like, which
# is precisely what a checksum exists to catch. Failing open would hand an
# unverified root install to anyone able to block a single URL. There is
# deliberately no bypass flag: if upstream really does move its assets, that is
# a rig PR editing the URL, not an operator improvising past a security gate.
fetch_and_verify_sha256() {
  local url="$1" file="$2" sumfile="$3" label="$4" want got
  if ! curl -fsSL "${url}.sha256" -o "$sumfile" 2>/dev/null; then
    printf 'no published .sha256 for %s at %s.sha256 — the binary itself downloaded, so this is not an upstream layout change; check what is intercepting the fetch\n' "$label" "$url" >&2
    return 1
  fi
  # The published .sha256 names the asset, not our temp path. Compare the
  # digest itself rather than rewriting the file into sha256sum -c's format:
  # one comparison, no parsing of a file we did not write.
  want="$(tr -d '\r' < "$sumfile" 2>/dev/null | awk '{print $1}' | head -n1)"
  got="$(sha256sum "$file" | awk '{print $1}')"
  if [ -z "$want" ]; then
    printf 'the published checksum for %s is unreadable — a fetch that succeeds but returns nothing usable is not a verified download\n' "$label" >&2
    return 1
  fi
  if [ "$want" != "$got" ]; then
    printf 'checksum mismatch for %s: published %s, downloaded %s\n' "$label" "$want" "$got" >&2
    return 1
  fi
  printf 'checksum verified (%s)\n' "$got"
}

BIN=/usr/local/bin/forgejo-runner

if [ -x "$BIN" ]; then
  exit 0
fi

case "$(uname -m)" in
  x86_64)  ARCH="amd64" ;;
  aarch64) ARCH="arm64" ;;
  *) echo "ci-box install: unsupported arch: $(uname -m)" >&2; exit 1 ;;
esac

# The latest release, resolved by following the releases/latest redirect — no
# API call, no token, no JSON to parse on a dependency-free guest. A pinned
# version belongs to `rig forgejo-runner install --version`, which is where an
# operator who needs a deterministic install already is; a pin baked into the
# registry would go stale in a repo nobody watches.
LATEST_URL="$(curl -fsSLI -o /dev/null -w '%{url_effective}' \
  https://code.forgejo.org/forgejo/runner/releases/latest)" \
  || { echo "ci-box install: could not resolve the latest forgejo-runner release" >&2; exit 1; }
VERSION="${LATEST_URL##*/}"
VERSION="${VERSION#v}"
case "$VERSION" in
  ""|*[!0-9.]*) echo "ci-box install: could not parse a version from ${LATEST_URL}" >&2; exit 1 ;;
esac

ASSET="forgejo-runner-${VERSION}-linux-${ARCH}"
URL="https://code.forgejo.org/forgejo/runner/releases/download/v${VERSION}/${ASSET}"

WORKDIR="$(mktemp -d)"
cleanup() { rm -rf "$WORKDIR"; }
trap cleanup EXIT

echo "ci-box install: downloading forgejo-runner ${VERSION} (${ARCH})"
curl -fsSL "$URL" -o "$WORKDIR/forgejo-runner" \
  || { echo "ci-box install: could not download ${URL}" >&2; exit 1; }

# Forgejo publishes a .sha256 beside each binary. Verifying it costs one
# request and makes the install auditable; this file executes as root inside
# every future mint, so an unverified download is the last thing it should do.
fetch_and_verify_sha256 "$URL" "$WORKDIR/forgejo-runner" "$WORKDIR/forgejo-runner.sha256" "$ASSET" \
  || { echo "ci-box install: refusing to install an unverified ${ASSET} — it lands as root inside every mint. See the checksum failure above." >&2; exit 1; }

install -m 0755 -o root -g root "$WORKDIR/forgejo-runner" "$BIN"
echo "ci-box install: installed ${BIN}"