577 lines
31 KiB
Bash
Executable file
577 lines
31 KiB
Bash
Executable file
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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# rig bootstrap — OS plumbing for a pristine Debian box.
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# Convergent: safe to re-run; a second run changes nothing.
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set -euo pipefail
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HERE="$(cd "$(dirname "$(readlink -f "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")")" && pwd)"
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# shellcheck source=SCRIPTDIR/lib/runner-config.sh
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. "$HERE/lib/runner-config.sh" # json_field / json_string_array read the netmap
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log() { printf 'rig-bootstrap: %s\n' "$*"; }
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warn() { printf 'rig-bootstrap: WARNING: %s\n' "$*" >&2; }
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die() { printf 'rig-bootstrap: ERROR: %s\n' "$1" >&2; exit "${2:-1}"; }
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usage() {
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cat <<'EOF'
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usage: rig bootstrap <control-plane|workload|runner|staging|dev|workstation|custom>
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[--hostname <name>] [--class <human|server>]
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[--host <yes|no>] [--join <authkey|login>]
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--hostname system + tailnet hostname (default: the role name; custom has
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no default and requires it)
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--class who lives here — human|server. Decides root SSH's fate after
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`rig users apply`: human closes it, server keeps it as the
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control plane's automation door.
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--host does this box host VMs (box/Incus) — yes|no
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--join how it enters the tailnet — authkey|login
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Roles are presets over the three traits; any flag overrides its trait.
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custom presets nothing and requires --hostname plus all three traits.
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role class host join
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control-plane server no authkey
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workload server no authkey
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runner server no authkey
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staging server yes authkey
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dev human yes authkey
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workstation human yes login
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The tailnet tag is NOT a rig argument. A pre-auth key is minted WITH its tags,
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so the key is the single source of truth: rig no longer requests a tag it might
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disagree with. After the box joins, rig reads the tag control actually GRANTED
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(tailscale status .Self.Tags) and asserts on THAT — an untagged key is refused
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outright, and only control-plane and workload may carry tag:server (they are
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the only shapes the control plane manages). Mint a correctly-tagged key.
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join=authkey: provide the single-use tailscale pre-auth key via the TS_AUTHKEY
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env var, or enter it at the interactive prompt. Used once, never written to disk.
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join=login: no pre-auth key — `tailscale up` prints a login URL and the human
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at the keyboard is the credential, so the node comes up user-owned and
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UNTAGGED (a tag here is refused and backed out). A set TS_AUTHKEY is a usage
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error: unset it, or pass --join authkey.
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EOF
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}
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# --- args (validated before the root check, so errors are testable) ---------
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ROLE="${1:-}"
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case "$ROLE" in
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control-plane|workload|runner|staging|dev|workstation|custom) shift ;;
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-h|--help) usage; exit 0 ;;
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"") usage >&2; die "role required (control-plane|workload|runner|staging|dev|workstation|custom)" 2 ;;
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*) die "unknown role: $ROLE (want control-plane|workload|runner|staging|dev|workstation|custom)" 2 ;;
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esac
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# Role→traits map — the single place a role's shape is declared (issue #26).
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# Roles are presets, nothing more: every behavior below keys off the traits,
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# so a flag override changes behavior without a new role, and custom exists
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# for the shape nobody foresaw — it declares nothing and must state all three.
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CLASS="" HOST="" JOIN=""
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case "$ROLE" in
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control-plane) CLASS=server HOST=no JOIN=authkey ;;
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workload) CLASS=server HOST=no JOIN=authkey ;;
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runner) CLASS=server HOST=no JOIN=authkey ;;
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staging) CLASS=server HOST=yes JOIN=authkey ;;
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dev) CLASS=human HOST=yes JOIN=authkey ;;
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workstation) CLASS=human HOST=yes JOIN=login ;;
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custom) ;;
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esac
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# custom has no hostname default: a made-up name on a made-up shape helps nobody.
