forked from heavy-duty/rig
rig's CI story was GitHub-shaped end to end. This makes it work against a self-hosted Forgejo, in three pieces. The registry fetch becomes forge-aware. templates_resolve hardcoded three github.com archive URLs; RIG_TEMPLATES_HOST now selects the grammar, because the forges genuinely differ — GitHub serves refs/tags, refs/heads and bare paths, Forgejo serves exactly one, and emitting the other two there would mean two guaranteed 404s per fetch and a failure message listing URLs that never could have worked. Measured against forgejo.heavyduty.builders, not inferred. The default stays GitHub, so every existing caller is unchanged. install.sh's snapshot reads the same variable through a byte-identical copy of the builder, diffed by the tests: a snapshot cached from a forge converge would never fetch from is worse than no snapshot, and the pin-in-the-name staleness guard cannot catch a wrong-ORIGIN snapshot, only an old one. ci-box is a tenant, not a machine role. The topology is a fleet machine hosting boxes, one of which runs CI — a '-box' guest by rig's own family rule. That also deletes the docker-in-docker layer the usual setup needs: bootstrap-tenant.sh already installs Docker and adds the tenant user to the group, and the isolation a privileged dind sidecar buys is already paid for by a box that is network-isolated, inbound-less and disposable. rig runner install refuses Docker for good reason — it converges a MACHINE, where the blast radius is the machine. Here it is a guest that gets thrown away. rig forgejo-runner is a new family beside rig runner, which is untouched. Forgejo registers against an INSTANCE and the token carries the scope, so there is no --repo to converge toward and nothing to compare; folding that into one command would make every guard bimodal to share a flag name while the contract underneath differs. assert_runner_instance asks the same trust-boundary question about the axis Forgejo actually has. There is no repoint and no --local, and both absences are explained where an operator arriving from the GitHub sibling will hit them. Forgejo's .runner holds the runner's own long-lived token, unlike GitHub's, so it is installed 0600 and the mode is re-asserted on every converge — a mode that drifted leaks the secret silently, since nothing fails and the runner keeps working. status reports it and never prints the token. Both downloads verify the published .sha256 before installing: this binary lands as root and is executed by a systemd unit. bootstrap --undo learns the guard for the same hazard on the other forge, and it matters more here — Forgejo has no deregistration endpoint, so the ghost it would strand has to be deleted by hand. Known prerequisite, documented rather than assumed: the fetch is unauthenticated by contract, and a Forgejo with REQUIRE_SIGNIN_VIEW=true answers 404 for repos it reports as public. Hosting a registry there needs FORGEJO__service__REQUIRE_SIGNIN_VIEW=false. The refusal names that case, because it is indistinguishable from a wrong ref. forgejo#109 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
274 lines
12 KiB
Markdown
274 lines
12 KiB
Markdown
# Forgejo-native CI: a `ci-box` tenant and a `forgejo-runner` command family
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Status: proposed (#109)
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Date: 2026-07-27
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## The shape of the thing
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A fleet machine hosts boxes. One of those boxes is the CI box. The Forgejo
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runner lives inside it, and CI jobs run in containers on that box's own
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dockerd.
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```
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+-----------------------------+ outbound HTTPS (long-poll)
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| Forgejo (Coolify) | <---------------------------------+
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| forgejo.heavyduty.builders | |
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+-----------------------------+ |
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+------------------------------+---+
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No inbound path to the box. | staging-server (host=yes) |
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The runner polls out. | +---------------------------+ |
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| | ci-box (tenant) | |
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| | forgejo-runner (systemd)| |
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| | dockerd -> job containers| |
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| +---------------------------+ |
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+----------------------------------+
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```
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Three pieces, in two repos.
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## 1. A forge-agnostic registry fetch (`commands/lib/templates.sh`)
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`templates_resolve` builds three candidate URLs, all on `github.com`. A
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registry hosted anywhere else cannot be fetched.
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The fix is a fourth knob beside `_DIR` / `_REF` / `_REPO`:
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```sh
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RIG_TEMPLATES_HOST the forge origin (default https://github.com)
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```
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The candidate list becomes the host's fact rather than a constant, because the
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two forges genuinely differ:
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| | GitHub | Forgejo |
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|---|---|---|
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| Candidates | `archive/refs/tags/<ref>.tar.gz`, `archive/refs/heads/<ref>.tar.gz`, `archive/<ref>.tar.gz` | `archive/<ref>.tar.gz` — one form, which resolves tags, branches and SHAs alike |
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| Archive top-level dir | `<repo>-<ref>` | `<repo>` |
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Both were measured against `forgejo.heavyduty.builders`, not assumed.
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The existing "exactly one top-level directory" assert survives untouched — it
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globs `*/` rather than reconstructing the name, so the differing directory name
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costs nothing. Its **comment** was wrong for Forgejo and is corrected.
