fix: address apt install review round

README.md

@@ -13,10 +13,15 @@ A command-line interface for [Forgejo](https://forgejo.org/), built with [Comman
 
 ### With apt (Debian/Ubuntu — recommended)
 
-The package is published to the Debian registry of the forge itself. The
-`heavy-duty` organization is private, so installation requires a Forgejo user
-that belongs to the organization and a personal access token that can read its
-packages. One-time setup:
+The package is published to the public Debian registry of the forge itself.
+One-time setup:
+
+```bash
+curl -fsSL https://forgejo.heavyduty.builders/heavy-duty/stoke/raw/branch/main/scripts/install-apt.sh | bash
+```
+
+If a private registry or a `FORGE_URL=` override requires authentication,
+download the installer and supply a Forgejo login and package-readable token:
 
 ```bash
 export FORGE_USER=your-forgejo-login
@@ -27,15 +32,16 @@ sudo --preserve-env=FORGE_USER,FORGE_TOKEN bash /tmp/stoke-install-apt.sh
 unset FORGE_TOKEN
 ```
 
-The installer keeps the credentials out of the source URL in a root-readable
-apt auth file. To configure that file manually before adding the source:
+The authenticated path keeps credentials out of the source URL in a
+root-readable apt auth file. To configure that file manually before adding the
+source:
 
 ```bash
 sudo install -d -m 0755 /etc/apt/auth.conf.d
+sudo install -m 0600 /dev/null /etc/apt/auth.conf.d/forgejo-heavy-duty.conf
 printf 'machine forgejo.heavyduty.builders\nlogin %s\npassword %s\n' \
   "$FORGE_USER" "$FORGE_TOKEN" \
   | sudo tee /etc/apt/auth.conf.d/forgejo-heavy-duty.conf >/dev/null
-sudo chmod 0600 /etc/apt/auth.conf.d/forgejo-heavy-duty.conf
 ```
 
 Then add the forge's registry as an apt source:
@@ -77,11 +83,13 @@ run:
 
 ```bash
 export STOKE_ALLOW_UNVERIFIED_APT=1
-sudo --preserve-env=FORGE_USER,FORGE_TOKEN,STOKE_ALLOW_UNVERIFIED_APT \
-  bash /tmp/stoke-install-apt.sh
+curl -fsSL https://forgejo.heavyduty.builders/heavy-duty/stoke/raw/branch/main/scripts/install-apt.sh | bash
 unset STOKE_ALLOW_UNVERIFIED_APT
 ```
 
+For a private registry, re-run the downloaded installer with
+`sudo --preserve-env=FORGE_USER,FORGE_TOKEN,STOKE_ALLOW_UNVERIFIED_APT` instead.
+
 This exact opt-in is the only path in the installer that writes a
 `[trusted=yes]` source. The installer prints the security trade-off again when
 it takes that path.

scripts/install-apt.sh

@@ -52,10 +52,10 @@ if [ -n "$FORGE_USER" ] && [ -n "$FORGE_TOKEN" ]; then
   forge_host="${FORGE_URL#*://}"
   forge_host="${forge_host%%/*}"
   $SUDO install -d -m 0755 "$APT_ETC/auth.conf.d"
+  $SUDO install -m 0600 /dev/null "$AUTH"
   printf 'machine %s\nlogin %s\npassword %s\n' \
     "$forge_host" "$FORGE_USER" "$FORGE_TOKEN" \
     | $SUDO tee "$AUTH" >/dev/null
-  $SUDO chmod 0600 "$AUTH"
   CURL_AUTH=(--netrc-file "$AUTH")
 fi
 
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ ensure_nodejs_source() {
 }
 
 echo "Adding APT source for $FORGE_URL/$OWNER ..."
-$SUDO install -d -m 0755 "$APT_ETC/keyrings"
+$SUDO install -d -m 0755 "$APT_ETC/keyrings" "$APT_ETC/sources.list.d"
 $SUDO curl "${CURL_AUTH[@]}" -fsSL "$FORGE_URL/api/packages/$OWNER/debian/repository.key" | $SUDO tee "$KEYRING" >/dev/null
 echo "deb [signed-by=$KEYRING] $FORGE_URL/api/packages/$OWNER/debian $DISTRIBUTION $COMPONENT" \
   | $SUDO tee "$LIST" >/dev/null
@@ -134,19 +134,13 @@ fi
 # is not the key algorithm, because the registry serves an RSA-2048 signing
 # key (`gpg --list-packets` on repository.key reports `algo 1` with a
 # 2048-bit pkey[0]). Try the properly signed source first so this heals
-# automatically once the forge is fixed. Only that signature-error class, plus
+# automatically once the forge is fixed. Only the exact live sqv failure, plus
 # the user's exact opt-in, permits an unverified source; auth, network, and
 # other failures must leave verification enabled and retain apt's diagnostic.
 if update_output="$(update_only_source "$LIST" 2>&1)"; then
   printf '%s\n' "$update_output"
 else
   update_status=$?
-  if ! grep -Eiq \
-    'NO_PUBKEY|EXPKEYSIG|BADSIG|signatures? (could not|couldn.t) be verified|signature (verification )?(failed|failure|error|invalid)|repository .*not signed|is not signed' \
-    <<<"$update_output"; then
-    printf '%s\n' "$update_output" >&2
-    exit "$update_status"
-  fi
   if ! grep -Fqi '/usr/bin/sqv' <<<"$update_output" \
     || ! grep -Fqi 'Malformed MPI' <<<"$update_output"; then
     printf '%s\n' "$update_output" >&2