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TS_HOSTNAME="$ROLE"
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[ "$ROLE" = "custom" ] && TS_HOSTNAME=""
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while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do
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case "$1" in
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--hostname)
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[ $# -ge 2 ] || die "--hostname needs a value" 2
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TS_HOSTNAME="$2"; shift 2 ;;
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--class)
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[ $# -ge 2 ] || die "--class needs a value" 2
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case "$2" in
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human|server) CLASS="$2" ;;
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*) die "bad --class: $2 (want human|server)" 2 ;;
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esac
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shift 2 ;;
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--host)
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[ $# -ge 2 ] || die "--host needs a value" 2
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case "$2" in
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yes|no) HOST="$2" ;;
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*) die "bad --host: $2 (want yes|no)" 2 ;;
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esac
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shift 2 ;;
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--join)
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[ $# -ge 2 ] || die "--join needs a value" 2
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case "$2" in
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authkey|login) JOIN="$2" ;;
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*) die "bad --join: $2 (want authkey|login)" 2 ;;
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esac
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shift 2 ;;
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--ts-tag)
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# --ts-tag is GONE, but this is a deliberate death with a message, not an
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# "unknown flag": the flag shipped for a month and scripts still pass it,
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# so it must explain where the tag went rather than look like a typo. The
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# tag is now the key's to state and rig's to verify after join (issue #16 —
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# the tag was said twice and rig never checked the two agreed). Consume a
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# following value if present so `--ts-tag tag:server` dies on the flag and
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# its argument never lands in the *) arm as a mystery unknown flag.
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[ $# -ge 2 ] && shift
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die "--ts-tag is removed: the tailnet tag comes from the pre-auth key now, not rig. Mint a key with the tag you want; rig verifies the granted tag after join." 2 ;;
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*) die "unknown flag: $1" 2 ;;
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esac
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done
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# custom must state its whole shape — collect every gap and report them at once,
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# so the operator fixes the command line in one round trip, not four.
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if [ "$ROLE" = "custom" ]; then
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MISSING=""
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[ -n "$TS_HOSTNAME" ] || MISSING="$MISSING --hostname"
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[ -n "$CLASS" ] || MISSING="$MISSING --class"
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[ -n "$HOST" ] || MISSING="$MISSING --host"
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[ -n "$JOIN" ] || MISSING="$MISSING --join"
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[ -z "$MISSING" ] || die "role custom has no presets; missing:$MISSING" 2
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fi
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# A set TS_AUTHKEY on a login join is a usage error, caught before the root
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# check: the operator plainly expected the key to be spent, and silently
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# ignoring a credential is how the wrong join path ships unnoticed.
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if [ "$JOIN" = "login" ] && [ -n "${TS_AUTHKEY:-}" ]; then
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die "join=login is interactive: unset TS_AUTHKEY or pass --join authkey" 2
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fi
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# --- guards ------------------------------------------------------------------
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[ "$(id -u)" -eq 0 ] || die "must run as root"
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if [ -r /etc/os-release ]; then
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# Sourced in a subshell: os-release defines VERSION, NAME, ID, etc. —
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# sourcing it in the main shell silently clobbers same-named script vars.
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# shellcheck source=/dev/null
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OS_FAMILY="$(. /etc/os-release && printf '%s %s' "${ID:-}" "${ID_LIKE:-}")"
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case "$OS_FAMILY" in
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*debian*) ;;
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*) warn "not a Debian-family system (${OS_FAMILY:-unknown}); proceeding anyway" ;;
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esac
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else
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warn "cannot read /etc/os-release; proceeding anyway"
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fi
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# A host=yes box exists to run VMs, so no /dev/kvm deserves a loud note — but
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# only a note: the shape is rehearsed in containers, where /dev/kvm is
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# legitimately absent, and rig cannot tell a rehearsal from a misconfigured box.
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if [ "$HOST" = "yes" ] && [ ! -e /dev/kvm ]; then
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warn "/dev/kvm is absent — a host=yes box is expected to run VMs. Harmless in a container rehearsal; on real hardware, enable virtualization (VT-x/AMD-V) in firmware."
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fi
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# The pre-auth key is acquired LATER, in the tailscale block — and only if the
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# box has not already joined. rig is convergent by contract, so re-running it to
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# pick up a fix (e.g. the 2026-07-12 sshd first-wins fix) must not demand a
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# credential it will never spend: prompting up front made the repair path cost a
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# throwaway Tailscale key, which is exactly the friction that stops people from
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# re-running it.
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# --- packages ----------------------------------------------------------------
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export DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive
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log "installing base packages"
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apt-get update -qq
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# openssh-server: a rig box is managed over SSH (Coolify SSHes in as root),
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# and the hardening drop-in below targets /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/ — which
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# only exists once the package is installed. Cloud images ship it; pristine
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# container/VM images (the Incus rehearsal) do not.