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`templates_source_desc` grows the host, so a misconfigured origin shows up in
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the unknown-role refusal instead of reading like a typo. The GitHub default
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means every existing caller behaves exactly as before.
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`install.sh`'s `snapshot_templates` duplicates the same candidate list for its
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install-time cache. It gets the same knob, from the same environment variable,
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so the snapshot and the live fetch cannot disagree about where the registry is.
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### The blocker this exposes
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`templates_resolve` documents a hard contract:
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> the fetch is unauthenticated by contract (box auto-runs bootstrap at mint,
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> holding nothing)
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Measured: on `forgejo.heavyduty.builders`, anonymous requests for
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`heavy-duty/rig` — reported by the API as `private: false` — return **404** for
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the API, the web page, the git remote and the archive endpoint. Only an
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authenticated request succeeds. The instance requires sign-in to view.
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A mint holds no credentials, so **a Forgejo-hosted registry is unreachable at
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mint time** until the instance serves public repos anonymously:
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```
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FORGEJO__service__REQUIRE_SIGNIN_VIEW=false
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```
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This is a Coolify env-var change on the Forgejo service, next to the
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`FORGEJO__actions__ENABLED=true` that Actions already needs. It is recorded
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here and in the README as a prerequisite. Nothing in this change silently
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assumes it: with the gate up, the fetch fails the way any unreachable ref
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fails, listing every URL tried.
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## 2. The `ci-box` tenant definition
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Data, not mechanism — it belongs in the registry repo. It is staged in this PR
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under `docs/templates/ci-box/` so it can be reviewed and linted here, and moves
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to the registry verbatim once that repo exists on Forgejo.
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```
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USER="ci"
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CONTEXT_PATH=".ci/CONTEXT.md"
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CLI_NAME="forgejo-runner"
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CLI_SRC="/usr/local/bin/forgejo-runner"
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PATH_LINE="export PATH="$HOME/.local/bin:$PATH""
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NEEDS_NODE="no"
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```
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`CLI_SRC` is absolute rather than `~/`-relative, which is the one place this
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definition departs from the agent tenants. Their CLI lives in the tenant's
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home; this binary is executed by a systemd unit, and a tenant-writable binary
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that a root-installed unit runs is a trivial path to root inside the box. So it
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lands root-owned under `/usr/local/bin`. `test/cli.sh` pins `CLI_SRC` against
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the path `install.sh` actually writes — a drifted pair converges to a CLI that
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exists and cannot run, which is the scar `grok-box` left.
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`NEEDS_NODE="no"` because the runner is a static Go binary. Jobs get their Node
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from the container image, which is the whole point of the label mapping below —
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installing a second Node on the host would be a toolchain nobody reads.
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`install.sh` fetches the release binary for the architecture and **verifies the
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published `.sha256` before installing it**. Forgejo ships bare binaries with
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`.sha256` and `.asc` beside them rather than a tarball, so a checksum is
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available for free; taking it makes the install auditable in the way
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`coolify install`'s version pin is.
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This satisfies the tenant schema honestly rather than by paperwork:
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`bootstrap-tenant.sh` asserts `<CLI> --version` answers **as the tenant user**,
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and `forgejo-runner --version` does.
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`creds.md` states the box holds no Forgejo credential and that registration is
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a separate, operator-run act — which is true, and is what the rendered context
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file needs to say.
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### Why the box replaces docker-in-docker
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The setup guide this design came from builds a `docker:dind` sidecar with
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`privileged: true` and a plaintext `tcp://…:2375` daemon socket. Inside a
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tenant that is redundant: `bootstrap-tenant.sh` already installs Docker on
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every tenant and adds the tenant user to the `docker` group. The runner talks
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to that daemon over its own socket.
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The isolation argument that justifies dind on a shared CI server is already
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paid for here by the box: it is network-isolated, disposable, and has no
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inbound path. Stacking dind inside it would add a privileged container to buy
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a boundary that already exists.
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Note the trade this makes explicit: `docker` group membership is
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root-equivalent *within the box*. `rig runner install` refuses Docker for
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exactly that reason — but it converges a fleet **machine**, where the blast
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radius is the machine. Here the blast radius is a guest that is thrown away.
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That is the difference that makes the same trade correct in one place and wrong
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in the other.
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## 3. `rig forgejo-runner install|status|remove`
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A new family beside `rig runner`, which is left untouched.
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```sh
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box shell ci-box
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sudo rig forgejo-runner install \
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--instance https://forgejo.heavyduty.builders \
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--name ci-runner-1
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```
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Default labels:
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```
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ubuntu-latest:docker://ghcr.io/catthehacker/ubuntu:act-22.04,docker:docker://node:22-bookworm
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```
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so `runs-on: ubuntu-latest` works in a workflow written for GitHub.
