Merge pull request 'fix: preserve apt signature verification' (#38) from build/1-apt-signed-install into main

Reviewed-on: #38
Reviewed-by: kimi-bot-andresmgsl <andres+4@heavyduty.builders>
Reviewed-by: claude-bot-andresmgsl <andres+1@heavyduty.builders>
Reviewed-by: glm-bot-andresmgsl <andres+5@heavyduty.builders>

README.md

@@ -13,13 +13,38 @@ A command-line interface for [Forgejo](https://forgejo.org/), built with [Comman
 
 ### With apt (Debian/Ubuntu — recommended)
 
-The package is published to the Debian registry of the forge itself. One-time setup:
+The package is published to the public Debian registry of the forge itself.
+One-time setup:
 
 ```bash
 curl -fsSL https://forgejo.heavyduty.builders/heavy-duty/stoke/raw/branch/main/scripts/install-apt.sh | bash
 ```
 
-or manually. First add the forge's registry as an apt source:
+If a private registry or a `FORGE_URL=` override requires authentication,
+download the installer and supply a Forgejo login and package-readable token:
+
+```bash
+export FORGE_USER=your-forgejo-login
+read -rsp 'Forgejo token: ' FORGE_TOKEN && echo && export FORGE_TOKEN
+curl -fsSLo /tmp/stoke-install-apt.sh \
+  https://forgejo.heavyduty.builders/heavy-duty/stoke/raw/branch/main/scripts/install-apt.sh
+sudo --preserve-env=FORGE_USER,FORGE_TOKEN bash /tmp/stoke-install-apt.sh
+unset FORGE_TOKEN
+```
+
+The authenticated path keeps credentials out of the source URL in a
+root-readable apt auth file. To configure that file manually before adding the
+source:
+
+```bash
+sudo install -d -m 0755 /etc/apt/auth.conf.d
+sudo install -m 0600 /dev/null /etc/apt/auth.conf.d/forgejo-heavy-duty.conf
+printf 'machine forgejo.heavyduty.builders\nlogin %s\npassword %s\n' \
+  "$FORGE_USER" "$FORGE_TOKEN" \
+  | sudo tee /etc/apt/auth.conf.d/forgejo-heavy-duty.conf >/dev/null
+```
+
+Then add the forge's registry as an apt source:
 
 ```bash
 sudo install -d /etc/apt/keyrings
@@ -46,7 +71,28 @@ sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install stoke
 
 Upgrades then arrive through regular `apt-get upgrade`. `install-apt.sh` performs all of the above, adding the NodeSource repository only when no already-configured apt source offers a new-enough nodejs.
 
-Note: apt releases that verify OpenPGP with `sqv` (Debian 13+, apt >= 2.9) currently reject the signature Forgejo generates for its Debian registry (an upstream signing bug). `install-apt.sh` detects this and falls back to a `[trusted=yes]` source — integrity then relies on HTTPS to the forge. The script prefers the signed source, so setups heal automatically once the forge is fixed.
+Note: apt releases that verify OpenPGP with `sqv` (Debian 13+, apt >= 2.9)
+may reject signatures produced by affected Forgejo versions. By default,
+`install-apt.sh` refuses that signature failure and removes the Forge source;
+authentication, network, and all other update failures are also fatal and never
+disable verification.
+
+If the installer reports the known `sqv` parsing failure and you deliberately
+accept HTTPS-only integrity without OpenPGP verification, opt in on a second
+run:
+
+```bash
+export STOKE_ALLOW_UNVERIFIED_APT=1
+curl -fsSL https://forgejo.heavyduty.builders/heavy-duty/stoke/raw/branch/main/scripts/install-apt.sh | bash
+unset STOKE_ALLOW_UNVERIFIED_APT
+```
+
+For a private registry, re-run the downloaded installer with
+`sudo --preserve-env=FORGE_USER,FORGE_TOKEN,STOKE_ALLOW_UNVERIFIED_APT` instead.
+
+This exact opt-in is the only path in the installer that writes a
+`[trusted=yes]` source. The installer prints the security trade-off again when
+it takes that path.