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apt-get install -y -qq curl ca-certificates unattended-upgrades openssh-server
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# enable periodic unattended upgrades (canonical file; idempotent overwrite)
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cat > /etc/apt/apt.conf.d/20auto-upgrades <<'EOF'
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APT::Periodic::Update-Package-Lists "1";
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APT::Periodic::Unattended-Upgrade "1";
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EOF
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# --- sshd hardening (restart only when the drop-in actually changed) ---------
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# The name must sort BEFORE cloud-init's drop-in. sshd_config is FIRST-wins
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# ("for each keyword, the first obtained value will be used" — sshd_config(5)),
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# and Include expands the glob in lexical order. Cloud images ship
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# /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/50-cloud-init.conf carrying `PasswordAuthentication
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# yes`, so the old 99-rig.conf was read second and silently lost every keyword
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# it set. 00- wins. (Found 2026-07-12: every Hetzner box rig had bootstrapped
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# was still serving `passwordauthentication yes`. The Incus rehearsal never
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# caught it — a pristine Debian container has no cloud-init drop-in.)
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DROPIN=/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-rig.conf
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LEGACY_DROPIN=/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/99-rig.conf
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TMP="$(mktemp)"
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cat > "$TMP" <<'EOF'
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PermitRootLogin prohibit-password
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PasswordAuthentication no
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EOF
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if ! cmp -s "$TMP" "$DROPIN" 2>/dev/null || [ -e "$LEGACY_DROPIN" ]; then
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BACKUP=""
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[ -e "$DROPIN" ] && { BACKUP="$(mktemp)"; cp -a "$DROPIN" "$BACKUP"; }
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install -m 0644 "$TMP" "$DROPIN"
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rm -f "$LEGACY_DROPIN" # sweep the losing file from already-bootstrapped boxes
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# Validate the MERGED config BEFORE bouncing the daemon. On a box whose only
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# door is SSH, `systemctl restart ssh` against a config sshd refuses to parse
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# leaves no listener and no way back in. `sshd -t` parses everything sshd
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# would parse — our drop-in, cloud-init's, and any third-party file — so a
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# broken neighbour is caught here rather than after the door has shut.
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if ! sshd -t 2>/dev/null; then
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if [ -n "$BACKUP" ]; then cp -a "$BACKUP" "$DROPIN"; else rm -f "$DROPIN"; fi
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rm -f "$TMP" "$BACKUP"
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die "sshd rejects the merged config; drop-in rolled back, daemon untouched. Run 'sshd -t' to see which file is bad."
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fi
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rm -f "$BACKUP"
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systemctl restart ssh
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log "sshd hardening drop-in installed"
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else
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log "sshd hardening drop-in already in place"
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fi
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rm -f "$TMP"
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# Assert the EFFECTIVE config, not the file's existence — asserting the file is
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# what let the first-wins bug ship green. `sshd -T` is what the daemon actually
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# resolved, cloud-init and all.
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eff="$(sshd -T 2>/dev/null)" || die "sshd -T failed; refusing to claim a hardened box"
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echo "$eff" | grep -qx 'passwordauthentication no' \
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|| die "sshd still resolves passwordauthentication=yes — a drop-in is beating ${DROPIN}; check ls /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/"
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# The permitrootlogin acceptance is CLASS-gated, because `no` means opposite
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# things on the two classes. class=human: `no` is the post-`rig users
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# close-root` state — strictly harder than the prohibit-password this script
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# installs. Bootstrap must never read a closed door as a broken one, and it
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# cannot reopen one either: by first-wins its own drop-in loses to
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# 00-rig-users.conf. class=server: root SSH is the control plane's automation
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# door (Coolify SSHes in as root), so `no` is not hardening — it is fleet
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# management silently dead, and the likely culprit is a drop-in left over from
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# a former class=human life on a repurposed box. rig can DETECT that but must
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# not FIX it: silently reopening a root door is worse than a loud stop, so —
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# same doctrine as the tag checks — detect, refuse, and name the repair.