test/install-apt.test.js

@@ -16,12 +16,13 @@ const SCRIPT = path.join(__dirname, '..', 'scripts', 'install-apt.sh');
 //   sourceUpdateError  stderr and exit 100 for the first signed stoke update
 //   forgeUser/token    private-registry credentials
 //   allowUnverified    explicit HTTPS-only integrity opt-in
+//   precreateSourcesDir whether the throwaway apt root already has sources.list.d
 // The apt-cache stub localizes the "Candidate:" label unless LC_ALL=C is set,
 // so every scenario doubles as a regression test for locale-safe parsing.
 const cleanups = [];
 process.on('exit', () => { for (const dir of cleanups) fs.rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true }); });
 
-function runScenario({ candInitial, candAfterUpdate, candAfterNodesource, preexistingNodesourceList, releaseStatus, sourceUpdateError, forgeUser, forgeToken, allowUnverified }) {
+function runScenario({ candInitial, candAfterUpdate, candAfterNodesource, preexistingNodesourceList, releaseStatus, sourceUpdateError, forgeUser, forgeToken, allowUnverified, precreateSourcesDir = true }) {
   const root = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'stoke-apt-test-'));
   cleanups.push(root);
   const bin = path.join(root, 'bin');
@@ -29,7 +30,7 @@ function runScenario({ candInitial, candAfterUpdate, candAfterNodesource, preexi
   const aptEtc = path.join(root, 'etc', 'apt');
   fs.mkdirSync(bin, { recursive: true });
   fs.mkdirSync(state, { recursive: true });
-  fs.mkdirSync(path.join(aptEtc, 'sources.list.d'), { recursive: true });
+  if (precreateSourcesDir) fs.mkdirSync(path.join(aptEtc, 'sources.list.d'), { recursive: true });
   fs.writeFileSync(path.join(state, 'candidate'), candInitial);
   if (preexistingNodesourceList !== undefined) {
     fs.writeFileSync(path.join(aptEtc, 'sources.list.d', 'nodesource.list'), preexistingNodesourceList);
@@ -43,6 +44,20 @@ function runScenario({ candInitial, candAfterUpdate, candAfterNodesource, preexi
   // Force the non-root path so every mutation goes through the sudo stub.
   stub('id', 'echo 1000');
   stub('sudo', 'SUDO_ACTIVE=1 exec "$@"');
+  stub('tee', [
+    'for destination in "$@"; do',
+    '  case "$destination" in',
+    '    */auth.conf.d/forgejo-*.conf)',
+    '      mode="$(stat -c %a "$destination" 2>/dev/null || true)"',
+    '      if [ "$mode" != 600 ]; then',
+    '        echo "credential destination was not mode 0600 before write" >&2',
+    '        exit 78',
+    '      fi',
+    '      ;;',
+    '  esac',
+    'done',
+    'exec /usr/bin/tee "$@"',
+  ].join('\n'));
   // Registry Release-file probes (URLs under /dists/) answer with the
   // scenario's HTTP status; everything else is a key fetch.
   stub('curl', [
@@ -196,6 +211,16 @@ test('registry Release file present: proceeds with the install', () => {
   assert.match(s.aptGetLog, /install -y stoke/);
 });
 
+test('fresh apt root creates sources.list.d before writing the forge source', () => {
+  const s = runScenario({
+    candInitial: '22.23.1-1nodesource1',
+    precreateSourcesDir: false,
+  });
+  assert.equal(s.res.status, 0, s.res.stderr);
+  assert.match(s.forgeList, /\[signed-by=/);
+  assert.match(s.aptGetLog, /install -y stoke/);
+});
+
 test('signature verification failure refuses by default and removes the forge source', () => {
   const s = runScenario({
     candInitial: '22.23.1-1nodesource1',
@@ -235,6 +260,20 @@ test('opt-in cannot bypass a missing signing key', () => {
   assert.doesNotMatch(s.aptGetLog, /install -y stoke/);
 });
 
+test('opt-in cannot bypass sqv output without the known Malformed MPI failure', () => {
+  const failure = 'W: OpenPGP signature verification failed: Sub-process /usr/bin/sqv returned an error code (1): unexpected packet';
+  const s = runScenario({
+    candInitial: '22.23.1-1nodesource1',
+    sourceUpdateError: failure,
+    allowUnverified: '1',
+  });
+  assert.notEqual(s.res.status, 0);
+  assert.match(s.res.stderr, new RegExp(failure.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, '\\$&')));
+  assert.match(s.forgeList, /\[signed-by=/);
+  assert.doesNotMatch(s.forgeList, /trusted=yes/);
+  assert.doesNotMatch(s.aptGetLog, /install -y stoke/);
+});
+
 test('unrecognized opt-in value is rejected before configuring apt', () => {
   const s = runScenario({
     candInitial: '22.23.1-1nodesource1',