 
 As a fallback, each release also has the `.deb` attached for direct install: `sudo dpkg -i stoke_<version>_all.deb`.
 

changelog.d/1.md

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+- Private apt installs keep credentials out of source URLs, refuse unverifiable registries by default, and require an explicit HTTPS-only opt-in to disable signature checks. (#1).

scripts/install-apt.sh

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
 # Usage:
 #   ./scripts/install-apt.sh
 #   FORGE_URL=... OWNER=... ./scripts/install-apt.sh   # non-default instance
+#   STOKE_ALLOW_UNVERIFIED_APT=1 ./scripts/install-apt.sh  # explicit HTTPS-only opt-in
 #
 # Run as root or as a user with sudo.
 
@@ -18,12 +19,27 @@ FORGE_URL="${FORGE_URL:-https://forgejo.heavyduty.builders}"
 OWNER="${OWNER:-heavy-duty}"
 DISTRIBUTION="${DISTRIBUTION:-stable}"
 COMPONENT="${COMPONENT:-main}"
+FORGE_USER="${FORGE_USER:-}"
+FORGE_TOKEN="${FORGE_TOKEN:-}"
+ALLOW_UNVERIFIED="${STOKE_ALLOW_UNVERIFIED_APT:-}"
 # Where apt configuration lives; overridable so tests can run against a
 # throwaway directory instead of the real /etc/apt.
 APT_ETC="${STOKE_APT_ETC:-/etc/apt}"
 
 KEYRING="$APT_ETC/keyrings/forgejo-$OWNER.asc"
 LIST="$APT_ETC/sources.list.d/forgejo-$OWNER.list"
+AUTH="$APT_ETC/auth.conf.d/forgejo-$OWNER.conf"
+
+if { [ -n "$FORGE_USER" ] && [ -z "$FORGE_TOKEN" ]; } \
+  || { [ -z "$FORGE_USER" ] && [ -n "$FORGE_TOKEN" ]; }; then
+  echo "error: FORGE_USER and FORGE_TOKEN must be set together" >&2
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+if [ -n "$ALLOW_UNVERIFIED" ] && [ "$ALLOW_UNVERIFIED" != "1" ]; then
+  echo "error: STOKE_ALLOW_UNVERIFIED_APT must be unset or exactly 1" >&2
+  exit 1
+fi
 
 SUDO=""
 if [ "$(id -u)" -ne 0 ]; then
@@ -31,6 +47,18 @@ if [ "$(id -u)" -ne 0 ]; then
   SUDO="sudo"
 fi
 
+CURL_AUTH=()
+if [ -n "$FORGE_USER" ] && [ -n "$FORGE_TOKEN" ]; then
+  forge_host="${FORGE_URL#*://}"
+  forge_host="${forge_host%%/*}"
+  $SUDO install -d -m 0755 "$APT_ETC/auth.conf.d"
+  $SUDO install -m 0600 /dev/null "$AUTH"
+  printf 'machine %s\nlogin %s\npassword %s\n' \
+    "$forge_host" "$FORGE_USER" "$FORGE_TOKEN" \
+    | $SUDO tee "$AUTH" >/dev/null
+  CURL_AUTH=(--netrc-file "$AUTH")
+fi
+
 update_only_source() {
   $SUDO apt-get update \
     -o Dir::Etc::sourcelist="$1" \
@@ -80,8 +108,8 @@ ensure_nodejs_source() {
 }
 
 echo "Adding APT source for $FORGE_URL/$OWNER ..."
-$SUDO install -d -m 0755 "$APT_ETC/keyrings"
+$SUDO install -d -m 0755 "$APT_ETC/keyrings" "$APT_ETC/sources.list.d"
-curl -fsSL "$FORGE_URL/api/packages/$OWNER/debian/repository.key" | $SUDO tee "$KEYRING" >/dev/null
+$SUDO curl "${CURL_AUTH[@]}" -fsSL "$FORGE_URL/api/packages/$OWNER/debian/repository.key" | $SUDO tee "$KEYRING" >/dev/null
 echo "deb [signed-by=$KEYRING] $FORGE_URL/api/packages/$OWNER/debian $DISTRIBUTION $COMPONENT" \
   | $SUDO tee "$LIST" >/dev/null
 # tee inherits our umask; apt's unprivileged _apt user must be able to
@@ -94,7 +122,7 @@ $SUDO chmod 0644 "$KEYRING" "$LIST"