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if [ "$CLASS" = "human" ]; then
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echo "$eff" | grep -qxE 'permitrootlogin (no|prohibit-password|without-password)' \
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|| die "sshd still permits root password login — check ls /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/"
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elif echo "$eff" | grep -qx 'permitrootlogin no'; then
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die "sshd resolves permitrootlogin=no, but this is a class=server box: root SSH is the control plane's automation door, and with it shut the fleet cannot manage this box. Likely cause: a leftover /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-rig-users.conf from a former class=human life ('rig users close-root' ran here once). Remove that drop-in and re-run bootstrap."
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else
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echo "$eff" | grep -qxE 'permitrootlogin (prohibit-password|without-password)' \
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|| die "sshd still permits root password login — check ls /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/"
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fi
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log "sshd hardening verified (sshd -T: passwordauthentication no)"
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# --- system hostname ----------------------------------------------------------
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# Set the SYSTEM hostname too, not just the tailnet one. Until 2026-07-12 rig
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# passed --hostname only to `tailscale up`, so a box reached as `coolify-box`
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# still greeted the operator with Hetzner's default (`root@internal-tooling`).
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# The shell prompt is the operator's only "am I on the right box" signal before
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# they run something destructive, and it was lying on every box rig built.
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if [ "$(hostname)" != "$TS_HOSTNAME" ]; then
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log "setting system hostname to ${TS_HOSTNAME}"
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hostnamectl set-hostname "$TS_HOSTNAME"
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# keep 127.0.1.1 in step, or sudo/sshd warn about an unresolvable host
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if grep -qE '^127\.0\.1\.1[[:space:]]' /etc/hosts; then
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sed -i -E "s/^127\.0\.1\.1[[:space:]].*/127.0.1.1\t${TS_HOSTNAME}/" /etc/hosts
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else
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printf '127.0.1.1\t%s\n' "$TS_HOSTNAME" >> /etc/hosts
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fi
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else
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log "system hostname already ${TS_HOSTNAME}"
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fi
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# --- tailscale ----------------------------------------------------------------
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# verify_effective_tag — assert the tag control actually GRANTED this node, never
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# the one rig requested. This is the sshd `sshd -T` lesson wearing a tailnet hat:
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# rig used to advertise a tag and trust it took, exactly as it once trusted that
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# a drop-in FILE existing meant sshd had read it. Both M900s joined carrying
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# tag:server and had to be retagged by hand; nothing in rig noticed because
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# nothing ever read the effective tag back.
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#
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# `.Self.Tags` from `tailscale status --json` is the netmap's ground truth.
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# `tailscale debug prefs` would LIE here — it prints AdvertiseTags, i.e. what was
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# REQUESTED — which is precisely the second source of truth issue #16 deletes.
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# Tags ride in with the netmap, not synchronously out of `up`, so a single read
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# right after join can legitimately come back empty; poll until tags appear OR
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# the backend reaches Running (past which an empty Tags is real, not just early).
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#
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# verify_effective_tag <back-out|keep> — same mode discipline as
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# verify_user_owned: back-out on first join (rig just spent the key, so an
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# untagged result is rig's own mess to undo), keep on the already-joined path
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# (never back out state rig did not create — the join there may be a
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# legitimately login-joined, user-owned workstation that someone re-ran with
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# join=authkey by mistake).
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verify_effective_tag() {
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local mode="$1" deadline=$((SECONDS + 30)) tags="" state="" json
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json="$(mktemp)"
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while :; do
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if tailscale status --json > "$json" 2>/dev/null; then
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tags="$(json_string_array "$json" Tags)"
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state="$(json_field "$json" BackendState)"
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if [ -n "$tags" ] || [ "$state" = "Running" ]; then break; fi
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fi
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if [ "$SECONDS" -ge "$deadline" ]; then break; fi
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sleep 2
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done
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rm -f "$json"
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# UNTAGGED is the real hazard and it is silent: with no tags the node joined
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# owned by the KEY CREATOR's user identity — it inherits that human's ACL
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# grants, expires with the key, and vanishes if the account is deleted.
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# Dropping --advertise-tags removed the accidental net that used to tag such a
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# node anyway, so rig must now catch this out loud. A wrong tag cannot be fixed
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# in place (`tailscale set` has no tag flag; re-tagging needs a fresh key via
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# `up --force-reauth`), so back the node out rather than leave a half-joined,
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# user-owned device squatting a hostname. That back-out is EARNED only on the
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# first-join path, where rig itself just performed the join; on the
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# already-joined path an untagged node may be exactly what someone built on
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# purpose — a login-joined workstation is untagged BY DESIGN — and tearing it
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# off the tailnet because a re-run said join=authkey would destroy state rig
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# did not create. keep mode refuses without touching the join and names both
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# ways out, since rig cannot tell which one the operator meant.