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### Why not `rig runner --forge forgejo`
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GitHub's runner registers against a repository URL, and
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`assert_runner_repo` converges toward `--repo`: re-running against the same
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repo is a no-op, a different repo is refused because silently restarting on the
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old one would leave the requested repo with jobs queued forever.
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Forgejo has no such argument. The runner registers against an **instance**, and
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whether the registration is instance-wide, org, or single-repo is a property of
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the *token*, decided in Forgejo's UI before rig ever sees it. There is no repo
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to converge toward and nothing to compare.
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Folding that into one command would make every guard bimodal to share a flag
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name, while the contract underneath differs. Two families is the smaller lie.
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### `register` is deprecated upstream, and is still the right call
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Measured on v12.13.2: both `forgejo-runner register` and `create-runner-file`
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carry `(deprecated)` in their help. The successor is
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`daemon --url <instance> --uuid <uuid> --token-url <url>`, which requires the
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runner to **already exist on the instance** — the operator creates it via the
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API or UI and carries a UUID back.
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`register` is chosen anyway:
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- It still works, and this was verified rather than assumed. A planted
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`.runner` made `daemon` resolve the instance from the file, connect to a live
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Forgejo, and fail with `Unauthenticated: unregistered runner` — the transport
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and the file format are intact; only the credential was fake.
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- The successor asks the operator for a second, differently-shaped credential
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dance for no gain today.
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- `register` writes a file `status` can read back. Under the successor, "what
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is this box registered to" has no on-disk answer that is not merely rig's own
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copy of what it was told.
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When upstream removes it: the unit line gains `--url`/`--uuid`, and the readers
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in `forgejo-runner-config.sh` move to whatever holds the UUID.
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`assert_runner_instance`'s contract survives either spelling, because it asks
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about the instance — which both record.
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Not verified here, and left to the drill: that `register` writes `.runner` on a
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live instance. That needs a real registration token, which this design cannot
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mint.
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### The convergence guard that does apply
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`assert_runner_instance`: re-running against the instance this box is already
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registered to re-uses the binary and skips registration; a **different**
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instance refuses and names both. Same trust-boundary reasoning as
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`assert_runner_repo`, asked about the axis Forgejo actually has.
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### `.runner` holds a credential here
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GitHub's `.runner` names a repo. Forgejo's holds `address`, `name`, `labels`
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**and the runner's own long-lived token** — the credential it authenticates
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with on every poll.
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So this family does something its GitHub sibling never had to: it installs
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`.runner` as `0600` owned by the runner user, and **re-asserts that mode on
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every converge**. A registration secret readable by every account on the box
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would be a quiet, permanent credential leak, and convergence is the only moment
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rig can notice a mode that drifted.
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`status` therefore reads `address`, `name` and `labels` and never prints the
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token.
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### Removal
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Forgejo's runner has no deregistration handshake — no removal-token endpoint,
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no `config.sh remove`. `remove` stops and disables the unit and wipes the local
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registration, then says plainly that the entry must be deleted in Forgejo's
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admin UI. `rig runner remove`'s `--local` escape hatch is the *only* mode here,
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so it is not offered as a flag that suggests a server-side alternative exists.
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## Guard: `bootstrap --undo`
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`bootstrap-undo.sh` refuses to leave the tailnet while a GitHub runner is
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installed, so undo cannot strand a ghost runner in a repository. The same
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hazard exists for a Forgejo runner on a machine, so the guard learns the
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`forgejo-runner.service` unit and the `.runner` under the runner user's home.
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## Testing
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`test/cli.sh` is dependency-free, non-root, offline. What it can prove:
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- Every new command's arg validation, `--help`, and unknown-flag refusals.
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- `bin/rig` dispatch, including bare `rig forgejo-runner` showing usage.
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- The forge-aware URL builder as a **pure function**, lifted and driven
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directly: GitHub host yields the three-candidate list in tag-first order,
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a Forgejo host yields the single `/archive/<ref>.tar.gz`.
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- `templates_source_desc` names a non-default host.
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- The staged `ci-box` definition passes `rig template-lint` — the same parser
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a mint runs, so the definition cannot ship malformed.
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- Grep-pins that the `.runner` 0600 assert and the `bootstrap --undo`
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forgejo-runner guard are present, so a deleted guard cannot ship green
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(the repo's existing precedent for guards that need a real machine).
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What it cannot prove, and is left to the drill: a real registration against a
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live Forgejo, and a job actually executing in a container.
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## Out of scope
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`install.sh` hardcodes `github.com` in `resolve_latest_tag` and
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`ref_candidate_urls` (rig's own source), and `commands/bootstrap.sh` fetches
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box from `raw.githubusercontent.com`. Hosting rig itself on Forgejo needs those
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too. They are follow-ups, not this change — `snapshot_templates` is included
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here only because it fetches *the registry*, and leaving it behind would let
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the snapshot and the live fetch disagree about where the registry lives.
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