 # is fatal; any other curl outcome (e.g. a network hiccup) is left for
 # apt-get update to report.
 RELEASE_URL="$FORGE_URL/api/packages/$OWNER/debian/dists/$DISTRIBUTION/Release"
-if [ "$(curl -sSL -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' "$RELEASE_URL" || true)" = "404" ]; then
+if [ "$($SUDO curl "${CURL_AUTH[@]}" -sSL -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' "$RELEASE_URL" || true)" = "404" ]; then
   echo "error: no stoke package has been published to the $OWNER Debian registry yet" >&2
   echo "($RELEASE_URL returned 404)." >&2
   echo "Install stoke via npm or manually instead — see the README." >&2
@@ -102,16 +130,37 @@ if [ "$(curl -sSL -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' "$RELEASE_URL" || true)" = "404
 fi
 
 # Newer apt verifies with sqv (Sequoia), which rejects the signature Forgejo
-# currently produces for its Debian registry (malformed Ed25519 MPI encoding
+# currently produces for its Debian registry. The cause is recorded on #1; it
-# in the upstream signing library). Try the properly signed source first so
+# is not the key algorithm, because the registry serves an RSA-2048 signing
-# this heals automatically once the forge is fixed; otherwise fall back to
+# key (`gpg --list-packets` on repository.key reports `algo 1` with a
-# [trusted=yes] — package integrity then relies on HTTPS to our own forge.
+# 2048-bit pkey[0]). Try the properly signed source first so this heals
-if ! update_only_source "$LIST"; then
+# automatically once the forge is fixed. Only the exact live sqv failure, plus
-  echo
+# the user's exact opt-in, permits an unverified source; auth, network, and
-  echo "WARNING: signature verification failed (known Forgejo registry issue" >&2
+# other failures must leave verification enabled and retain apt's diagnostic.
-  echo "with sqv-based apt). Falling back to [trusted=yes]; transport" >&2
+if update_output="$(update_only_source "$LIST" 2>&1)"; then
-  echo "security is provided by HTTPS to $FORGE_URL." >&2
+  printf '%s\n' "$update_output"
-  echo
+else
+  update_status=$?
+  if ! grep -Fqi '/usr/bin/sqv' <<<"$update_output" \
+    || ! grep -Fqi 'Malformed MPI' <<<"$update_output"; then
+    printf '%s\n' "$update_output" >&2
+    exit "$update_status"
+  fi
+  if [ "$ALLOW_UNVERIFIED" != "1" ]; then
+    $SUDO rm -f "$LIST"
+    echo "error: apt could not verify the Forgejo registry signature." >&2
+    echo "On sqv-based apt, the known cause is that sqv-based apt cannot parse" >&2
+    echo "the Forgejo registry signature, although gpgv-based apt accepts it." >&2
+    echo "No apt source was left behind." >&2
+    echo "If you knowingly accept HTTPS-only integrity, re-run with" >&2
+    echo "STOKE_ALLOW_UNVERIFIED_APT=1 to disable OpenPGP verification." >&2
+    exit "$update_status"
+  fi
+  echo >&2
+  echo "WARNING: OpenPGP signature verification is disabled for the Forgejo" >&2
+  echo "registry at $FORGE_URL. You explicitly accepted HTTPS-only integrity" >&2
+  echo "by setting STOKE_ALLOW_UNVERIFIED_APT=1." >&2
+  echo >&2
   echo "deb [trusted=yes] $FORGE_URL/api/packages/$OWNER/debian $DISTRIBUTION $COMPONENT" \
     | $SUDO tee "$LIST" >/dev/null
   $SUDO chmod 0644 "$LIST"

test/install-apt.test.js

@@ -13,12 +13,16 @@ const SCRIPT = path.join(__dirname, '..', 'scripts', 'install-apt.sh');
 //   candAfterUpdate    Candidate after any `apt-get update`
 //   candAfterNodesource Candidate after an update once nodesource.list exists
 //   releaseStatus      HTTP status curl reports for the registry Release file
+//   sourceUpdateError  stderr and exit 100 for the first signed stoke update
+//   forgeUser/token    private-registry credentials
+//   allowUnverified    explicit HTTPS-only integrity opt-in
+//   precreateSourcesDir whether the throwaway apt root already has sources.list.d
 // The apt-cache stub localizes the "Candidate:" label unless LC_ALL=C is set,
 // so every scenario doubles as a regression test for locale-safe parsing.