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if [ -z "$tags" ]; then
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if [ "$mode" = "back-out" ]; then
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tailscale logout >/dev/null 2>&1 \
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|| warn "tailscale logout failed — this node is joined UNTAGGED and user-owned; remove it from the tailnet by hand"
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die "joined with NO tag: the pre-auth key was untagged, so this node is owned by the key creator's user identity, not a tag. Backed it out. Fix: mint a TAGGED pre-auth key and re-run."
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fi
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die "this box is joined but UNTAGGED — possibly a login-joined (user-owned) machine re-run with join=authkey. It was joined before this run, so nothing was backed out. If it should be fleet-owned: run 'tailscale logout' and re-run with a TAGGED pre-auth key. If it is a workstation: re-run with --join login."
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fi
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# tag:server policy is DERIVED, not a trait: it means "the control plane
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# manages this box", and only control-plane and workload are shapes the
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# control plane manages. Everything else refuses it on the EFFECTIVE tag —
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# strictly stronger than the old request-time check, which only guarded the
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# tag rig HOPED for. The fleet has been bitten both ways: a runner carrying
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# tag:server extends every server grant to repo-controlled code, and a
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# staging host carrying it extends them to a box the control plane does not
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# even know. Refused, never warned; rig can DETECT this but cannot FIX it,
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# so each refusal names its repair.
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if printf '%s\n' "$tags" | grep -qx 'tag:server'; then
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case "$ROLE" in
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control-plane|workload) ;;
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runner)
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die "role runner joined with tag:server (effective tags: $(printf '%s' "$tags" | tr '\n' ' ')). The key you used grants tag:server to repo-controlled code; that must never happen. Re-run bootstrap with a key minted for a CI tag (e.g. tag:ci)." ;;
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staging)
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die "role staging joined with tag:server (effective tags: $(printf '%s' "$tags" | tr '\n' ' ')). A staging host is never managed by the control plane — its guest VMs are. Re-run bootstrap with a key minted for tag:local." ;;
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*)
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die "role $ROLE joined with tag:server (effective tags: $(printf '%s' "$tags" | tr '\n' ' ')). Only control-plane and workload are managed by the control plane; tag:server on this box extends every server grant to it. Re-run bootstrap with a key minted for a non-server tag (e.g. tag:local)." ;;
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esac
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fi
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log "verified effective tailnet tag(s): $(printf '%s' "$tags" | tr '\n' ' ')"
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}
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# verify_user_owned <back-out|keep> — join=login INVERTS the tag assertion:
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# the whole point of a login join is a user-owned, untagged node, so here a tag
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# is the hazard (control granted this device fleet identity) and untagged is
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# the success case. Same poll as verify_effective_tag — tags ride the netmap —
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# but the empty read is what we WANT once the backend reaches Running.
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# back-out: first join, so a refusal logs the node out (mirror of the
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# untagged-key back-out on the authkey path). keep: the box was already joined
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# before this run — never back out state rig did not create; detect, refuse,
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# and name the by-hand repair instead.
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verify_user_owned() {
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local mode="$1" deadline=$((SECONDS + 30)) tags="" state="" json shown
|
|
json="$(mktemp)"
|
|
while :; do
|
|
if tailscale status --json > "$json" 2>/dev/null; then
|
|
tags="$(json_string_array "$json" Tags)"
|
|
state="$(json_field "$json" BackendState)"
|
|
if [ -n "$tags" ] || [ "$state" = "Running" ]; then break; fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if [ "$SECONDS" -ge "$deadline" ]; then break; fi
|
|
sleep 2
|
|
done
|
|
rm -f "$json"
|
|
|
|
if [ -n "$tags" ]; then
|
|
shown="$(printf '%s' "$tags" | tr '\n' ' ')"
|
|
if [ "$mode" = "back-out" ]; then
|
|
tailscale logout >/dev/null 2>&1 \
|
|
|| warn "tailscale logout failed — this node is joined TAGGED; remove it from the tailnet by hand"
|
|
die "joined TAGGED (${shown}) but join=login expects a user-owned, untagged node — a tag here means control granted this device fleet identity; use a pre-auth key path (--join authkey) for fleet machines. Backed it out."
|
|
fi
|
|
die "this node is TAGGED (${shown}) but join=login expects a user-owned, untagged node — a tag here means control granted this device fleet identity. It was joined before this run, so nothing was backed out: run 'tailscale logout' and re-run bootstrap, or re-run with --join authkey."