 const cleanups = [];
 process.on('exit', () => { for (const dir of cleanups) fs.rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true }); });
 
-function runScenario({ candInitial, candAfterUpdate, candAfterNodesource, preexistingNodesourceList, releaseStatus }) {
+function runScenario({ candInitial, candAfterUpdate, candAfterNodesource, preexistingNodesourceList, releaseStatus, sourceUpdateError, forgeUser, forgeToken, allowUnverified, precreateSourcesDir = true }) {
   const root = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'stoke-apt-test-'));
   cleanups.push(root);
   const bin = path.join(root, 'bin');
@@ -26,7 +30,7 @@ function runScenario({ candInitial, candAfterUpdate, candAfterNodesource, preexi
   const aptEtc = path.join(root, 'etc', 'apt');
   fs.mkdirSync(bin, { recursive: true });
   fs.mkdirSync(state, { recursive: true });
-  fs.mkdirSync(path.join(aptEtc, 'sources.list.d'), { recursive: true });
+  if (precreateSourcesDir) fs.mkdirSync(path.join(aptEtc, 'sources.list.d'), { recursive: true });
   fs.writeFileSync(path.join(state, 'candidate'), candInitial);
   if (preexistingNodesourceList !== undefined) {
     fs.writeFileSync(path.join(aptEtc, 'sources.list.d', 'nodesource.list'), preexistingNodesourceList);
@@ -39,10 +43,30 @@ function runScenario({ candInitial, candAfterUpdate, candAfterNodesource, preexi
 
   // Force the non-root path so every mutation goes through the sudo stub.
   stub('id', 'echo 1000');
-  stub('sudo', 'exec "$@"');
+  stub('sudo', 'SUDO_ACTIVE=1 exec "$@"');
+  stub('tee', [
+    'for destination in "$@"; do',
+    '  case "$destination" in',
+    '    */auth.conf.d/forgejo-*.conf)',
+    '      mode="$(stat -c %a "$destination" 2>/dev/null || true)"',
+    '      if [ "$mode" != 600 ]; then',
+    '        echo "credential destination was not mode 0600 before write" >&2',
+    '        exit 78',
+    '      fi',
+    '      ;;',
+    '  esac',
+    'done',
+    'exec /usr/bin/tee "$@"',
+  ].join('\n'));
   // Registry Release-file probes (URLs under /dists/) answer with the
   // scenario's HTTP status; everything else is a key fetch.