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Fail CLOSED on a poll that never reached Running: empty tags is this
|
|
# function's SUCCESS signal, which makes a timeout uniquely dangerous here —
|
|
# a tagged node on a slow tailscaled reads as empty and would be waved
|
|
# through as user-owned (verify_effective_tag has the mirror problem, but
|
|
# there timeout-empty already lands in a refusal). Nothing was verified
|
|
# either way, and the join may be perfectly fine, so neither mode logs out;
|
|
# the only honest move is to stop and have the operator re-run the verify.
|
|
if [ "$state" != "Running" ]; then
|
|
die "tailscale backend never reached Running within 30s — could not verify the join is user-owned and untagged. Nothing was backed out; re-run bootstrap to verify once tailscaled settles."
|
|
fi
|
|
log "user-owned join verified (untagged)"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ! command -v tailscale >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
|
log "installing tailscale"
|
|
curl -fsSL https://tailscale.com/install.sh | sh
|
|
fi
|
|
if tailscale status >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
|
log "tailnet already joined; skipping tailscale up (no pre-auth key needed)"
|
|
# ...but skipping `tailscale up` also skipped --hostname, so the TAILNET name
|
|
# never converged: a box that joined under the wrong name (e.g. --hostname
|
|
# omitted, so it defaulted to the ROLE) stayed misnamed forever, and re-running
|
|
# rig — the documented repair — could not fix it. rig is convergent by
|
|
# contract; this was the one field that wasn't. `tailscale set` converges it
|
|
# without a re-auth or a pre-auth key.
|
|
#
|
|
# Safe by construction here: Tailscale ACLs cannot bind a rule's dst to a
|
|
# hostname (it must be a tag, an IP, or a `hosts` alias — which is exactly why
|
|
# acl.hujson pins coolify-box to an IP), so a rename cannot silently void a
|
|
# grant. It also will NOT clobber a deliberate rename: a machine renamed in the
|
|
# admin console keeps that name, and the device hostname no longer overrides it.
|
|
current_ts_name="$(tailscale status --peers=false 2>/dev/null | awk 'NR==1 {print $2}')"
|
|
if [ -n "$current_ts_name" ] && [ "$current_ts_name" != "$TS_HOSTNAME" ]; then
|
|
log "tailnet hostname is '${current_ts_name}', want '${TS_HOSTNAME}' — converging"
|
|
tailscale set --hostname="$TS_HOSTNAME" \
|
|
|| warn "tailscale set --hostname failed; rename '${current_ts_name}' -> '${TS_HOSTNAME}' in the admin console"
|
|
else
|
|
log "tailnet hostname already ${TS_HOSTNAME}"