   stub('curl', [
+    'uses_netrc=false',
+    'for a in "$@"; do [ "$a" = "--netrc-file" ] && uses_netrc=true; done',
+    'if [ "$uses_netrc" = true ] && [ "${SUDO_ACTIVE:-}" != 1 ]; then',
+    '  echo "curl: root-owned netrc is unreadable without sudo" >&2',
+    '  exit 77',
+    'fi',
     'for a in "$@"; do',
     '  case "$a" in */dists/*) echo "${RELEASE_STATUS:-200}"; exit 0;; esac',
     'done',
@@ -58,8 +82,16 @@ function runScenario({ candInitial, candAfterUpdate, candAfterNodesource, preexi
   ].join('\n'));
   stub('apt-get', [
     'echo "apt-get $*" >> "$STATE_DIR/apt-get.log"',
+    'source_list=""',
+    'for a in "$@"; do',
+    '  case "$a" in Dir::Etc::sourcelist=*) source_list="${a#*=}";; esac',
+    'done',
     'for a in "$@"; do',
     '  if [ "$a" = update ]; then',
+    '    if [ -n "$source_list" ] && grep -q "signed-by=" "$source_list" && [ -n "${SOURCE_UPDATE_ERROR:-}" ]; then',
+    '      printf "%s\\n" "$SOURCE_UPDATE_ERROR" >&2',
+    '      exit 100',
+    '    fi',
     '    if [ -e "$STOKE_APT_ETC/sources.list.d/nodesource.list" ] && [ -n "${CAND_AFTER_NODESOURCE:-}" ]; then',
     '      echo "$CAND_AFTER_NODESOURCE" > "$STATE_DIR/candidate"',
     '    elif [ -n "${CAND_AFTER_UPDATE:-}" ]; then',
@@ -82,6 +114,10 @@ function runScenario({ candInitial, candAfterUpdate, candAfterNodesource, preexi
       CAND_AFTER_UPDATE: candAfterUpdate || '',
       CAND_AFTER_NODESOURCE: candAfterNodesource || '',
       RELEASE_STATUS: releaseStatus || '',
+      SOURCE_UPDATE_ERROR: sourceUpdateError || '',
+      FORGE_USER: forgeUser || '',
+      FORGE_TOKEN: forgeToken || '',
+      STOKE_ALLOW_UNVERIFIED_APT: allowUnverified || '',
       LC_ALL: 'es_ES.UTF-8', // localized environment; the script must force C
     },
   });
@@ -96,6 +132,9 @@ function runScenario({ candInitial, candAfterUpdate, candAfterNodesource, preexi
     nodesourceKey: read(path.join(aptEtc, 'keyrings', 'nodesource.asc')),
     nodesourceKeyMode: mode(path.join(aptEtc, 'keyrings', 'nodesource.asc')),
     forgeKeyMode: mode(path.join(aptEtc, 'keyrings', 'forgejo-heavy-duty.asc')),
+    forgeList: read(path.join(aptEtc, 'sources.list.d', 'forgejo-heavy-duty.list')),
+    forgeAuth: read(path.join(aptEtc, 'auth.conf.d', 'forgejo-heavy-duty.conf')),
+    forgeAuthMode: mode(path.join(aptEtc, 'auth.conf.d', 'forgejo-heavy-duty.conf')),
     aptGetLog: read(path.join(state, 'apt-get.log')) || '',
   };
   // Drop the throwaway tree after we have read everything we need.
@@ -171,3 +210,118 @@ test('registry Release file present: proceeds with the install', () => {
   assert.equal(s.res.status, 0, s.res.stderr);
   assert.match(s.aptGetLog, /install -y stoke/);
 });
+
+test('fresh apt root creates sources.list.d before writing the forge source', () => {
+  const s = runScenario({
+    candInitial: '22.23.1-1nodesource1',
+    precreateSourcesDir: false,
+  });
+  assert.equal(s.res.status, 0, s.res.stderr);
+  assert.match(s.forgeList, /\[signed-by=/);
+  assert.match(s.aptGetLog, /install -y stoke/);
+});
+
+test('signature verification failure refuses by default and removes the forge source', () => {
+  const s = runScenario({
+    candInitial: '22.23.1-1nodesource1',
+    sourceUpdateError: 'W: OpenPGP signature verification failed: Sub-process /usr/bin/sqv returned an error code (1), error message is: Verifying signature: Malformed MPI: leading bit is not set',
+  });
+  assert.notEqual(s.res.status, 0);
+  assert.equal(s.forgeList, null);
+  assert.match(s.res.stderr, /sqv-based apt cannot parse\s+the Forgejo registry signature/);
+  assert.match(s.res.stderr, /STOKE_ALLOW_UNVERIFIED_APT=1/);
+  assert.doesNotMatch(s.aptGetLog, /install -y stoke/);
+});
+
+test('exact opt-in permits an HTTPS-only forge source after signature failure', () => {
+  const s = runScenario({
+    candInitial: '22.23.1-1nodesource1',
+    sourceUpdateError: 'W: OpenPGP signature verification failed: Sub-process /usr/bin/sqv returned an error code (1), error message is: Verifying signature: Malformed MPI: leading bit is not set',
+    allowUnverified: '1',
+  });
+  assert.equal(s.res.status, 0, s.res.stderr);
+  assert.match(s.forgeList, /\[trusted=yes\]/);
+  assert.match(s.res.stderr, /OpenPGP signature verification is disabled/);
+  assert.match(s.res.stderr, /HTTPS-only integrity/);
+  assert.match(s.aptGetLog, /install -y stoke/);
+});
+
+test('opt-in cannot bypass a missing signing key', () => {
+  const failure = 'W: GPG error: signatures could not be verified: NO_PUBKEY DEADBEEF\nE: The repository is not signed.';
+  const s = runScenario({
+    candInitial: '22.23.1-1nodesource1',
+    sourceUpdateError: failure,
+    allowUnverified: '1',
+  });
+  assert.notEqual(s.res.status, 0);
+  assert.match(s.res.stderr, new RegExp(failure.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, '\\$&')));
+  assert.match(s.forgeList, /\[signed-by=/);
+  assert.doesNotMatch(s.forgeList, /trusted=yes/);
+  assert.doesNotMatch(s.aptGetLog, /install -y stoke/);
+});
+
+test('opt-in cannot bypass sqv output without the known Malformed MPI failure', () => {
+  const failure = 'W: OpenPGP signature verification failed: Sub-process /usr/bin/sqv returned an error code (1): unexpected packet';
+  const s = runScenario({
+    candInitial: '22.23.1-1nodesource1',
+    sourceUpdateError: failure,
+    allowUnverified: '1',
+  });
+  assert.notEqual(s.res.status, 0);
+  assert.match(s.res.stderr, new RegExp(failure.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, '\\$&')));
+  assert.match(s.forgeList, /\[signed-by=/);
+  assert.doesNotMatch(s.forgeList, /trusted=yes/);
+  assert.doesNotMatch(s.aptGetLog, /install -y stoke/);
+});
+
+test('unrecognized opt-in value is rejected before configuring apt', () => {
+  const s = runScenario({
+    candInitial: '22.23.1-1nodesource1',
+    allowUnverified: 'yes',
+  });
+  assert.notEqual(s.res.status, 0);
+  assert.match(s.res.stderr, /STOKE_ALLOW_UNVERIFIED_APT must be unset or exactly 1/);
+  assert.equal(s.forgeList, null);
+  assert.equal(s.aptGetLog, '');
+});
+
+test('network update failure stays fatal and never disables signature verification', () => {
+  const failure = 'Temporary failure resolving forgejo.heavyduty.builders';
+  const s = runScenario({
+    candInitial: '22.23.1-1nodesource1',
+    sourceUpdateError: failure,
+  });
+  assert.notEqual(s.res.status, 0);
+  assert.match(s.res.stderr, new RegExp(failure));
+  assert.match(s.forgeList, /\[signed-by=/);
+  assert.doesNotMatch(s.forgeList, /trusted=yes/);
+  assert.doesNotMatch(s.aptGetLog, /install -y stoke/);
+});
+
+test('private-registry credentials stay in a root-readable auth file, not the source URL', () => {
+  const s = runScenario({
+    candInitial: '22.23.1-1nodesource1',
+    forgeUser: 'apt-user',
+    forgeToken: 'secret-token',
+  });
+  assert.equal(s.res.status, 0, s.res.stderr);
+  assert.equal(s.forgeAuthMode, 0o600);
+  assert.equal(s.forgeAuth, [
+    'machine forgejo.heavyduty.builders',
+    'login apt-user',
+    'password secret-token',
+    '',
+  ].join('\n'));
+  assert.doesNotMatch(s.forgeList, /apt-user|secret-token/);
+});
+
+test('incomplete private-registry credentials fail before configuring apt', () => {
+  const s = runScenario({
+    candInitial: '22.23.1-1nodesource1',
+    forgeUser: 'apt-user',
+  });
+  assert.notEqual(s.res.status, 0);
+  assert.match(s.res.stderr, /FORGE_USER and FORGE_TOKEN must be set together/);
+  assert.equal(s.forgeList, null);
+  assert.equal(s.aptGetLog, '');
+});