|
|
fi
|
|
# Verify the tag on the already-joined path too, not only on first join: this
|
|
# catches a box bootstrapped BEFORE rig looked at tags, or one retagged behind
|
|
# rig's back, on the very next ordinary re-run. Skipping `tailscale up` here is
|
|
# deliberate and stays — re-running an identical tagged-authkey `up` errors —
|
|
# but skipping the CHECK was how the M900s stayed mis-tagged unnoticed.
|
|
# The check the traits demand: authkey wants the granted tag, login wants none
|
|
# — both in `keep` mode: never back out a join this run did not perform.
|
|
if [ "$JOIN" = "login" ]; then
|
|
verify_user_owned keep
|
|
else
|
|
verify_effective_tag keep
|
|
fi
|
|
elif [ "$JOIN" = "login" ]; then
|
|
# No pre-auth key on this path — the human at the keyboard is the credential.
|
|
# `tailscale up` prints a login URL and blocks until the browser login lands.
|
|
log "joining tailnet as ${TS_HOSTNAME} (interactive login; follow the URL tailscale prints)"
|
|
tailscale up --hostname="$TS_HOSTNAME"
|
|
verify_user_owned back-out
|
|
else
|
|
# env override, else prompt; never touches disk
|
|
if [ -z "${TS_AUTHKEY:-}" ]; then
|
|
read -rsp "tailscale pre-auth key (single-use, tagged, <=1h expiry): " TS_AUTHKEY
|
|
echo
|
|
fi
|
|
[ -n "${TS_AUTHKEY:-}" ] || die "empty pre-auth key"
|
|
# No --advertise-tags: the key's own tags apply (documented default for a
|
|
# tagged key), and rig verifies them below instead of stating a second tag it
|
|
# cannot reconcile with the key's. A tagged key needs no flag; an untagged one
|
|
# cannot be rescued by one (verify_effective_tag refuses it and logs out).
|
|
log "joining tailnet as ${TS_HOSTNAME} (tag comes from the pre-auth key)"
|
|
tailscale up --authkey="$TS_AUTHKEY" --hostname="$TS_HOSTNAME"
|
|
verify_effective_tag back-out
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# --- role marker --------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
# /etc/rig/role is the traits' ground truth for later rig commands (`rig users`
|
|
# reads class from it to decide root SSH's fate). Written only AFTER the tag
|
|
# verification, so a marker never describes a box that failed to become what it
|
|
# claims — and cmp-guarded like every file rig converges.
|
|
MARKER=/etc/rig/role
|
|
MARKER_TMP="$(mktemp)"
|
|
printf 'role=%s class=%s host=%s join=%s\n' "$ROLE" "$CLASS" "$HOST" "$JOIN" > "$MARKER_TMP"
|
|
if ! cmp -s "$MARKER_TMP" "$MARKER" 2>/dev/null; then
|
|
mkdir -p /etc/rig
|
|
install -m 0644 "$MARKER_TMP" "$MARKER"
|
|
log "role marker written: role=$ROLE class=$CLASS host=$HOST join=$JOIN"
|
|
else
|
|
log "role marker already current"
|
|
fi
|
|
rm -f "$MARKER_TMP"
|
|
|
|
# --- box install (host-class only) -------------------------------------------
|
|
# A host=yes box exists to run guest boxes, so bootstrap finishes the job rather
|
|
# than printing a to-do: it installs the box CLI globally and lets box's OWN
|
|
# setup-host build the Incus stack. Placed AFTER the role marker write on
|
|
# purpose — a box that failed to become what it claims (tag refused, join backed
|
|
# out) dies above and never reaches here, so box is never installed on top of a
|
|
# half-built host.
|
|
#
|
|
# rig DELEGATES to box; it never touches Incus itself. This is the same design
|
|
# law `rig users apply` enforces — "rig NEVER installs Incus: box's setup-host
|
|
# owns the daemon and its group." rig does not apt-install incus, does not
|
|
# configure the daemon, does not create the incus group. It runs BOX'S global
|
|
# installer as root, and box installs Incus via its setup-host. Two tools
|
|
# converging one daemon is drift by construction; box is the single owner.
|
|
#
|
|
# CONVERGENT: box's installer is a no-op when box is already installed — it says
|
|
# so and changes nothing — so re-running bootstrap is safe and cheap.
|
|
#
|
|
# OPT-OUT: RIG_SKIP_BOX_INSTALL=1 skips the whole step (a container rehearsal
|
|
# with no /dev/kvm, an offline box, or a host whose box you manage by hand). The
|
|
# step ALSO skips gracefully — with a warning pointing at the manual command —
|
|
# when curl is missing or the network is down: bootstrap's core job is OS
|
|
# hardening + the tailnet, and box is the host EXTRA, so a failed box install
|
|
# must never abort a bootstrap that otherwise fully succeeded.
|
|
#
|
|
# PIN POINTS: BOX_REPO / BOX_REF override the source (default heavy-duty/box@main).
|
|
# BOX_YES=1 makes box's installer non-interactive AND keeps setup-host (so the
|
|
# Incus stack is actually built, not just the CLI dropped on PATH).
|
|
#
|
|
# rig#12's hard constraints hold here: the HOST joined the tailnet above; the
|
|
# guest boxes never do (box does not join the tailnet — fine), and there are no
|
|
# credentials on the host (box is creds-free — fine).
|
|
#
|
|
# DEPENDENCY (box#71): the GLOBAL, world-readable install path — box under
|
|
# /opt/box with a /usr/local/bin shim that every non-root user can read — depends
|
|
# on box PR #71. Until that merges, box's root install lands in /root and non-root
|
|
# users cannot reach it, so this step is only fully correct once box#71 is merged.
|
|
if [ "$HOST" = "yes" ]; then
|
|
BOX_REPO="${BOX_REPO:-heavy-duty/box}"
|
|
BOX_REF="${BOX_REF:-main}"
|
|
BOX_INSTALL_URL="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/${BOX_REPO}/${BOX_REF}/install.sh"
|
|
BOX_MANUAL="curl -fsSL ${BOX_INSTALL_URL} | BOX_YES=1 bash"
|
|
if [ "${RIG_SKIP_BOX_INSTALL:-}" = "1" ]; then
|
|
log "RIG_SKIP_BOX_INSTALL=1 — skipping box install; to prepare Incus by hand later: ${BOX_MANUAL}"
|
|
elif ! command -v curl >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
|
warn "curl not found — skipping box install; once curl is present, prepare Incus with: ${BOX_MANUAL}"
|
|
else
|
|
log "installing box (${BOX_REPO}@${BOX_REF}) and running its host setup — box owns Incus, not rig"
|
|
# BOX_YES=1 in the environment: non-interactive AND keeps setup-host, so box
|
|
# builds the Incus stack rather than only dropping the CLI on PATH. Running as
|
|
# root, box installs globally (/opt/box + /usr/local/bin). No-op if box is
|
|
# already installed, so re-running bootstrap converges instead of reinstalling.
|
|
# A curl failure (no network) fails the pipe under pipefail and lands in the
|
|
# else — a warning, never an abort: box is the host extra, the OS+tailnet core
|
|
# is already done.
|
|
if curl -fsSL "$BOX_INSTALL_URL" | BOX_YES=1 bash; then
|
|
# Don't trust the exit code — prove the effective state (issue #12). An
|
|
# installer can exit 0 having done less than it claims: box's setup-host
|
|
# is written for a sudo-capable user, and one of its paths exits 0 after
|
|
# only adding a group, asking for a re-login. That is the sshd first-wins
|
|
# bug's exact shape — asserting what was REQUESTED (here: the installer's
|
|
# claimed success) instead of what actually TOOK.
|
|
# Two proofs, one claim each. `command -v box` proves the CLI landed
|
|
# (box's root install symlinks into /usr/local/bin, already on this
|
|
# shell's PATH — no login shell needed). "Host set up" is a separate
|
|
# claim and gets box's OWN effective-state verdict, `box doctor` —
|
|
# the daemon, the pool, the network stay box's domain (the same
|
|
# delegation law as the install itself: box owns the daemon), rig
|
|
# just refuses to claim what that verdict does not answer. Both
|
|
# failures WARN, never die: box is the host EXTRA, and the OS+tailnet
|
|
# core above is already done and asserted.
|
|
if command -v box >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
|
if box doctor >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
|
log "box installed and host set up — 'box doctor' passed; mint guest boxes with 'box new'"
|
|
else
|
|
warn "box is on PATH but 'box doctor' does not pass — the CLI landed, the host stack is unproven. Run 'box doctor' for the verdict, then 'box setup-host' (or finish by hand: ${BOX_MANUAL})"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
warn "box's installer reported success but no 'box' is on PATH — the install did not take effect. Finish the host by hand: ${BOX_MANUAL}"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
warn "box install did not complete (no network, or box's installer failed); bootstrap's core work is done. Finish the host by hand: ${BOX_MANUAL}"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
log "done — role ${ROLE}, hostname ${TS_HOSTNAME}"
|
|
if [ "$ROLE" = "control-plane" ]; then
|
|
log "next: rig coolify install --version <pin>"
|
|
elif [ "$ROLE" = "runner" ]; then
|
|
log "next: rig runner install --repo <owner/repo> --version <pin>"
|
|
fi
|
|
# Every class gets operators: humans always enter as themselves and elevate via
|
|
# sudo — a shared root login is unattributable. What differs by class is root
|
|
# SSH's fate once named users exist.
|
|
if [ "$CLASS" = "human" ]; then
|
|
log "next: rig users apply --file <users-file>, then 'rig users close-root' once your admin key works"
|
|
else
|
|
log "next: rig users apply --file <users-file> for named operator logins; root SSH stays — it is the control plane's automation door"
|
|
fi
|